Otmar Issing – författare

CONTENTS: The Lessons of History; Stages of European Integration; The Role of Monetary Policy in the Integration Process; Common Currency as Pace-Setter for Political Union; The Labour Market & Social Union; Compensatory transfers; Possible Political Tensions; Institutional Arrangements & 'Good Money from Outside'; The Difficulties & Risks of Monetary Union; Barriers Against Deficits & Debts; Constitutional restraints; Ambivalence of the Political Union; Summary.

In the 1999 IEA Hayek Memorial Lecture, reprinted in Occasional Paper 111, Otmar Issing, the eminent monetary economist and one of Europe's most influential central bankers, discusses currency competition and European Monetary Union. Professor Issing argues that choosing a '..Hayekian discovery process as a route to monetary union' would have been too risky. However, the introduction of the euro has triggered '..a kind of Hayekian discovery process' which gives more scope for the private sector to 'enhance the quality of the medium-of-exchange and store-of-value functions of money.' This Occasional Paper also includes commentaries by two other distinguished economists - Professors Lawrence H. White and Roland Vaubel - who criticise Professor Issing's views. There is then an Afterword by Issing.

Central bank independence is now in vogue because of previous experience of politicisation of monetary policy. But can the central bankers be trusted more than the politicians? In this Occasional Paper, Professor Otmar Issing, the leading monetary economist and one of Europe's most influential central bankers, argues that price stability is a 'common good' and that it is better in the hands of an independent central bank with a clear price stability mandate. The independent central bank with such a manadate, in effect, represents a set of rules which impose constraints on the abuse of power either by politicians or by central bankers. Central bankers operate best in institutions which have a clear objective and are held accountable to the public. Professor Geoffrey Wood adds a commentary which puts Issing's paper in the context of the 'rules versus discretion' debate and deals with three related issues: the meaning of 'price stability', the importance of stable money to the functioning of a market economy and the central bank's role in maintaining financial stability.

Today, 318 million people in 15 countries use the Euro, which now rivals the importance of the US Dollar in the world economy. This is an outcome that few would have predicted with confidence when the Euro was launched. How can we explain this success and what are the prospects for the future? There is nobody better placed to answer these questions than Otmar Issing, who as a founding member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (1998-2006), was one of the Euro's principal architects. His story is a unique insider account, combining personal memoir with reference to the academic and policy literature. Free of jargon, this is a very human reflection on a unique historical experiment and a key reference for all academics, policy makers, and 'Eurowatchers' seeking to understand how the Euro has got to where it is today and what challenges lie ahead.

Based on lectures given as part of The Stone Lectures in Economics, this book discusses the problem of formulating monetary policy in practice, under the uncertain circumstances which characterize the real world. The first lecture highlights the limitations of decision rules suggested by the academic literature and recommends an approach involving, first, a firm reliance on the few fundamental and robust results of monetary economics and, secondly, a pragmatic attitude to policy implementation, taking into consideration lessons from central banking experience. The second lecture revisits Milton Friedman's questions about the effects of active stabilization policies on business cycle fluctuations. It explores the implications of a simple model where the policy maker has imperfect knowledge about potential output and the private sector forms expectations according to adaptive learning. This lecture shows that imperfect knowledge limits the scope for active stabilization policy and strengthens the case for conservatism.

Today, 318 million people in 15 countries use the Euro, which now rivals the importance of the US Dollar in the world economy. This is an outcome that few would have predicted with confidence when the Euro was launched. How can we explain this success and what are the prospects for the future? There is nobody better placed to answer these questions than Otmar Issing, who as a founding member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (1998-2006), was one of the Euro's principal architects. His story is a unique insider account, combining personal memoir with reference to the academic and policy literature. Free of jargon, this is a very human reflection on a unique historical experiment and a key reference for all academics, policy makers, and 'Eurowatchers' seeking to understand how the Euro has got to where it is today and what challenges lie ahead.

How and for whose benefit the European Central Bank (ECB) will work is the most important issue facing Europe, and has been the subject of vast media and academic interest which has already spawned a vast literature of discussion papers in the academic literature, and 'Euro Watch' features. Much of this discussion has been of an increasingly hysterical and political nature and has served to blur rather than inform. This book, written by a team at the ECB, including Otmar Issing the ECB's Chief Economist, provides the first comprehensive, inside, non-technical analysis of the monetary policy strategy, institutional features and operational procedures of the Eurosystem. The goals and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are explored, as are the theoretical and empirical results underpinning the 'stability-oriented monetary policy strategy' adopted by the ECB. The characteristics of this strategy are also discussed in comparison with suggested alternatives.

How and for whose benefit the European Central Bank (ECB) will work is the most important issue facing Europe, and has been the subject of vast media and academic interest which has already spawned a vast literature of discussion papers in the academic literature, and 'Euro Watch' features. Much of this discussion has been of an increasingly hysterical and political nature and has served to blur rather than inform. This book, written by a team at the ECB, including Otmar Issing the ECB's Chief Economist, provides the first comprehensive, inside, non-technical analysis of the monetary policy strategy, institutional features and operational procedures of the Eurosystem. The goals and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are explored, as are the theoretical and empirical results underpinning the 'stability-oriented monetary policy strategy' adopted by the ECB. The characteristics of this strategy are also discussed in comparison with suggested alternatives.

Based on lectures given as part of The Stone Lectures in Economics, this book discusses the problem of formulating monetary policy in practice, under the uncertain circumstances which characterize the real world. The first lecture highlights the limitations of decision rules suggested by the academic literature and recommends an approach involving, first, a firm reliance on the few fundamental and robust results of monetary economics and, secondly, a pragmatic attitude to policy implementation, taking into consideration lessons from central banking experience. The second lecture revisits Milton Friedman's questions about the effects of active stabilization policies on business cycle fluctuations. It explores the implications of a simple model where the policy maker has imperfect knowledge about potential output and the private sector forms expectations according to adaptive learning. This lecture shows that imperfect knowledge limits the scope for active stabilization policy and strengthens the case for conservatism.

Zu allen Zeiten waren die Regierungen der Versuchung ausgesetzt, ihre Ausgaben durch die Verschlechterung des Geldes zu finanzieren. Mit seinem Vorschlag, das staatliche Monopol der Notenemission zu brechen, will Hayek diese Möglichkeit ausschalten. Sein Plan des Währungswettbewerbs kann jedoch nicht überzeugen. Im Zeitalter der Papierwährungen sind die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbank und die gesetzliche Verpflichtung auf das Ziel der Preisstabilität die beste Vorkehrung gegen den Missbrauch der Notenpresse durch den Staat. Die Anforderungen an Kommunikation, Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht der Notenbanken haben sich im Laufe der Zeit immer mehr erhöht. Gleichzeitig gerät die Unabhängigkeit weltweit unter zunehmenden Druck. Der Kampf um stabiles Geld bleibt eine stetige Herausforderung.