Neil P. Chatelain – författare

In early October 1861, United States warships entered the Head of Passes, where the Mississippi River’s multiple entrances converge into a single channel. The occupation simplified the blockade by enabling a handful of ships to seal off the “father of waters” and cut off supplies to New Orleans. Confederate Capt. George N. Hollins recognized the danger, assembled a makeshift flotilla, and launched a surprise attack on the enemy vessels. Neil P. Chatelain’s Ironclad Ambush: Confederates Strike Lincoln's Mississippi River Blockade at the Head of Passes, October 12, 1861, is the first book-length treatment of this pivotal naval action.The Battle of the Head of Passes on October 12 marked the Civil War’s first major fleet engagement. The Southern privateer ironclad ram Manassas rammed USS Richmond, and as the Federals retreated toward the Gulf, two blockaders ran aground and crews abandoned ship as Confederate gunboats closed in. The clash represented the Confederacy’s first major naval victory, the first use of an ironclad in North American waters, and the first direct challenge to Abraham Lincoln’s blockade. The battle quickly became mired in confusion and conflicting accounts. Outdated technologies—sailing ships, fire rafts, and rams—collided with modern innovations like screw-propelled steamers, telegraph communications, and ironclads. The fog of war led officers and enlisted men to misinterpret orders, as many historians have misinterpreted the facts. Some commanders excelled and earned promotions; others faltered, appeared drunk, or suffered breakdowns.Lingering questions persist: Why did U.S. forces initially enter the Head of Passes? Why did Hollins seek to counter them? Which ships were involved? Why did two blockading crews abandon their vessels mid-battle? Why did the Confederates withdraw yet claim victory? And why does this seemingly minor, often-overlooked engagement matter?Award-winning historian Neil P. Chatelain’s Ironclad Ambush scrutinizes every previous account of the battle, firsthand archival material, and period newspapers. Drawing on voices from all sides—including ship captains, junior officers, enlisted sailors, lighthouse keepers, and civilians across southeastern Louisiana—he unravels the complexities and contradictions of early Civil War coastal and riverine naval operations. Everyone with an interest in naval warfare will find this book invaluable.

Across North America's periphery, unknown and overlooked Civil War campaigns were waged over whether the United States or Confederacy would dominate lands, mines, and seaborne transportation networks of North America's mineral wealth. The U.S. needed this wealth to stabilize their wartime economy while the Confederacy sought to expand their own treasury. Confederate armies advanced to seize the West and its gold and silver reserves, while warships steamed to intercept Panama route ships transporting bullion from California to Panama to New York. United States forces responded by expelling Confederate incursions and solidified territorial control by combating Indigenous populations and enacting laws encouraging frontier settlement. The U.S. Navy patrolled key ports, convoyed treasure ships, and integrated continent-wide intelligence networks in the ultimate game of cat and mouse.This book examines the campaigns to control North America's mineral wealth, linking the Civil War's military, naval, political, diplomatic and economic elements. Included are the hemispheric land and sea adventures involving tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt, admiral and explorer Charles Wilkes, renowned sea captain Raphael Semmes, General Henry Sibley, cowboy and mountain man Kit Carson, Indigenous leaders Mangas Coloradas and Geronimo, writer and miner Mark Twain, and Mormon leader Brigham Young.

This thorough account of the South''s efforts to hold the Mississippi River is "fast-paced, easy to read, and well supported by archival research"(The Civil War Monitor).Most studies of the Mississippi River focus on Union campaigns to open and control it, while overlooking Southern attempts to stop them. This book tells the other side of the story—the first modern full-length treatment of inland naval operations from the Confederate perspective.Jefferson Davis realized the value of the Mississippi River and its entire valley, which he described as the "great artery of the Confederacy." This was the key internal highway that controlled the fledgling nation''s transportation network. Davis and his secretary of the navy knew these vital logistical paths offered potential highways of invasion for Union warships and armies to stab their way deep into the heart of the Confederacy, and had to be held.They planned to protect these arteries of rebellion by crafting a ring of powerful fortifications supported by naval forces. Different military branches, however, including the navy, marine corps, army, and revenue service, as well as civilian privateers and even state naval forces, competed for scarce resources to operate their own vessels. A lack of industrial capacity further complicated Confederate efforts and guaranteed the South''s grand vision of deploying dozens of river gunboats and powerful ironclads would never be fully realized.Despite these limitations, the Southern war machine introduced many innovations and alternate defenses including the Confederacy''s first operational ironclad, the first successful use of underwater torpedoes, widespread use of army-navy joint operations, and the employment of extensive river obstructions. When the river came under complete Union control in 1863, Confederate efforts shifted to its many tributaries, and a bitter, deadly struggle to control these internal lifelines. Despite a lack of ships, material, personnel, funding, and unified organization, the Confederacy fought desperately and scored many localized tactical victories—often at great cost—but failed at the strategic level.Written by a former Navy Surface Warfare Officer, this study, grounded in extensive archival and firsthand accounts, official records, and a keen understanding of terrain and geography, "very astutely gets to the heart of the main internal factors that lay behind the CSN''s catastrophic failure to defend the strategic waterways of the Mississippi River Valley" (Civil War Books and Authors).