Mohammad Heydari – författare

Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a channel through which the public sector can seek alternative funding and expertise from the private sector to procure public infrastructure. Governments around the world are increasingly turning to Public-Private Partnerships to deliver essential goods and services. Unfortunately, PPPs, like any other public procurement, can be at risk of corruption. This book begins by looking at the basics of PPP and the challenges of the PPP process. It then conceptualizes the vulnerability of various stages of Public-Private Partnership models and corruption risk against the backdrop of contract theory, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics. The book also discusses potential control mechanisms.

The book also stresses the importance of good governance for PPP. It outlines principles and procedures of project risk management (PRM) developed by a working party of the Association of Project Managers. Finally, the book concludes by proposing strategies and solutions to overcome the limitations and challenges of the current approach toward PPP.

Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a channel through which the public sector can seek alternative funding and expertise from the private sector to procure public infrastructure. Governments around the world are increasingly turning to Public-Private Partnerships to deliver essential goods and services. Unfortunately, PPPs, like any other public procurement, can be at risk of corruption. This book begins by looking at the basics of PPP and the challenges of the PPP process. It then conceptualizes the vulnerability of various stages of Public-Private Partnership models and corruption risk against the backdrop of contract theory, principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics. The book also discusses potential control mechanisms.

The book also stresses the importance of good governance for PPP. It outlines principles and procedures of project risk management (PRM) developed by a working party of the Association of Project Managers. Finally, the book concludes by proposing strategies and solutions to overcome the limitations and challenges of the current approach toward PPP.

Public–Private Partnerships (PPP or 3Ps) allow the public sector to seek alternative funding and expertise from the private sector during procurement processes. Such partnerships, if executed with due diligence, often benefit the public immensely. Unfortunately, Public–Private Partnerships can be vulnerable to corruption. This book looks at what measures we can put in place to check corruption during procurement and what good governance strategies the public sector can adopt to improve the performance of 3Ps.

The book applies mathematical models to analyze 3Ps. It uses game theory to study the interaction and dynamics between the stakeholders and suggests strategies to reduce corruption risks in various 3Ps stages. The authors explain through game theory-based simulation how governments can adopt a evaluating process at the start of each procurement to weed out undesirable private partners and why the government should take a more proactive approach.

Using a methodological framework rooted in mathematical models to illustrate how we can combat institutional corruption, this book is a helpful reference for anyone interested in public policymaking and public infrastructure management.

Public–Private Partnerships (PPP or 3Ps) allow the public sector to seek alternative funding and expertise from the private sector during procurement processes. Such partnerships, if executed with due diligence, often benefit the public immensely. Unfortunately, Public–Private Partnerships can be vulnerable to corruption. This book looks at what measures we can put in place to check corruption during procurement and what good governance strategies the public sector can adopt to improve the performance of 3Ps.

The book applies mathematical models to analyze 3Ps. It uses game theory to study the interaction and dynamics between the stakeholders and suggests strategies to reduce corruption risks in various 3Ps stages. The authors explain through game theory-based simulation how governments can adopt a evaluating process at the start of each procurement to weed out undesirable private partners and why the government should take a more proactive approach.

Using a methodological framework rooted in mathematical models to illustrate how we can combat institutional corruption, this book is a helpful reference for anyone interested in public policymaking and public infrastructure management.

The book examines a relatively unexplored issue in supply chain risk management, which is how long companies specifically take to respond to catastrophic events of low probability but high impact. The book also looks at why such supply chain disruptions are unavoidable, and consequently, all complex supply chains are inherently at risk.

The book illustrates how companies can respond to supply chain disruptions with faster responses and in shorter lead-times to reduce impact. In reducing total response time, designing solutions, and deploying a recovery plan sooner after a disruption in anticipation of such events, companies reduce the impact of disruption risk. The book also explores the basics of multiple-criteria decision-making (MCDM) and analytic hierarchy process (AHP), and how they contribute to both the quality of the financial economic decision-making process and the quality of the resulting decisions. The book illustrates through cases in the construction sector how this industry has become more complex and riskier due to the diverse nature of activities among global companies.

The book examines a relatively unexplored issue in supply chain risk management, which is how long companies specifically take to respond to catastrophic events of low probability but high impact. The book also looks at why such supply chain disruptions are unavoidable, and consequently, all complex supply chains are inherently at risk.

The book illustrates how companies can respond to supply chain disruptions with faster responses and in shorter lead-times to reduce impact. In reducing total response time, designing solutions, and deploying a recovery plan sooner after a disruption in anticipation of such events, companies reduce the impact of disruption risk. The book also explores the basics of multiple-criteria decision-making (MCDM) and analytic hierarchy process (AHP), and how they contribute to both the quality of the financial economic decision-making process and the quality of the resulting decisions. The book illustrates through cases in the construction sector how this industry has become more complex and riskier due to the diverse nature of activities among global companies.

This book examines corruption as a collective behavior problem for entrepreneurs. In particular, it considers Azjen’s theory of planned behavior (TPB) to explain perceived corruption and its effects on entrepreneurship.

Heydari argues that behavioral intentions are shaped by variables such as attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. He proposes the novel Heydari Behavioral Synthesis Theory (HBST) model and applies it to two case studies to highlight the institutional, individual and societal factors that may inhibit entrepreneurial behavior. He concludes that corruption may persist not just because of difficulties in monitoring and prosecuting, but because it is systemically pervasive and discourages individual countermeasures. He closes by looking at anti-corruption policies and outlining future research directions.

Arguing that widespread corruption may be theoretically mischaracterized in the literature, this book is of interest to policy-makers, researchers and postgraduate students in the fields of management science, industrial and organizational psychology, entrepreneurship and corruption studies.

This book examines corruption as a collective behavior problem for entrepreneurs. In particular, it considers Azjen’s theory of planned behavior (TPB) to explain perceived corruption and its effects on entrepreneurship.

Heydari argues that behavioral intentions are shaped by variables such as attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. He proposes the novel Heydari Behavioral Synthesis Theory (HBST) model and applies it to two case studies to highlight the institutional, individual and societal factors that may inhibit entrepreneurial behavior. He concludes that corruption may persist not just because of difficulties in monitoring and prosecuting, but because it is systemically pervasive and discourages individual countermeasures. He closes by looking at anti-corruption policies and outlining future research directions.

Arguing that widespread corruption may be theoretically mischaracterized in the literature, this book is of interest to policy-makers, researchers and postgraduate students in the fields of management science, industrial and organizational psychology, entrepreneurship and corruption studies.