Moshe Shemesh – författare

Former Israeli intelligence officer Moshe Shemesh offers a fresh understanding of the complex history and politics of the Middle East in this new analysis of the Palestinian national movement. Shemesh looks at the formative years of the movement that emerged following the 1948 War and traces the leaders, their objectives, and their weaknesses, fragmentation, and conflicts with their neighbors. He follows the formation of the Sons of Nakba, the establishment of Fatah, the reframing of Jordan as analogous with the Palestinian cause, and the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its new expression of nationalism until the 1967 War. With unprecedented access to Arabic sources, Shemesh provides new perspectives on inter-Arab politics and the history of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.

Former Israeli intelligence officer Moshe Shemesh offers a fresh understanding of the complex history and politics of the Middle East in this new analysis of the Palestinian national movement. Shemesh looks at the formative years of the movement that emerged following the 1948 War and traces the leaders, their objectives, and their weaknesses, fragmentation, and conflicts with their neighbors. He follows the formation of the Sons of Nakba, the establishment of Fatah, the reframing of Jordan as analogous with the Palestinian cause, and the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its new expression of nationalism until the 1967 War. With unprecedented access to Arabic sources, Shemesh provides new perspectives on inter-Arab politics and the history of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.

Former Israeli intelligence officer Moshe Shemesh offers a fresh understanding of the complex history and politics of the Middle East in this new analysis of the Palestinian national movement. Shemesh looks at the formative years of the movement that emerged following the 1948 War and traces the leaders, their objectives, and their weaknesses, fragmentation, and conflicts with their neighbors. He follows the formation of the Sons of Nakba, the establishment of Fatah, the reframing of Jordan as analogous with the Palestinian cause, and the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its new expression of nationalism until the 1967 War. With unprecedented access to Arabic sources, Shemesh provides new perspectives on inter-Arab politics and the history of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.

This book traces the development of the Palestinian national movement, especially in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, between 1968 and 1974 under the leadership of the Fatah which has become the PLO's backbone.

A comprehensive and balanced volume which juxtaposes the views of statesmen with those of military leaders that fought the war.

A comprehensive and balanced volume which juxtaposes the views of statesmen with those of military leaders that fought the war.

A comprehensive and balanced volume which juxtaposes the views of statesmen with those of military leaders that fought the war.

This book traces the development of the Palestinian national movement, especially in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, between 1968 and 1974 under the leadership of the Fatah which has become the PLO''s backbone.

This book traces the development of the Palestinian national movement, especially in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, between 1968 and 1974 under the leadership of the Fatah which has become the PLO''s backbone.

A comprehensive and balanced volume which juxtaposes the views of statesmen with those of military leaders that fought the war.

The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would 'liberate Filastin'. He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step. This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallisation of Arab strategy to reveal conclusions substantively different from previous scholarly and political-military assessments. Issues dealt with include: the relevance of the Filastin problem as key to understanding the descent to war; the pivotal Syrian water struggle as a key motivating factor; Nasir's military blunders with respect to advice received from the Egyptian High Command; Nasir's acceptance of the principle that Egypt had to absorb the first Israeli strike, to be followed by Egypt's delivery of a second, decisive strike; the "political process" approach to solving the conflict as evidenced by the Khartoum protocols notwithstanding the "1948 refugee problem"; and the Hashemite regime's response to Palestinians' heightened national awakening. The enlistment of all the Arab states to Nasir's moves in May 1967 testifies not only to the president's charismatic leadership, but also to the depths of the 1948 trauma (al-nakba), which lies at the heart of any future compromise or agreement.