P. Weingartner – författare

Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VII

The task of the book is not to give a survey of the main theories on truth found in the literature. There are several books available which do this: The one of David for Deflationist (and Disquotational) Theories of Truth; that of Chapuis for Revision Theories of Truth; that of Kirkham for Correspondence Theories and several others; that ofRescher for Coherence Theories of Truth. Moreover the book is not an analy­ sis just of Tar ski's theory, like that of Moreno or the respective chapters in Kirkham, though Tarski's theory plays an important role in the whole work presented. The task of the book is to give a detailed answer to some basic questions on truth which have been perennial problems through the centuries and are still discussed today. The answer is given in the light of our knowledge today and with the help of modem logic. But the book explicitly aims at connecting recent problems with re­ lated ones in the whole history of philosophy. The method to incorporate important philosophers of the tradition into the analysis is that of disputation, i. e. of putting some of their main thesis into objections or counterobjections pro or contra a posi­ tive answer to the respective question. After the pros and cons are given a detailed answer to the question is proposed and finally commentaries and corrections are given to the objections and counterobjections in the light of the proposed answer.

This volume constitutes the Proceedings and Discussions of the 1968 Salzburg Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. The Colloquium was held at the Institut fUr Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungszentrum fUr Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, Salzburg, Austria, from August 28 to August 31, 1968, under the joint auspices of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and the Institut fur Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungs- zentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was organized by an executive committee consisting ofY. Bar-Hillel (President), M. Black, J. Hintikka, B. Juhos, M. Strauss, and P. Weingartner (Secretary). The Colloquium was generously subsidised by the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and by the Internationales For- schungszentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was divided into three main sections: Induction and Probability (Chairman: 1. Hintikka), Foundations of Physics (Chairman: M. Strauss), and Science and Ethics: The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Chairman: M. Black). This volume contains all papers presented at the Colloquium.Six of those papers concerning Induction and Probability, have, with slight changes, already been published in Synthese 20, 1969. Although the articles of the section Science and Ethics were only read at the International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna on September 3, 1968, the discussion on them took place in Salzburg two days ago. This was possible, because early drafts of all papers had been sent to each participant, in order to prepare appropriate discussions.

Value change and uncertainty about the validity of traditional moral convictions are frequently observed when scientific re­ search confronts us with new moral problems or challenges the moral responsibility of the scientist. Which ethics is to be relied on? Which principles are the most reasonable, the most humane ones? For want of an appropriate answer, moral authorities of­ ten point to conscience, the individual conscience, which seems to be man's unique, directly accessible and final source of moral contention. But what is meant by 'conscience'? There is hardly a notion as widely used and at the same time as controversial as that of conscience. In the history of ethics we can distinguish several trends in the interpretation of the concept and function of conscience. The Greeks used the word O"uvEt81lm~ to denote a kind of 'accompa­ nying knowledge' that mostly referred to negatively experienced behavior. In Latin, the expression conscientia meant a knowing­ together pointing beyond the individual consciousness to the common knowledge of other people. In the Bible, especially in the New Testament, O"uvEt81l0"t~ is used for the guiding con­ sciousness of the morality of one's own action.

Value change and uncertainty about the validity of traditional moral convictions are frequently observed when scientific re­ search confronts us with new moral problems or challenges the moral responsibility of the scientist. Which ethics is to be relied on? Which principles are the most reasonable, the most humane ones? For want of an appropriate answer, moral authorities of­ ten point to conscience, the individual conscience, which seems to be man''s unique, directly accessible and final source of moral contention. But what is meant by ''conscience''? There is hardly a notion as widely used and at the same time as controversial as that of conscience. In the history of ethics we can distinguish several trends in the interpretation of the concept and function of conscience. The Greeks used the word O"uvEt81lm~ to denote a kind of ''accompa­ nying knowledge'' that mostly referred to negatively experienced behavior. In Latin, the expression conscientia meant a knowing­ together pointing beyond the individual consciousness to the common knowledge of other people. In the Bible, especially in the New Testament, O"uvEt81l0"t~ is used for the guiding con­ sciousness of the morality of one''s own action.

Als Schiiler Ernst Mallys hatte ich das Gluck, mitzuerleben, wie sich urn 1930 die Philosophie Mallys von der reichen Vielfalt der Meinongschen Lehre zu eigenen geschlosseneren Konturen wandelte. Es folgten Jahre intensiven Weiterbaus bis zum Todesjahr 1944. Durch widrige Um- sHinde, Krankheit und Krieg, kamen Mallys Erkenntnisse nicht zu brei- terer Wirkung. Urn so erfreulicher ist es, daB im Jahre des 25. Todestages und 90. Geburtstages ein Kreis Interessierter zusammenfand, urn ein Opus postumum MalIys, ein groBes logisches Fragment, von Mally einmal Schwanberger Logik genannt, herauszugeben, das in den letzten Lebens- jahren des Philosophen entstand. Auf Anregung von Professor Dr. Roderick M. Chisholm (Brown University, Rhode Island) wird gleich- zeitig auch ein 'basic work' der Deontik, Mallys Grundgesetze des Sol/ens aus dem Jahr 1926, im Neudruck publiziert. Damit ist auch Gelegenheit gegeben, eine erste zusammenfassende Darstellung uber die Philosophie Mallys mit Schriftenverzeichnis etc. zu veroffentlichen, so daB diese Edition auch als Gedenkschrift fUr Mally gelten kann.

This volume constitutes the Proceedings and Discussions of the 1968 Salzburg Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. The Colloquium was held at the Institut fUr Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungszentrum fUr Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, Salzburg, Austria, from August 28 to August 31, 1968, under the joint auspices of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and the Institut fur Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungs- zentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was organized by an executive committee consisting ofY. Bar-Hillel (President), M. Black, J. Hintikka, B. Juhos, M. Strauss, and P. Weingartner (Secretary). The Colloquium was generously subsidised by the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and by the Internationales For- schungszentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was divided into three main sections: Induction and Probability (Chairman: 1. Hintikka), Foundations of Physics (Chairman: M. Strauss), and Science and Ethics: The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Chairman: M. Black). This volume contains all papers presented at the Colloquium.Six of those papers concerning Induction and Probability, have, with slight changes, already been published in Synthese 20, 1969. Although the articles of the section Science and Ethics were only read at the International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna on September 3, 1968, the discussion on them took place in Salzburg two days ago. This was possible, because early drafts of all papers had been sent to each participant, in order to prepare appropriate discussions.

The papers contained in this volume were given at the International Con- ference on Scientific and Religious Belief which was held at the Institut fUr Wissenschaftstheorie of the International Research Center Salzburg in August 1991. The conference was understood as a research conference dealing with an area which is not yet investigated sufficiently: Aspects of interrelation between scientific and religious belief. The conference started with papers on important features of belief in gene- ral and on distinctive properties between belief, knowledge and acceptance. In the paper of Keith Lehrer they are analyzed comparatively and are also consi- dered in respect to religious belief (faith). The paper of Franz von Kutschera takes up other important features of beliefs in general to be applicable to both, scientific and religious belief: reasons (explanations for beliefs which consist essentially in other beliefs again and which allow that the agent had alternati- ves) and causes (chance events or actions).Gerhard Schurz's special topics on non-monotonic reasoning deals with the question how our beliefs change, when our information changes, especially when the respective information is increased or completely new information is added. Is belief value-free? Is value-ladenness an essential and intrinsic cha- racteristic of belief? This question is dealt with in the paper by Elena Kleva- kina-Uljanov and applies to both scientific and religious belief.

The task of the book is not to give a survey of the main theories on truth found in the literature. There are several books available which do this: The one of David for Deflationist (and Disquotational) Theories of Truth; that of Chapuis for Revision Theories of Truth; that of Kirkham for Correspondence Theories and several others; that ofRescher for Coherence Theories of Truth. Moreover the book is not an analy­ sis just of Tar ski's theory, like that of Moreno or the respective chapters in Kirkham, though Tarski's theory plays an important role in the whole work presented. The task of the book is to give a detailed answer to some basic questions on truth which have been perennial problems through the centuries and are still discussed today. The answer is given in the light of our knowledge today and with the help of modem logic. But the book explicitly aims at connecting recent problems with re­ lated ones in the whole history of philosophy. The method to incorporate important philosophers of the tradition into the analysis is that of disputation, i. e. of putting some of their main thesis into objections or counterobjections pro or contra a posi­ tive answer to the respective question. After the pros and cons are given a detailed answer to the question is proposed and finally commentaries and corrections are given to the objections and counterobjections in the light of the proposed answer.

Value change and uncertainty about the validity of traditional moral convictions are frequently observed when scientific re­ search confronts us with new moral problems or challenges the moral responsibility of the scientist. Which ethics is to be relied on? Which principles are the most reasonable, the most humane ones? For want of an appropriate answer, moral authorities of­ ten point to conscience, the individual conscience, which seems to be man's unique, directly accessible and final source of moral contention. But what is meant by 'conscience'? There is hardly a notion as widely used and at the same time as controversial as that of conscience. In the history of ethics we can distinguish several trends in the interpretation of the concept and function of conscience. The Greeks used the word O"uvEt81lm~ to denote a kind of 'accompa­ nying knowledge' that mostly referred to negatively experienced behavior. In Latin, the expression conscientia meant a knowing­ together pointing beyond the individual consciousness to the common knowledge of other people. In the Bible, especially in the New Testament, O"uvEt81l0"t~ is used for the guiding con­ sciousness of the morality of one's own action.