Massimo Mugnai – författare

Leibniz published the Dissertation on Combinatorial Art in 1666. This book contains the seeds of Leibniz''s mature thought, as well as many of the mathematical ideas that he would go on to further develop after the invention of the calculus. It is in the Dissertation, for instance, that we find the project for the construction of a logical calculus clearly expressed for the first time. The idea of encoding terms and propositions by means of numbers, later developed byKurt Gödel, also appears in this work. In this text, furthermore, Leibniz conceives the possibility of constituting a universal language or universal characteristic, a project that he would pursue for the rest of his life. Mugnai, van Ruler, and Wilson present the first full English translation ofthe Dissertation, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive commentary.

Leibniz published the Dissertation on Combinatorial Art in 1666. This book contains the seeds of Leibniz''s mature thought, as well as many of the mathematical ideas that he would go on to further develop after the invention of the calculus. It is in the Dissertation, for instance, that we find the project for the construction of a logical calculus clearly expressed for the first time. The idea of encoding terms and propositions by means of numbers, later developed byKurt Gödel, also appears in this work. In this text, furthermore, Leibniz conceives the possibility of constituting a universal language or universal characteristic, a project that he would pursue for the rest of his life. Mugnai, van Ruler, and Wilson present the first full English translation ofthe Dissertation, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive commentary.

New Texts in the History of PhilosophyPublished in association with the British Society for the History of PhilosophyThe aim of this series is to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of the history of philosophy, including the rediscovery of neglected elements and the exploration of new approaches to the subject. Texts are selected on the basis of their philosophical and historical significance and with a view to promoting the understanding of currently under-represented authors, philosophical traditions, and historical periods. They include new editions and translations of important yet less well-known works which are not widely available to an Anglophone readership. The series is sponsored by the British Society for the History of Philosophy (BSHP) and is managed by an editorial team elected by the Society. It reflects the Society''s main mission and its strong commitment to broadening the canon.In General Inquiries on the Analysis of Notions and Truths, Leibniz articulates for the first time his favourite solution to the problem of contingency and displays the main features of his logical calculus. Leibniz composed the work in 1686, the same year in which he began to correspond with Arnauld and wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics. General Inquiries supplements these contemporary entries in Leibniz''s philosophical oeuvre and demonstrates the intimate connection that links Leibniz''s philosophy with the attempt to create a new kind of logic. This edition presents the text and translation of the General Inquiries along with an introduction and commentary. Given the composite structure of the text, where logic and metaphysics strongly intertwine, Mugnai''s introduction falls into two sections, respectively dedicated to logic and metaphysics. The first section (''Logic'') begins with a preliminary account of Leibniz''s project for a universal characteristic and focuses on the relationships between rational grammar and logic, and discusses the general structure and the main ingredients of Leibniz''s logical calculus. The second section (''Metaphysics'') is centred on the problem of contingency, which occupied Leibniz until the end of his life. Mugnai provides an account of the problem, and details Leibniz''s proposed solution, based on the concept of infinite analysis.

New Texts in the History of PhilosophyPublished in association with the British Society for the History of PhilosophyThe aim of this series is to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of the history of philosophy, including the rediscovery of neglected elements and the exploration of new approaches to the subject. Texts are selected on the basis of their philosophical and historical significance and with a view to promoting the understanding of currently under-represented authors, philosophical traditions, and historical periods. They include new editions and translations of important yet less well-known works which are not widely available to an Anglophone readership. The series is sponsored by the British Society for the History of Philosophy (BSHP) and is managed by an editorial team elected by the Society. It reflects the Society''s main mission and its strong commitment to broadening the canon.In General Inquiries on the Analysis of Notions and Truths, Leibniz articulates for the first time his favourite solution to the problem of contingency and displays the main features of his logical calculus. Leibniz composed the work in 1686, the same year in which he began to correspond with Arnauld and wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics. General Inquiries supplements these contemporary entries in Leibniz''s philosophical oeuvre and demonstrates the intimate connection that links Leibniz''s philosophy with the attempt to create a new kind of logic. This edition presents the text and translation of the General Inquiries along with an introduction and commentary. Given the composite structure of the text, where logic and metaphysics strongly intertwine, Mugnai''s introduction falls into two sections, respectively dedicated to logic and metaphysics. The first section (''Logic'') begins with a preliminary account of Leibniz''s project for a universal characteristic and focuses on the relationships between rational grammar and logic, and discusses the general structure and the main ingredients of Leibniz''s logical calculus. The second section (''Metaphysics'') is centred on the problem of contingency, which occupied Leibniz until the end of his life. Mugnai provides an account of the problem, and details Leibniz''s proposed solution, based on the concept of infinite analysis.

New Texts in the History of PhilosophyPublished in association with the British Society for the History of PhilosophyThe aim of this series is to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of the history of philosophy, including the rediscovery of neglected elements and the exploration of new approaches to the subject. Texts are selected on the basis of their philosophical and historical significance and with a view to promoting the understanding of currently under-represented authors, philosophical traditions, and historical periods. They include new editions and translations of important yet less well-known works which are not widely available to an Anglophone readership. The series is sponsored by the British Society for the History of Philosophy (BSHP) and is managed by an editorial team elected by the Society. It reflects the Society's main mission and its strong commitment to broadening the canon.In General Inquiries on the Analysis of Notions and Truths, Leibniz articulates for the first time his favourite solution to the problem of contingency and displays the main features of his logical calculus. Leibniz composed the work in 1686, the same year in which he began to correspond with Arnauld and wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics. General Inquiries supplements these contemporary entries in Leibniz's philosophical oeuvre and demonstrates the intimate connection that links Leibniz's philosophy with the attempt to create a new kind of logic. This edition presents the text and translation of the General Inquiries along with an introduction and commentary. Given the composite structure of the text, where logic and metaphysics strongly intertwine, Mugnai's introduction falls into two sections, respectively dedicated to logic and metaphysics. The first section ('Logic') begins with a preliminary account of Leibniz's project for a universal characteristic and focuses on the relationships between rational grammar and logic, and discusses the general structure and the main ingredients of Leibniz's logical calculus. The second section ('Metaphysics') is centred on the problem of contingency, which occupied Leibniz until the end of his life. Mugnai provides an account of the problem, and details Leibniz's proposed solution, based on the concept of infinite analysis.

Leibniz published the Dissertation on Combinatorial Art in 1666. This book contains the seeds of Leibniz's mature thought, as well as many of the mathematical ideas that he would go on to further develop after the invention of the calculus. It is in the Dissertation, for instance, that we find the project for the construction of a logical calculus clearly expressed for the first time. The idea of encoding terms and propositions by means of numbers, later developed by Kurt Gödel, also appears in this work. In this text, furthermore, Leibniz conceives the possibility of constituting a universal language or universal characteristic, a project that he would pursue for the rest of his life. Mugnai, van Ruler, and Wilson present the first full English translation of the Dissertation, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive commentary.

Does syllogistic logic have the resources to capture mathematical proof? This volume provides the first unified account of the history of attempts to answer this question, the reasoning behind the different positions taken, and their far-reaching implications. Aristotle had claimed that scientific knowledge, which includes mathematics, is provided by syllogisms of a special sort: 'scientific' ('demonstrative') syllogisms. In ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages, the claim that Euclid's theorems could be recast syllogistically was accepted without further scrutiny. Nevertheless, as early as Galen, the importance of relational reasoning for mathematics had already been recognized. Further critical voices emerged in the Renaissance and the question of whether mathematical proofs could be recast syllogistically attracted more sustained attention over the following three centuries. Supported by more detailed analyses of Euclidean theorems, this led to attempts to extend logical theory to include relational reasoning, and to arguments purporting to reduce relational reasoning to a syllogistic form. Philosophical proposals to the effect that mathematical reasoning is heterogenous with respect to logical proofs were famously defended by Kant, and the implications of the debate about the adequacy of syllogistic logic for mathematics are at the very core of Kant's account of synthetic a priori judgments. While it is now widely accepted that syllogistic logic is not sufficient to account for the logic of mathematical proof, the history and the analysis of this debate, running from Aristotle to de Morgan and beyond, is a fascinating and crucial insight into the relationship between philosophy and mathematics.

Does syllogistic logic have the resources to capture mathematical proof? This volume provides the first unified account of the history of attempts to answer this question, the reasoning behind the different positions taken, and their far-reaching implications. Aristotle had claimed that scientific knowledge, which includes mathematics, is provided by syllogisms of a special sort: ''scientific'' (''demonstrative'') syllogisms. In ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages, theclaim that Euclid''s theorems could be recast syllogistically was accepted without further scrutiny. Nevertheless, as early as Galen, the importance of relational reasoning for mathematics had already been recognized. Further critical voices emerged in the Renaissance and the question of whethermathematical proofs could be recast syllogistically attracted more sustained attention over the following three centuries. Supported by more detailed analyses of Euclidean theorems, this led to attempts to extend logical theory to include relational reasoning, and to arguments purporting to reduce relational reasoning to a syllogistic form. Philosophical proposals to the effect that mathematical reasoning is heterogenous with respect to logical proofs were famously defended by Kant, and theimplications of the debate about the adequacy of syllogistic logic for mathematics are at the very core of Kant''s account of synthetic a priori judgments. While it is now widely accepted that syllogistic logic is not sufficient to account for the logic of mathematical proof, the history and the analysisof this debate, running from Aristotle to de Morgan and beyond, is a fascinating and crucial insight into the relationship between philosophy and mathematics.