N. Ashton – författare

The years 1955-59 were a vital transitional period for the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East. British and American leaders sought to protect cold war and oil interests in the region against the background of a renaissance of Arab nationalism personified by the Egyptian leader Nasser. With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. It shows how the differing priorities of the two powers in the region promoted a patchwork of confrontation and cooperation over Middle Eastern questions. For Britain, this study reveals that it was the Iraqi Revolution rather than Suez which led to a redefinition of strategy in the region, and a concentration on the defence of her oil interests in the Gulf.

Nigel J. Ashton analyses Anglo-American relations during a crucial phase of the Cold War. He argues that although policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic used the term ''interdependence'' to describe their relationship this concept had different meanings in London and Washington. The Kennedy Administration sought more centralized control of the Western alliance, whereas the Macmillan Government envisaged an Anglo-American partnership. This gap in perception gave rise to a ''crisis of interdependence'' during the winter of 1962-3, encompassing issues as diverse as the collapse of the British EEC application, the civil war in the Yemen, the denouement of the Congo crisis and the fate of the British independent nuclear deterrent.

With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.

Nigel J. Ashton analyses Anglo-American relations during a crucial phase of the Cold War. He argues that although policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic used the term 'interdependence' to describe their relationship this concept had different meanings in London and Washington. The Kennedy Administration sought more centralized control of the Western alliance, whereas the Macmillan Government envisaged an Anglo-American partnership. This gap in perception gave rise to a 'crisis of interdependence' during the winter of 1962-3, encompassing issues as diverse as the collapse of the British EEC application, the civil war in the Yemen, the denouement of the Congo crisis and the fate of the British independent nuclear deterrent.

Drawing on a wide range of British and Argentine sources, this book highlights the importance of the neglected 1960s as the decade in which the dormant Falklands (Malvinas) dispute became reactivated, developing into a dynamic set of bilateral negotiations on the question of sovereignty.

Drawing on a wide range of British and Argentine sources, this book highlights the importance of the neglected 1960s as the decade in which the dormant Falklands (Malvinas) dispute became reactivated, developing into a dynamic set of bilateral negotiations on the question of sovereignty.

Nigel J. Ashton analyses Anglo-American relations during a crucial phase of the Cold War. He argues that although policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic used the term 'interdependence' to describe their relationship this concept had different meanings in London and Washington. The Kennedy Administration sought more centralized control of the Western alliance, whereas the Macmillan Government envisaged an Anglo-American partnership. This gap in perception gave rise to a 'crisis of interdependence' during the winter of 1962-3, encompassing issues as diverse as the collapse of the British EEC application, the civil war in the Yemen, the denouement of the Congo crisis and the fate of the British independent nuclear deterrent.