Maria Elisabeth Reicher – författare

Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong) is, roughly, the view that there are not only existent but also nonexistent objects. In this book, Meinong's so-called object theory as well as "neo-Meinongian" reconstructions are presented and discussed, especially with respect to logical issues, both from a historical and a systematic perspective. Among others, the following topics are addressed: basic principles and motivations for Meinongianism; the distinction between "there is" ("x") and "exists" ("E!"); interpretations and kinds of quantification; Meinongianism, the principle of excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction; the nuclear-extranuclear distinction and modes of predication; varieties of neo-Meinongianism and Meinongian logics.

Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong) is, roughly, the view that there are not only existent but also nonexistent objects. In this book, Meinong's so-called object theory as well as "neo-Meinongian" reconstructions are presented and discussed, especially with respect to logical issues, both from a historical and a systematic perspective. Among others, the following topics are addressed: basic principles and motivations for Meinongianism; the distinction between "there is" ("x") and "exists" ("E!"); interpretations and kinds of quantification; Meinongianism, the principle of excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction; the nuclear-extranuclear distinction and modes of predication; varieties of neo-Meinongianism and Meinongian logics.

States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor.

States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor.