Paolo Siciliani – författare

This casebook, designed for a readership of graduate students, policy makers, and practitioners in competition law, aims to provide a comprehensive reference on EU and UK competition law. While the majority of the text comprises analysis supplemented with detailed commentary and analysis of judgments, NCA and Commission decisions, and legislation, the casebook also gives a high-level introduction to the design and history of EU and UK competition law, including an overview of the main actors and their objectives, furnishing students with the understanding of the law required to practise competition law. In particular, the casebook takes an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, featuring a substantial section on the economic context of competition law accessible even to those with no economics background. The book is accompanied by specialist volumes on intellectual property and enforcement and procedure.

This casebook, designed for a readership of graduate students, policy makers, and practitioners in competition law, aims to provide a comprehensive reference on EU and UK competition law. While the majority of the text comprises analysis supplemented with detailed commentary and analysis of judgments, NCA and Commission decisions, and legislation, the casebook also gives a high-level introduction to the design and history of EU and UK competition law, including an overview of the main actors and their objectives, furnishing students with the understanding of the law required to practise competition law. In particular, the casebook takes an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, featuring a substantial section on the economic context of competition law accessible even to those with no economics background. The book is accompanied by specialist volumes on intellectual property and enforcement and procedure.

This casebook, designed for a readership of graduate students, policy makers, and practitioners in competition law, aims to provide a comprehensive reference on EU and UK competition law. While the majority of the text comprises analysis supplemented with detailed commentary and analysis of judgments, NCA and Commission decisions, and legislation, the casebook also gives a high-level introduction to the design and history of EU and UK competition law, including an overview of the main actors and their objectives, furnishing students with the understanding of the law required to practise competition law. In particular, the casebook takes an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, featuring a substantial section on the economic context of competition law accessible even to those with no economics background. The book is accompanied by specialist volumes on intellectual property and enforcement and procedure.

It has long been thought that fairness in European Consumer Law would be achieved by relying on information as a remedy and expecting the average consumer to keep businesses in check by voting with their feet. This monograph argues that the way consumer law operates today promises a lot but does not deliver enough. It struggles to avoid harm being caused to consumers and it struggles to repair the harm after the event. To achieve fairness, solutions need to be found elsewhere. Consumer Theories of Harm offers an alternative model to assess where and how consumer detriment may occur and solutions to prevent it. It shows that a more confident use of economic theory will allow practitioners to demonstrate how a poor standard of professional diligence lies at the heart of consumer harm. The book provides both theoretical and practical examples of how to combine existing law with economic theory to improve case outcomes. The book shows how public enforcers can move beyond the dominant transparency paradigm to an approach where firms have a positive duty to treat consumers fairly and shape their commercial offers in a way that prevents consumers from making mistakes. Over time, this ‘fairness-by-design’ approach will emerge as the only acceptable way to compete.

It has long been thought that fairness in European Consumer Law would be achieved by relying on information as a remedy and expecting the average consumer to keep businesses in check by voting with their feet. This monograph argues that the way consumer law operates today promises a lot but does not deliver enough. It struggles to avoid harm being caused to consumers and it struggles to repair the harm after the event. To achieve fairness, solutions need to be found elsewhere. Consumer Theories of Harm offers an alternative model to assess where and how consumer detriment may occur and solutions to prevent it. It shows that a more confident use of economic theory will allow practitioners to demonstrate how a poor standard of professional diligence lies at the heart of consumer harm. The book provides both theoretical and practical examples of how to combine existing law with economic theory to improve case outcomes. The book shows how public enforcers can move beyond the dominant transparency paradigm to an approach where firms have a positive duty to treat consumers fairly and shape their commercial offers in a way that prevents consumers from making mistakes. Over time, this ''fairness-by-design'' approach will emerge as the only acceptable way to compete.

It has long been thought that fairness in European Consumer Law would be achieved by relying on information as a remedy and expecting the average consumer to keep businesses in check by voting with their feet. This monograph argues that the way consumer law operates today promises a lot but does not deliver enough. It struggles to avoid harm being caused to consumers and it struggles to repair the harm after the event. To achieve fairness, solutions need to be found elsewhere. Consumer Theories of Harm offers an alternative model to assess where and how consumer detriment may occur and solutions to prevent it. It shows that a more confident use of economic theory will allow practitioners to demonstrate how a poor standard of professional diligence lies at the heart of consumer harm. The book provides both theoretical and practical examples of how to combine existing law with economic theory to improve case outcomes. The book shows how public enforcers can move beyond the dominant transparency paradigm to an approach where firms have a positive duty to treat consumers fairly and shape their commercial offers in a way that prevents consumers from making mistakes. Over time, this ''fairness-by-design'' approach will emerge as the only acceptable way to compete.