Michael J. Shaffer – författare

The author attempts to show that scientific realism is compatible with the presence of idealization in the sciences. His main contention is that idealized theories can be treated as counterfactuals about how things are in worlds that are similar to but simpler than the actual world.

Before the 20th century, the concept of a priori knowledge -- knowledge based in reason and reflection rather than experience -- found nearly universal acceptance. By the early 20th century, however, philosophers were skeptical of the idea that there was any nontrivial existence of a priori knowledge. Fifty years later, it was fashionable to doubt it existed at all. The articles in this book tackle a priori knowledge from every angle -- does it exist? what might it be like? what is its relation to empirical knowledge? -- and other topics of perennial interest.

This book deals with questions about the nature of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge. Until the twentieth century, it was more or less taken for granted that there was such a thing as a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge whose source is in reason and reflection rather than sensory experience. With a few notable exceptions, philosophers believed that mathematics, logic and philosophy were all a priori. Although the seeds of doubt were planted earlier on, by the early twentieth century, philosophers were widely skeptical of the idea that there was any nontrivial existence of a priori knowledge. By the mid to late twentieth century, it became fashionable to doubt the existence of any kind of a priori knowledge at all. Since many think that philosophy is an a priori discipline if it is any kind of discipline at all, the questions about a priori knowledge are fundamental to our understanding of philosophy itself.

The author attempts to show that scientific realism is compatible with the presence of idealization in the sciences. His main contention is that idealized theories can be treated as counterfactuals about how things are in worlds that are similar to but simpler than the actual world.