M. Krepon – författare

In the Treaty of Versailles and the SALT II Treaty, years of painstaking diplomatic effort were lost when the United States Senate refused to provide its consent to ratification. This book provides a comparative assessment of executive-congressional relations and the arms control treaty ratification process. A team of historians, political scientists and policy analysts looks at seven case studies, from Versailles to the INF Treaty, to explore the myriad ways to win and lose treaty ratification battles. This book constitutes a marriage of scholarship and public policy. Michael Krepon is the editor of "Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security". Dan Caldwell has also written "The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate".

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union accepted Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, to facilitate strategic arms control. Now the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, and the demise of the Soviet Union has prompted a new set of proliferation nightmares. Treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are now outdated, and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. The last wave of creative thinking about strategic arms control crested over four decades ago. This book presents a new strategic concept to deal with the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of asymmetric warfare. The United States has developed cooperative threat reduction programs to safeguard dangerous materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union. These efforts deserve to be expanded and elevated into a central organizing principle to increase national, regional and global security.

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course.