Marcelo Neves – författare

This title offers a unique approach to constitutionalism, focusing on the paradoxical relationship between principles and rules from the perspective of systems theory. It presents a critical counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin''s principle-based theory, and in particular to Robert Alexy''s idea of optimizing balancing. Instead of ceding to the compulsion of an optimizing balancing, it suggests the possibility of a comparative or at least ''satisficing'' balancing, consideringthe precariousness of legal rationality. The book also reverses Dworkin''s metaphor, associating rules with Hercules and principles with the Hydra. It takes constitutional principles seriously, criticizing the abuse of principles by the legal and constitutional doctrine and practice, and pointing outtheir relationship of complementarity and tension with rules. Finally, it offers an alternative model to the recent legal and constitutional theory on the basis of certain assumptions of the systems theory. It deals especially with the paradox of the circular and reflexive relationship between constitutional principles and rules: the former refers primarily to the openness and adequacy of legal system to society and thus to substantive argumentation; the second refers primarily to the closureand consistency of legal system and thus to formal argumentation.

This title offers a unique approach to constitutionalism, focusing on the paradoxical relationship between principles and rules from the perspective of systems theory. It presents a critical counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin''s principle-based theory, and in particular to Robert Alexy''s idea of optimizing balancing. Instead of ceding to the compulsion of an optimizing balancing, it suggests the possibility of a comparative or at least ''satisficing'' balancing, consideringthe precariousness of legal rationality. The book also reverses Dworkin''s metaphor, associating rules with Hercules and principles with the Hydra. It takes constitutional principles seriously, criticizing the abuse of principles by the legal and constitutional doctrine and practice, and pointing outtheir relationship of complementarity and tension with rules. Finally, it offers an alternative model to the recent legal and constitutional theory on the basis of certain assumptions of the systems theory. It deals especially with the paradox of the circular and reflexive relationship between constitutional principles and rules: the former refers primarily to the openness and adequacy of legal system to society and thus to substantive argumentation; the second refers primarily to the closureand consistency of legal system and thus to formal argumentation.

The subject of this book is the social and political meaning of constitutional texts to the detriment of their legal concretization. Focusing on the discrepancy between the hypertrophically symbolic function of constitutions and their insufficient legal concretization, it offers a critical counterpoint to constitutional theory that treats constitutional texts as a panacea to solving political, legal, and social problems. In contrast to the premises of Niklas Luhmann''s systems theory regarding law and constitution in world''s society, symbolic constitutionalization is approached here in both a comprehensive and far-reaching perspective. Chapter 1 sets out the debate about symbolic legislation. Chapter 2 explains the notion of symbolic constitutionalization as a problem embracing the whole legal system. Chapter 3 approaches the issue in terms of allopoiesis of law, characterizing it primarily as a problem in peripheral modernity and referring to the Brazilian experience. The final chapter discusses the tendency to a symbolic constitutionalization of world society in the scope of a paradoxical peripheralization of the centre.

The subject of this book is the social and political meaning of constitutional texts to the detriment of their legal concretization. Focusing on the discrepancy between the hypertrophically symbolic function of constitutions and their insufficient legal concretization, it offers a critical counterpoint to constitutional theory that treats constitutional texts as a panacea to solving political, legal, and social problems. In contrast to the premises of Niklas Luhmann''s systems theory regarding law and constitution in world''s society, symbolic constitutionalization is approached here in both a comprehensive and far-reaching perspective. Chapter 1 sets out the debate about symbolic legislation. Chapter 2 explains the notion of symbolic constitutionalization as a problem embracing the whole legal system. Chapter 3 approaches the issue in terms of allopoiesis of law, characterizing it primarily as a problem in peripheral modernity and referring to the Brazilian experience. The final chapter discusses the tendency to a symbolic constitutionalization of world society in the scope of a paradoxical peripheralization of the centre.

The subject of this book is the social and political meaning of constitutional texts to the detriment of their legal concretization. Focusing on the discrepancy between the hypertrophically symbolic function of constitutions and their insufficient legal concretization, it offers a critical counterpoint to constitutional theory that treats constitutional texts as a panacea to solving political, legal, and social problems. In contrast to the premises of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory regarding law and constitution in world's society, symbolic constitutionalization is approached here in both a comprehensive and far-reaching perspective. Chapter 1 sets out the debate about symbolic legislation. Chapter 2 explains the notion of symbolic constitutionalization as a problem embracing the whole legal system. Chapter 3 approaches the issue in terms of allopoiesis of law, characterizing it primarily as a problem in peripheral modernity and referring to the Brazilian experience. The final chapter discusses the tendency to a symbolic constitutionalization of world society in the scope of a paradoxical peripheralization of the centre.

This title offers a unique approach to constitutionalism, focusing on the paradoxical relationship between principles and rules from the perspective of systems theory. It presents a critical counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin's principle-based theory, and in particular to Robert Alexy's idea of optimizing balancing. Instead of ceding to the compulsion of an optimizing balancing, it suggests the possibility of a comparative or at least 'satisficing' balancing, considering the precariousness of legal rationality. The book also reverses Dworkin's metaphor, associating rules with Hercules and principles with the Hydra. It takes constitutional principles seriously, criticizing the abuse of principles by the legal and constitutional doctrine and practice, and pointing out their relationship of complementarity and tension with rules. Finally, it offers an alternative model to the recent legal and constitutional theory on the basis of certain assumptions of the systems theory. It deals especially with the paradox of the circular and reflexive relationship between constitutional principles and rules: the former refers primarily to the openness and adequacy of legal system to society and thus to substantive argumentation; the second refers primarily to the closure and consistency of legal system and thus to formal argumentation.

Transconstitutionalism is a concept used to describe what happens to constitutional law when it is emancipated from the state, in which can be found the origins of constitutional law. Transconstitutionalism does not exist because a multitude of new constitutions have appeared, but because other legal orders are now implicated in resolving basic constitutional problems. A transconstitutional problem entails a constitutional issue whose solution may involve national, international, supranational and transnational courts or arbitral tribunals, as well as native local legal institutions. Transconstitutionalism does not take any single legal order or type of order as a starting-point or ultima ratio. It rejects both nation-statism and internationalism, supranationalism, transnationalism and localism as privileged spaces for solving constitutional problems. The transconstitutional model avoids the dilemma of ''monism versus pluralism''. From the standpoint of transconstitutionalism, a plurality of legal orders entails a complementary and conflicting relationship between identity and alterity: constitutional identity is rearticulated on the basis of alterity. Rather than seeking a ''Herculean Constitution'', transconstitutionalism tackles the many-headed Hydra of constitutionalism, always looking for the blind spot in one legal system and reflecting it back against the many others found in the world''s legal orders.

Transconstitutionalism is a concept used to describe what happens to constitutional law when it is emancipated from the state, in which can be found the origins of constitutional law. Transconstitutionalism does not exist because a multitude of new constitutions have appeared, but because other legal orders are now implicated in resolving basic constitutional problems. A transconstitutional problem entails a constitutional issue whose solution may involve national, international, supranational and transnational courts or arbitral tribunals, as well as native local legal institutions. Transconstitutionalism does not take any single legal order or type of order as a starting-point or ultima ratio. It rejects both nation-statism and internationalism, supranationalism, transnationalism and localism as privileged spaces for solving constitutional problems. The transconstitutional model avoids the dilemma of ''monism versus pluralism''. From the standpoint of transconstitutionalism, a plurality of legal orders entails a complementary and conflicting relationship between identity and alterity: constitutional identity is rearticulated on the basis of alterity. Rather than seeking a ''Herculean Constitution'', transconstitutionalism tackles the many-headed Hydra of constitutionalism, always looking for the blind spot in one legal system and reflecting it back against the many others found in the world''s legal orders.

Transconstitutionalism is a concept used to describe what happens to constitutional law when it is emancipated from the state, in which can be found the origins of constitutional law. Transconstitutionalism does not exist because a multitude of new constitutions have appeared, but because other legal orders are now implicated in resolving basic constitutional problems. A transconstitutional problem entails a constitutional issue whose solution may involve national, international, supranational and transnational courts or arbitral tribunals, as well as native local legal institutions. Transconstitutionalism does not take any single legal order or type of order as a starting-point or ultima ratio. It rejects both nation-statism and internationalism, supranationalism, transnationalism and localism as privileged spaces for solving constitutional problems. The transconstitutional model avoids the dilemma of 'monism versus pluralism'. From the standpoint of transconstitutionalism, a plurality of legal orders entails a complementary and conflicting relationship between identity and alterity: constitutional identity is rearticulated on the basis of alterity. Rather than seeking a 'Herculean Constitution', transconstitutionalism tackles the many-headed Hydra of constitutionalism, always looking for the blind spot in one legal system and reflecting it back against the many others found in the world's legal orders.