Mark Lubell – författare

Networks are omnipresent in our natural and social world, and they are at the heart of politics. Relationships of many types drive political institutions, processes, and decision-making. Therefore, it is imperative for the study of politics to include network approaches. Already, these approaches have advanced our understanding of critical questions, such as: Why do people vote? How can people build problem-solving coalitions? How can governments and organizations foster innovations? How can countries build ties that promote peace? What are the most fruitful strategies for disrupting arms or terrorist networks? This volume is designed as a foundational statement and resource. The contributions offer instruction on network theory and methods at both beginner and advanced levels, as well as an assessment of the state-of-the-discipline on a variety of applied network topics in politics. Through this dynamic collection of essays, The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks elucidates how the field is transforming and what that means for the future of political science.

How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution.

How do polycentric governance systems respond to new collective action problems? This Element tackles this question by studying the governance of adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. Like climate mitigation, climate adaptation has public good characteristics and therefore poses collective action problems of coordination and cooperation. The Element brings together the literature on adaptation planning with the Ecology of Games framework, a theory of polycentricity combining rational choice institutionalism with social network theory, to investigate how policy actors address the collective action problems of climate adaptation: the key barriers to coordination they perceive, the collaborative relationships they form, and their assessment of the quality of the cooperation process in the policy forums they attend. Using both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the Element finds that polycentric governance systems can address coordination problems by fostering the emergence of leaders who reduce transaction and information costs. Polycentric systems, however, struggle to address issues of inequality and redistribution.