Luca Moretti – författare

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that things are a particular way gives one prima facie justification for believing that they are that way) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is immune to some of these problems, but not all. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one's evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.

This book contrasts two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE) which is the dominant model in most school systems of the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of school systems of Northern Europe. CBE interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and it is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD. BOE characterises learning holistically, aimed at the progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Moretti and Marabini argue that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, CBE is incoherent and unreliable, and contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, fosters social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need in our complex post-industrial societies. They defend BOE from objections made by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers, and argue that it is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, and can help heal social pathologies. The book builds analytical bridges and explores connections between philosophy of education and important issues currently debated in critical theory, political philosophy and social epistemology.

This book contrasts two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE) which is the dominant model in most school systems of the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of school systems of Northern Europe. CBE interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and it is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD. BOE characterises learning holistically, aimed at the progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Moretti and Marabini argue that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, CBE is incoherent and unreliable, and contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, fosters social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need in our complex post-industrial societies. They defend BOE from objections made by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers, and argue that it is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, and can help heal social pathologies. The book builds analytical bridges and explores connections between philosophy of education and important issues currently debated in critical theory, political philosophy and social epistemology.

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind.