Mark Tunick - Böcker

In 2014, Conrad Roy committed suicide following encouragement from his long-distance girlfriend, Michelle Carter, in what has become known as the Texting Suicide case. The case has attracted much attention, largely focusing on the First Amendment free speech issue. This book takes the view that the issue is intertwined with several others, some of which have received less attention but help explain why the case is so captivating and important, issues concerning privacy, accountability, coercion, punishment, and assisted suicide. The focus here is on how all of these issues are interconnected. By breaking the issue down into its complex layers, the work aids reasoned judgment, ensuring we aren’t guided solely by our gut reactions. The book is laid out as a case against punishing Ms. Carter, but it is less important that we agree with that conclusion than that we reach our conclusions not just through our instincts and intuitions but by thinking about these fundamental issues. The work will be of interest to scholars in law, political theory, and philosophy as an example of how theoretical issues apply to particular controversies. It will also appeal to readers interested in freedom of speech and the First Amendment, criminal justice and theories of punishment, suicide laws, and privacy.

In 2014, Conrad Roy committed suicide following encouragement from his long-distance girlfriend, Michelle Carter, in what has become known as the Texting Suicide case. The case has attracted much attention, largely focusing on the First Amendment free speech issue. This book takes the view that the issue is intertwined with several others, some of which have received less attention but help explain why the case is so captivating and important, issues concerning privacy, accountability, coercion, punishment, and assisted suicide. The focus here is on how all of these issues are interconnected. By breaking the issue down into its complex layers, the work aids reasoned judgment, ensuring we aren’t guided solely by our gut reactions. The book is laid out as a case against punishing Ms. Carter, but it is less important that we agree with that conclusion than that we reach our conclusions not just through our instincts and intuitions but by thinking about these fundamental issues. The work will be of interest to scholars in law, political theory, and philosophy as an example of how theoretical issues apply to particular controversies. It will also appeal to readers interested in freedom of speech and the First Amendment, criminal justice and theories of punishment, suicide laws, and privacy.

What actions should be punished? Should plea-bargaining be allowed? How should sentencing be determined? In this original, penetrating study, Mark Tunick explores not only why society punishes wrongdoing, but also how it implements punishment. Contending that the theory and practice of punishment are inherently linked, Tunick draws on a broad range of thinkers, from the radical criticisms of Nietzsche, Foucault, and some Marxist theorists through the sociological theories of Durkheim and Girard to various philosophical traditions and the 'law and economics' movement. He defends punishment against its radical critics and offers a version of retribution, distinct from revenge, that holds that we punish not to deter or reform, but to mete out just deserts, vindicate right, and express society's righteous anger. Demonstrating first how this theory best accounts for how punishment is carried out, he then provides 'immanent criticism' of certain features of our practice that don't accord with the retributive principle.Thought-provoking and deftly argued, "Punishment" will garner attention and spark debate among political theorists, philosophers, legal scholars, sociologists, and criminologists.

A Japanese woman living in California attempts parent-child suicide, an ancient Japanese custom called "oyako-shinju," in order to rid herself of shame upon learning that her husband has a mistress. She survives, but her two children are drowned in the attempt. Since her attempt was made in accordance with the standards of Japanese culture, should she be tried by the standards and laws of the United States? Are there universally valid moral principles that dictate what is right? Or are moral judgments culturally relative, ultimately dictated by conventions and practices that vary among societies? In Practices and Principles, Mark Tunick takes up the debate between universalists and relativists, and, in political philosophy, between communitarians and liberals, each of which has roots in an earlier debate between Kant and Hegel. Tunick focuses on three case studies: promises, contract law, and the Fourth Amendment issue of privacy. In his analysis, he rejects both uncritical deference to social practice and draconian adherence to principles when making legal and ethical judgments. He argues that we do not always need to choose between abstract principles and social practices.Sometimes we appeal to both; sometimes we need to appeal to shared social norms; and sometimes, where there is no ethical community, we can appeal only to principles. Ultimately, Tunick rejects simplified arguments that force us to choose between either practices or principles, universalism or relativism, and liberalism or communitarianism.

To scholars of Western intellectual history Hegel is one of the most important of all political thinkers, but politicians and other "down-to-earth" persons see his speculative philosophy as far removed from their immediate concerns. Put off by his difficult terminology, many participants in practical politics may also believe that Hegel's idealism unduly legitimates the status quo. By examining his justification of legal punishment, this book introduces a Hegel quite different from these preconceptions: an acute critic of social practices. Mark Tunick draws on recently published but still untranslated lectures of Hegel's philosophy of right to take us to the core of Hegel's political thought. Hegel opposes radical criticism like that later offered by Marx, but, argues Tunick, he employs "immanent" criticism instead. For instance, Hegel claims that punishment is the criminal's right and makes the criminal free. From this standpoint, he defends specific features of the practice of punishment that accord with this retributive ideal and criticizes other features that contradict it.In a lucid account of what Hegel means by right and freedom, Tunick addresses Hegel specialists and those interested in criminal law, the interpretation of legal institutions and social practices, and justification from an immanent standpoint. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

To scholars of Western intellectual history Hegel is one of the most important of all political thinkers, but politicians and other "down-to-earth" persons see his speculative philosophy as far removed from their immediate concerns. Put off by his difficult terminology, many participants in practical politics may also believe that Hegel's idealism unduly legitimates the status quo. By examining his justification of legal punishment, this book introduces a Hegel quite different from these preconceptions: an acute critic of social practices. Mark Tunick draws on recently published but still untranslated lectures of Hegel's philosophy of right to take us to the core of Hegel's political thought. Hegel opposes radical criticism like that later offered by Marx, but, argues Tunick, he employs "immanent" criticism instead. For instance, Hegel claims that punishment is the criminal's right and makes the criminal free. From this standpoint, he defends specific features of the practice of punishment that accord with this retributive ideal and criticizes other features that contradict it.In a lucid account of what Hegel means by right and freedom, Tunick addresses Hegel specialists and those interested in criminal law, the interpretation of legal institutions and social practices, and justification from an immanent standpoint. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In an age of smartphones, Facebook and YouTube, privacy may seem to be a norm of the past. This book addresses ethical and legal questions that arise when media technologies are used to give individuals unwanted attention. Drawing from a broad range of cases within the US, UK, Australia, Europe, and elsewhere, Mark Tunick asks whether privacy interests can ever be weightier than society’s interest in free speech and access to information.Taking a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, and drawing on the work of political theorist Jeremy Waldron concerning toleration, the book argues that we can still have a legitimate interest in controlling the extent to which information about us is disseminated. The book begins by exploring why privacy and free speech are valuable, before developing a framework for weighing these conflicting values. By taking up key cases in the US and Europe, and the debate about a ‘right to be forgotten’, Tunick discusses the potential costs of limiting free speech, and points to legal remedies and other ways to develop new social attitudes to privacy in an age of instant information sharing.This book will be of great interest to students of privacy law, legal ethics, internet governance and media law in general.