Merijn Chamon – författare

While the EU agencies that have been granted the power to adopt binding decisions are a diverse group, they at least share one feature: in all of them an organisationally separate administrative review body, i.e. a board of appeal, has been established. The review procedures before these boards must be exhausted before private parties can seize the EU courts and the boards therefore all fulfil a similar function: filtering cases before they end up before the courts and providing parties by expert-driven review. Sharing this common function as well as some common features, the boards of appeal of the different agencies remain heterogenous in their set up and functioning. This raises a host of questions from both a theoretic and practical perspective which this volume analyses in depth: how do the boards function, which kind of review do they offer, and how should they be conceptualized in the EU's overall system of legal protection against administrative action? To answer these questions, the volume's first part presents a series of case studies, covering all the EU boards of appeal currently in existence, while a second part looks into the horizontal issues raised by the phenomenon of the boards of appeal.

Over the last two decades, EU legislation has established a growing number of subsidiary bodies commonly referred to as EU decentralised agencies. Recent years have witnessed the conferral of increasingly significant powers to these bodies to the point where the successful implementation of many of the EU's policies is now dependent upon the activities of EU agencies. While EU agencies have become indispensable in terms of their practical importance, the lack of a legal basis in the EU Treaties to establish and empower new bodies as well as the lack of an adequate framework in secondary law means that there exists little control over EU agencies. This results in critical issues, such as the absence of clear criteria prescribing when an agency may be empowered to act and also the failure to consider the interests of the actors normally responsible for the implementation of EU law, such as the Member States and the Commission. Providing the first comprehensive overview of the development of agencification in the EU, this book explores the question: What are the political and legal limits to EU agencification? Analysing EU agencies from an institutional and constitutional perspective, the book traces the development of EU agencies, explores the different tasks they perform, investigates the limits to agencification, and discusses the legal basis for such agencies.

This book revisits the Treaty of Lisbon’s promise to further parliamentarize the EU’s functioning by looking into the Treaty-law framework governing the delegation of legislative power in the EU. In this field, the Lisbon Treaty formally greatly strengthened the position of the European Parliament vis-à-vis both the European Commission and the Council. The book explores whether Parliament’s formally reinforced role is reflected in the actual balance of powers in the area of delegated legislation and executive rule-making. It does so by assessing how both the law and practice of decision-making at the legislative level, looking at specific case studies, and the sub-legislative level, examining the scrutiny over delegated legislation, has crystallized in the ten years following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This rigorous study gives a fascinating insight into one of the most significant developments in European parliamentary law-making, which EU constitutional lawyers will find required reading.