Lubna Z. Qureshi – författare

In the thirty-five years since the violent overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has vehemently denied U.S. involvement. Almost with the same breath, Kissinger suggests that the democratically elected Allende represented Soviet aggression in Latin America, therefore posing a threat to the United States' physical security.Newly released documents reveal the Nixon administration's efforts to undermine Allende, while indicating that Nixon and Kissinger did not believe the socialist regime in Santiago endangered the United States or even had close ties to Moscow. The White House feared that the Chilean experiment would encourage other Latin American countries to challenge U.S. hegemony. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende explores the president's cultural and intellectual prejudices against Latin America and the economic pressures that induced action against Allende.

In the thirty-five years since the violent overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has vehemently denied U.S. involvement. Almost with the same breath, Kissinger suggests that the democratically elected Allende represented Soviet aggression in Latin America, therefore posing a threat to the United States' physical security.Newly released documents reveal the Nixon administration's efforts to undermine Allende, while indicating that Nixon and Kissinger did not believe the socialist regime in Santiago endangered the United States or even had close ties to Moscow. The White House feared that the Chilean experiment would encourage other Latin American countries to challenge U.S. hegemony. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende explores the president's cultural and intellectual prejudices against Latin America and the economic pressures that induced action against Allende.

In 1972, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme’s fierce condemnation of the Christmas Bombings of the North Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations at the highest level between Sweden and the United States. The author argues that Sweden’s official position of neutrality allowed its Prime Minister greater independence of action on the international stage. Palme opposed the American military intervention in Southeast Asia for its violation of Vietnamese self-determination. Superpower aggression against one small country threatened all others, including Palme’s own. At the same time, the diplomatic freeze did not substantially damage Swedish-American relations. In spite of the tension with the Nixon White House, Stockholm and its embassy in Washington maintained excellent relations with Congress, with many ordinary Americans, and even with Nixon’s own State Department.