Ofra Magidor – författare

Nearly all properties are, to a certain extent, versatile: there are many different ways to instantiate them. Consider a light-blue scarf and a dark-blue gemstone. They share the property of being blue, despite being different kinds of objects and differing in the way in which they are blue. The key insight explored in this book is that this apparently mundane observation should be extended: many properties are considerably more versatile than theorists typically take them to be. This insight turns out to be incredibly powerful in addressing a wide range of issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and beyond. One such issue is the problem of copredication. Copredication sentences such as 'Lunch was delicious but took hours' are common yet puzzling. These sentences can be true despite seemingly ascribing incompatible properties: it appears that only the food eaten can be delicious, and only the event attended can take hours. This book offers a comprehensive discussion of the problem of copredication, including a critical evaluation of extant approaches to the problem and culminating with a defence of the Property Versatility approach to copredication. In addition, the book demonstrates how Property Versatility is a powerful tool in addressing a wide range of issues beyond copredication, including the semantics of generics, the metaphysics of establishments and repeatable artworks, fictional discourse, and the nature of ambiguity, as well as a host of others.

Category mistakes are sentences such as 'Green ideas sleep furiously', 'Saturday is in bed', and 'The theory of relativity is eating breakfast'. Such sentences strike most speakers as highly infelicitous but it is a challenge to explain precisely why they are so. Ofra Magidor addresses this challenge, while providing a comprehensive discussion of the various treatments of category mistakes in both philosophy of language and linguistics. The phenomenon of category mistakes is particularly interesting to both these fields because a plausible case can be (and has been) made for explaining it in terms of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics--making it a fruitful case for exploring the relations between and nature of these three fundamental realms of language. Category Mistakes follows this division. After an introduction which explains the aims and motivations for the project and provides a brief historical survey of the (modern) treatment of category mistakes in each of philosophy, linguistics, and computer science, Magidor discusses four approaches in turn: first, the syntactic approach, which maintains that category mistakes are syntactically ill-formed; then two semantic approaches, though ones that appeal to different semantic facets: the meaninglessness view, which maintains that category mistakes are meaningless, and the MBT view, according to which category mistakes are meaningful but truth-valueless; and finally the pragmatic approach, according to which category mistakes are syntactically well-formed, meaningful, truth-valued but nevertheless pragmatically inappropriate. Magidor argues that the first three approaches ought to be rejected, and in the final chapter addresses the main challenge by developing and defending a particular version of the pragmatic approach: a presuppositional account of category mistakes.