Martin Renze-Westendorf – författare
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5 produkter
5 produkter
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2006221 kr
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Scientific Study from the year 2006 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 1,0, European Business School - International University Schlo Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel, language: English, abstract: Over the last decade, there is an increasing involvement of financial advisers in European M&A-transactions. Since 1995 the involvement of M&A-advisers in transactions with European participation has more than doubled (16.4% in 1995; 34.7% in 2005). In approximately a quarter of all deals (mean percentage of deals from 1995-2005), M&A-advisers were involved. This raises the questions whether companies hiring M&A-advisers are better off and whether M&A-advisers can be seen as value drivers. The aforementioned questions have been rarely examined in empirical research. Furthermore, most of the existing studies focus on the US-American M&A-market. There has been little research on the European M&A-market and no research at all on the European construction industry in particular. Thus, the paper's purpose is to examine the question whether M&A-advisers are value drivers in the European construction industry. In the first part of this paper relevant theoretical concepts (2.1) are presented, existing literature is reviewed (2.2) and the research hypotheses are derived from theory (2.3). In the empirical part of the paper, the selection of the data sample (3.1) and the event study methodology (3.2) are first described. Then, the four hypotheses (adviser involvement, adviser reputation, negotiation effect and number of adviser involved) are tested followed by the multivariate analysis and the combined entity analysis (3.3). The paper is concluded by a summary of the findings including implications for further research (4).
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2006247 kr
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Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject Business economics - Controlling, grade: 1,0, European Business School - International University Schlo Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel, language: English, abstract: Questions in the field of group control are increasingly important in today's economic environment. This development is especially driven by the fact that almost 90% of the German public companies and around 50% of the German limited liabilities companies are organized as groups. These structures imply information asymmetries and higher coordination requirements because commonly the parent company is responsible for strategic decisions while the subsidiary is responsible for the operations. As decentralized structures are gaining importance and the complexity of the company's environment is growing, the group control faces new challenges and increasing importance for the management. In its aim to supply rationality assurance to the management it needs to work effective and efficient using a set of control tools. The basic data can be retrieved internally or externally. Especially, in the case of listed subsidiaries the data provided by capital markets seem to be a very simple solution for the problem of information gathering and processing in a complex environment. Hence the following research questions arise: How can a holding control its listed subsidiaries through data from capital markets?What could be rationality deficits and limitation in the application of data from capital markets? Beginning with basic definitions the paper defines management control to lay the basis of the examination and to determine the point of view. The holding is the entity that group control is located in. Capital market data in group control is the theme of this paper and those two terms need to be defined properly. Group control is defined in respect to rationality assurance, so it must be distinguished between external and internal institutions of rationality assurance. The internal institution includes a description of the functions and tasks of the controller. Control instruments are the tools used by the controller to process capital market data in group control. The main part is assessing the theory of the utilization of capital market data in group control. The first step is to ex-amine the aims of the application of capital market data, which are effectiveness and efficiency. In the second step different forms of application of capital market data in group control are assessed by looking at selected control instruments. They are grouped by their employment in the tasks of the controller, which are information, planning and control, and coordination. [...]
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2006247 kr
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Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, European Business School - International University Schlo Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel, language: English, abstract: If the market for mergers and acquisitions is observed over the last few decades, it is quite impressive by what amounts the number and dollar volume of takeovers have increased year by year.1 Although the rapid development has ceased over the past years, it is evident that mergers and acquisitions still play an important role in shaping the business landscape. In contrast, however, the benefits which are supposed to be generated by those takeovers are not that obvious. The topic of takeovers which turn out to be negative for shareholders is common and widely discussed in the financial business press. In spite of this fact, it is far less known what actually happens later on to those companies that realize one or more of these 'bad' acquisitions. Observing these underperforming companies over time, it is disclosed that many of these losers become takeover targets themselves afterwards.2 Hence, it seems to be the case that the takeover of the value destructing company is related to or a consequence of the previously made transactions. If that holds true, then it could be the case that the takeover market serves as a means to discipline inefficient managers for their underperformance. [...]1 See Appendix I. 2 This assumption will be discussed more thoroughly in section 3.2. It relates to findings of the field study that was carried out by Mitchell and Lehn. See MITCHELL/LEHN (1990), p. 37.
Häftad, Engelska, 2010
539 kr
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Häftad, Engelska, 2006
1 125 kr
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