M. Neurath – författare

On the last day of his life, Otto Neurath had given help to a Chinese philosopher who was writing about Schlick. Only an hour before his death he said to me: "Nobody will do such a thing for me." My answer then was: "Never mind, you have Bilston, isn't that better?" There were con­ sultations in new housing schemes, an exhibition, and hopes for a fruitful relationship of longer duration. I did not dream at that time that I would one day work on a book like this. The idea came from Horace M. Kallen, of the New School for Social Research, New York, years later; to encourage me he sent me his selection from William James' writings. Later I met Robert S. Cohen. Carnap had sent him to me with the message: "If you want to find out what my political views were in the twenties and thirties, read Otto Neurath's books and articles of that time; his views were also mine." In this way Robert Cohen became ac­ quainted with Otto Neurath. Even more: he became interested; and when I asked him, would he help me as an editor of an Otto N eurath volume, he agreed at once. In previous years I had already asked a number of Otto Neurath's friends to write down for me what they especially remembered about him.

On the last day of his life, Otto Neurath had given help to a Chinese philosopher who was writing about Schlick. Only an hour before his death he said to me: "Nobody will do such a thing for me." My answer then was: "Never mind, you have Bilston, isn't that better?" There were con­ sultations in new housing schemes, an exhibition, and hopes for a fruitful relationship of longer duration. I did not dream at that time that I would one day work on a book like this. The idea came from Horace M. Kallen, of the New School for Social Research, New York, years later; to encourage me he sent me his selection from William James' writings. Later I met Robert S. Cohen. Carnap had sent him to me with the message: "If you want to find out what my political views were in the twenties and thirties, read Otto Neurath's books and articles of that time; his views were also mine." In this way Robert Cohen became ac­ quainted with Otto Neurath. Even more: he became interested; and when I asked him, would he help me as an editor of an Otto N eurath volume, he agreed at once. In previous years I had already asked a number of Otto Neurath's friends to write down for me what they especially remembered about him.

The philosophical writings of Otto Neurath, and their central themes, have been described many times, by Carnap in his authobiographical essay, by Ayer and Morris and Kraft decades ago, by Haller and Hegselmann and Nemeth and others in recent years. How extraordinary Neurath's insights were, even when they perhaps were more to be seen as conjectures, aperfus, philosophical hypotheses, tools to be taken up and used in the practical workshop of life; and how prescient he was. A few examples may be helpful: (1) Neurath's 1912 lecture on the conceptual critique of the idea of a pleasure maximum [ON 50] substantially anticipates the development of aspects of analytical ethics in mid-century. (2) Neurath's 1915 paper on alternative hypotheses, and systems of hypotheses, within the science of physical optics [ON 81] gives a lucid account of the historically-developed clashing theories of light, their un­ realized further possibilities, and the implied contingencies of theory survival in science, all within his framework that antedates not only the quite similar work of Kuhn so many years later but also of the Vienna Circle too. (3) Neurath's subsequent paper of 1916 investigates the inadequacies of various attempts to classify systems of hypotheses [ON 82, and this volume], and sets forth a pioneering conception of the metatheoretical task of scientific philosophy.

The philosophical writings of Otto Neurath, and their central themes, have been described many times, by Carnap in his authobiographical essay, by Ayer and Morris and Kraft decades ago, by Haller and Hegselmann and Nemeth and others in recent years. How extraordinary Neurath''s insights were, even when they perhaps were more to be seen as conjectures, aperfus, philosophical hypotheses, tools to be taken up and used in the practical workshop of life; and how prescient he was. A few examples may be helpful: (1) Neurath''s 1912 lecture on the conceptual critique of the idea of a pleasure maximum [ON 50] substantially anticipates the development of aspects of analytical ethics in mid-century. (2) Neurath''s 1915 paper on alternative hypotheses, and systems of hypotheses, within the science of physical optics [ON 81] gives a lucid account of the historically-developed clashing theories of light, their un­ realized further possibilities, and the implied contingencies of theory survival in science, all within his framework that antedates not only the quite similar work of Kuhn so many years later but also of the Vienna Circle too. (3) Neurath''s subsequent paper of 1916 investigates the inadequacies of various attempts to classify systems of hypotheses [ON 82, and this volume], and sets forth a pioneering conception of the metatheoretical task of scientific philosophy.

The philosophical writings of Otto Neurath, and their central themes, have been described many times, by Carnap in his authobiographical essay, by Ayer and Morris and Kraft decades ago, by Haller and Hegselmann and Nemeth and others in recent years. How extraordinary Neurath's insights were, even when they perhaps were more to be seen as conjectures, aperfus, philosophical hypotheses, tools to be taken up and used in the practical workshop of life; and how prescient he was. A few examples may be helpful: (1) Neurath's 1912 lecture on the conceptual critique of the idea of a pleasure maximum [ON 50] substantially anticipates the development of aspects of analytical ethics in mid-century. (2) Neurath's 1915 paper on alternative hypotheses, and systems of hypotheses, within the science of physical optics [ON 81] gives a lucid account of the historically-developed clashing theories of light, their un­ realized further possibilities, and the implied contingencies of theory survival in science, all within his framework that antedates not only the quite similar work of Kuhn so many years later but also of the Vienna Circle too. (3) Neurath's subsequent paper of 1916 investigates the inadequacies of various attempts to classify systems of hypotheses [ON 82, and this volume], and sets forth a pioneering conception of the metatheoretical task of scientific philosophy.