Otto Heilbrunn – författare

This book, first published in 1965, examines the doctrine for fighting a conventional war against a nuclear power. Troops must be deployed as if they were fighting a nuclear war: dispersed over a greatly extended battlefield, conducting mobile operations, with no fixed front line, or static defence system, or defence zone. A new strategy of forward defence is needed, whereby significant numbers of troops are dispatched into the enemy’s rear, and this book lays out such a strategy, and thereby sets a proposal for the future safety of Western Europe.

This book, first published in 1965, examines the doctrine for fighting a conventional war against a nuclear power. Troops must be deployed as if they were fighting a nuclear war: dispersed over a greatly extended battlefield, conducting mobile operations, with no fixed front line, or static defence system, or defence zone. A new strategy of forward defence is needed, whereby significant numbers of troops are dispatched into the enemy’s rear, and this book lays out such a strategy, and thereby sets a proposal for the future safety of Western Europe.

This book, first published in 1956, analyses the Red Army’s strategic planning for a war involving nuclear weapons – whereby the front line is thinned out to protect it from nuclear attack and replaced by large-scale offensive operations in NATO’s rear. This new warfare technique had been successfully practised in WWII by Soviet partisan and guerrilla forces, and this book examines these foundations of Soviet secret services doctrine, and the principles by which they would operate.

This book, first published in 1956, analyses the Red Army’s strategic planning for a war involving nuclear weapons – whereby the front line is thinned out to protect it from nuclear attack and replaced by large-scale offensive operations in NATO’s rear. This new warfare technique had been successfully practised in WWII by Soviet partisan and guerrilla forces, and this book examines these foundations of Soviet secret services doctrine, and the principles by which they would operate.

This book, first published in 1963, is an analysis of modern warfare in the enemy’s rear, written by the leading authority on irregular warfare, and stemming from a close examination of real-life examples. Rear warfare on scale poses many problems, such as the exact field of operations; supply line issues; combat or harassment; and coordination with frontline troops. There is also the issue of protecting one’s own rear troops.

This book, first published in 1963, is an analysis of modern warfare in the enemy’s rear, written by the leading authority on irregular warfare, and stemming from a close examination of real-life examples. Rear warfare on scale poses many problems, such as the exact field of operations; supply line issues; combat or harassment; and coordination with frontline troops. There is also the issue of protecting one’s own rear troops.

This book, first published in 1962, was the first systematic study of partisan war, investigating questions thrown up by the success of guerrillas in the Second World War, where they were never decisively beaten by regular armies. Drawing on lessons from Soviet Russia and China in particular, areas with especially active and large partisan forces, this book evolves a doctrine of guerrilla war in modern conditions, with an analysis of partisans in post-war Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba and Laos.

This book, first published in 1962, was the first systematic study of partisan war, investigating questions thrown up by the success of guerrillas in the Second World War, where they were never decisively beaten by regular armies. Drawing on lessons from Soviet Russia and China in particular, areas with especially active and large partisan forces, this book evolves a doctrine of guerrilla war in modern conditions, with an analysis of partisans in post-war Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba and Laos.