Mohor Chakraborty – författare

The tensions in the South China Sea pose considerable challenges to the rules-based liberal international maritime order. The situation demonstrates the interplay between maritime nationalism and geostrategic rivalry; fuelling militarisation and endangering freedom of navigation, over-flight and exploitation of natural resources. China’s dedicated "terraclaims", land reclamation and island-building spree – enhanced with military surveillance, communications and logistics infrastructure-building in the form of port facilities, military installations and airstrips – have escalated these tensions. China declares that these territories are an integral part of its "core interests", taking an uncompromising stance on the question of sovereignty and its determination to protect the domain militarily. India, although not a South China Sea littoral state, sees both the general principle of the rules-based order and the specific issue of navigation between the Indian and Pacific Oceans as core to its own national interest.

Chakraborti and Chakraborty assess the rationale and implications of India’s strategies and responses vis-à-vis the South China Sea dispute, and their impact on its overall "Act East" initiative in Southeast Asia policy. They also analyse the implications of India’s stance on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), five member-states of which (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) are involved in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. The analysis focuses on the administrative tenures of both the United Progressive Alliance from 2004 until 2014 and the National Democratic Alliance from 2014 onwards.

The tensions in the South China Sea pose considerable challenges to the rules-based liberal international maritime order. The situation demonstrates the interplay between maritime nationalism and geostrategic rivalry; fuelling militarisation and endangering freedom of navigation, over-flight and exploitation of natural resources. China’s dedicated "terraclaims", land reclamation and island-building spree – enhanced with military surveillance, communications and logistics infrastructure-building in the form of port facilities, military installations and airstrips – have escalated these tensions. China declares that these territories are an integral part of its "core interests", taking an uncompromising stance on the question of sovereignty and its determination to protect the domain militarily. India, although not a South China Sea littoral state, sees both the general principle of the rules-based order and the specific issue of navigation between the Indian and Pacific Oceans as core to its own national interest.

Chakraborti and Chakraborty assess the rationale and implications of India’s strategies and responses vis-à-vis the South China Sea dispute, and their impact on its overall "Act East" initiative in Southeast Asia policy. They also analyse the implications of India’s stance on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), five member-states of which (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) are involved in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. The analysis focuses on the administrative tenures of both the United Progressive Alliance from 2004 until 2014 and the National Democratic Alliance from 2014 onwards.

Over the course of four decades of the Cold War, Chakraborti and Chakraborty analyse India’s path from nonalignment towards realism and self-assertion, and finally to confidence-building and interdependence with respect to their neighbours in Southeast Asia.

What were the reasons for India’s shift from non-alignment to a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations in its relationships with both the non-Communist states of ASEAN and the Communist States of Indochina? How was this shift perceived by those countries? To what degree were Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies responsible for India’s changes in alignment throughout the Cold War? What lessons can we draw from these events, as the Indo-Pacific is again becoming a major arena of great power rivalry? In order to address these questions, Chakraborti and Chakraborty study the development of India’s foreign and security policies throughout the period, tracking the changes of stances between and within administrations. They evaluate how these decisions were driven by a combination of ideology, pragmatism and changes in priorities as the regional architecture developed over time.

A valuable read for scholars and students of India’s foreign relations and of Indo-Pacific geopolitics more broadly.

Over the course of four decades of the Cold War, Chakraborti and Chakraborty analyse India’s path from nonalignment towards realism and self-assertion, and finally to confidence-building and interdependence with respect to their neighbours in Southeast Asia.

What were the reasons for India’s shift from non-alignment to a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations in its relationships with both the non-Communist states of ASEAN and the Communist States of Indochina? How was this shift perceived by those countries? To what degree were Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies responsible for India’s changes in alignment throughout the Cold War? What lessons can we draw from these events, as the Indo-Pacific is again becoming a major arena of great power rivalry? In order to address these questions, Chakraborti and Chakraborty study the development of India’s foreign and security policies throughout the period, tracking the changes of stances between and within administrations. They evaluate how these decisions were driven by a combination of ideology, pragmatism and changes in priorities as the regional architecture developed over time.

A valuable read for scholars and students of India’s foreign relations and of Indo-Pacific geopolitics more broadly.