Matti Häyry – författare

Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti Häyry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti Häyry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken.

Should we make people healthier, smarter, and longer-lived if genetic and medical advances enable us to do so? Matti Häyry asks this question in the context of genetic testing and selection, cloning and stem cell research, gene therapies and enhancements. The ethical questions explored include parental responsibility, the use of people as means, the role of hope and fear in risk assessment, and the dignity and meaning of life. Taking as a starting point the arguments presented by Jonathan Glover, John Harris, Ronald M. Green, Jürgen Habermas, Michael J. Sandel, and Leon R. Kass, who defend a particular normative view as the only rational or moral answer, Matti Häyry argues that many coherent rationalities and moralities exist in the field, and that to claim otherwise is mistaken.

The Medical Biobank of Umeå in Sweden, deCODE's Health Sector Database in Iceland, the Estonian Genome Project and the UK Biobank contain health data and genetic data from large populations. Some include genealogical or lifestyle information. They are resources for research in human genetics and medicine, exploring interaction between genes, lifestyle, environmental factors and health and diseases. The collection, storage and use of this data raise ethical, legal and social issues. In this book, first published in 2007, bioethics scholars examine whether existing ethical frameworks and social policies reflect people's concerns, and how they may need to change in light of new scientific and technological developments. The ethical issues of social justice, genetic discrimination, informational privacy, trust in science and consent to participation in database research are analyzed, whilst an empirical survey, conducted in the four countries, demonstrates public views of privacy and related moral values in the context of human genetic databases.

This Element traces the origins and development of bioethics, the principles and values involved in the discipline, and the roles of justice among these principles and values. The main tasks given to the concept of justice have since the late 1970s been nondiscrimination in research, prioritization in medical practice, and redistribution in healthcare. The Element argues that in a world challenged by planet-wide political and environmental threats this is not sufficient. The nature and meaning of justice has to be rethought. The Element does this by dissecting current bioethical approaches in the light of theories of justice as partly clashing interpretations of equality. The overall findings are twofold. Seen against the background of global concerns, justice in bioethics has become a silent guardian of economic sustainability. Seen against the same background, we should set our aims higher. Justice can, and must, be put to better use than it presently is. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element explores the rationality and morality of the kind of human reproductive cloning that does not involve genetic enhancements or other biological alterations in the individuals produced. The analysis is needed because, sooner or later, the technique will be safe enough to be tested; yet its pros and cons have not been sufficiently investigated. The literature abounds with defenses and criticisms of cloning but these do not distinguish between impure and pure forms, the one allowing the combination of reproduction and amendments, the other not. Therefore, cloning is condemned or condoned on grounds that have more to do with enhancements than the reproductive act. This Element shows how the conceptual landscape changes when the distinction is made visible and the arguments targeted at the production of a new life without the support or burden of the enhancement factor. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element provides an exploration of antinatalism, the view that assigns a negative value to reproduction. First, the history of Western philosophy as a two-and-a-half millennia reaction to antinatalist sentiments. Human life has no obvious meaning and philosophers have been forced to build elaborate theories to invent imaginary purposes. Second, analysis of the concept of antinatalism in the light of human extinction. If people stop having children, the species will cease to exist, and this prospect has prompted attempts to find alternatives and excuses. Third, outlines a normative view defending antinatalism both theoretically and practically. If it is wrong to bring about suffering in the absence of redeeming meaning and if it is possible to create meaning only by imposing a pronatalist mentality upon children before they can make up their own minds, parents morally corrupt themselves by procreating. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element provides an exploration of antinatalism, the view that assigns a negative value to reproduction. First, the history of Western philosophy as a two-and-a-half millennia reaction to antinatalist sentiments. Human life has no obvious meaning and philosophers have been forced to build elaborate theories to invent imaginary purposes. Second, analysis of the concept of antinatalism in the light of human extinction. If people stop having children, the species will cease to exist, and this prospect has prompted attempts to find alternatives and excuses. Third, outlines a normative view defending antinatalism both theoretically and practically. If it is wrong to bring about suffering in the absence of redeeming meaning and if it is possible to create meaning only by imposing a pronatalist mentality upon children before they can make up their own minds, parents morally corrupt themselves by procreating. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element explores the rationality and morality of the kind of human reproductive cloning that does not involve genetic enhancements or other biological alterations in the individuals produced. The analysis is needed because, sooner or later, the technique will be safe enough to be tested; yet its pros and cons have not been sufficiently investigated. The literature abounds with defenses and criticisms of cloning but these do not distinguish between impure and pure forms, the one allowing the combination of reproduction and amendments, the other not. Therefore, cloning is condemned or condoned on grounds that have more to do with enhancements than the reproductive act. This Element shows how the conceptual landscape changes when the distinction is made visible and the arguments targeted at the production of a new life without the support or burden of the enhancement factor. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.