Lucio Biggiero - Böcker

Cooperatives have spread across virtually all continents. Today, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) recognises over 3 million cooperatives with 1 billion cooperative members or about 12% of the human population and serving many more members of the public, collectively owning trillions in assets. This handbook provides a comprehensive introduction to the subject and the current state of affairs with regard to the study of cooperation in the economy generally and of the cooperative and related sectors particularly.It highlights the essential issues and debates; provides a future research agenda, outlining the distinctions and similarities between individual and (inter)organisational cooperation; and explores the connections of cooperative economics and management to fundamental ethical principles. This book examines coopetition and the similarities and differences between competitive economics and cooperative economics, identifying to what extent and how cooperative economics and management are more capable of addressing the problems of global neoliberalism, such as ecological collapse, wealth inequity, value capture, and distribution, including via online platforms and social/relational problems.This book offers a variety of new research and theory‑building from various disciplines, particularly focusing on the fields of economics and management but extending beyond these disciplines to domains such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and political science. It will become the standard reference work for not only a broad and large audience of scholars, researchers, and students but also interested professionals, policymakers, regulators, and cooperators in the field wishing to orient themselves in a global, rapidly developing movement and field of study with reference to issues of producing and allocating resources and focusing on the impact of cooperation on issues like risk, trust, the development of preferences, institutional governance, networks, and inequity.The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.The handbook has received an Honorable Mention for the Joyce Rothschild book prize.

This book contributes to the development of a relational view of economics. In contrast to discrete market transactions as a traditional subject of economic discourse, the book analyses the role of relational transactions in the study of economic phenomena.

This book contributes to the development of a relational view of economics. In contrast to discrete market transactions as a traditional subject of economic discourse, the book analyses the role of relational transactions in the study of economic phenomena.

This book examines the inter-firm networks created by interlock coordination through shared directors (inter-board) and managers (inter-department) at various levels: whole aggregate, core vs. peripheral companies, and distribution by country and sector. Presenting an empirical case study on all the limited liability or stock companies of the aerospace industry in the European Union and its interlock partners worldwide, the authors shed new light on these forms of coordination. Moreover, they reveal the relevance of shared managers’ coordination and hybrid manager-director interlocks.The book applies advanced statistical and social network analysis alike by combining firms’ attributes (e.g. standard economic-financial parameters) and topological indices for firms (e.g. centrality and cluster measures). By conducting the analysis at both the aggregate network level and the cluster or corporate group level, the authors show how extensive and intensive the interlock forms of coordination are, especially when dealing with shared managers. By testing seven hypotheses concerning the research stream on board interlocks and (more broadly) inter-firm networks, the study offers new insights into the role of the financial sector, on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ performance, on the role of geographical, technological and organizational proximity, and on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ size. As such, this book will appeal to scholars of organization studies, business and management studies, industrial and evolutionary economics, and economic sociology, as well as officers and policymakers at anti-trust regulation institutions.

This book examines the inter-firm networks created by interlock coordination through shared directors (inter-board) and managers (inter-department) at various levels: whole aggregate, core vs. peripheral companies, and distribution by country and sector. Presenting an empirical case study on all the limited liability or stock companies of the aerospace industry in the European Union and its interlock partners worldwide, the authors shed new light on these forms of coordination. Moreover, they reveal the relevance of shared managers’ coordination and hybrid manager-director interlocks.The book applies advanced statistical and social network analysis alike by combining firms’ attributes (e.g. standard economic-financial parameters) and topological indices for firms (e.g. centrality and cluster measures). By conducting the analysis at both the aggregate network level and the cluster or corporate group level, the authors show how extensive and intensive the interlock forms of coordination are, especially when dealing with shared managers. By testing seven hypotheses concerning the research stream on board interlocks and (more broadly) inter-firm networks, the study offers new insights into the role of the financial sector, on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ performance, on the role of geographical, technological and organizational proximity, and on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ size. As such, this book will appeal to scholars of organization studies, business and management studies, industrial and evolutionary economics, and economic sociology, as well as officers and policymakers at anti-trust regulation institutions.