In this comprehensive, balanced examination of Argentina's Dirty War, Lewis analyzes the causes, describes the ideologies that motivated both sides, and explores the consequences of all-or-nothing politics. The military and guerrillas may seem marginal today, but Lewis questions whether the Dirty War is really over.Lewis traces the Dirty War's origins back to military interventions in the 1930s and 1940s, and the rise of General Juan Peron's populist regime, which resulted in the polarization of Argentine society. Peron's overthrow by the military in 1955 only heightened social conflict by producing a resistance movement out of which several guerrilla organizations would soon emerge. The ideologies, terrorist tactics, and internal dynamics of those underground groups are examined in detail, as well as their links to other movements in Argentina and abroad. The guerrillas reached the height of their influence when the military withdrew from power in 1973 and turned over the government to Peron's puppet president, Hector Campora. They quickly found themselves in opposition again after Peron returned from exile, and as Peronism dissolved into factions after Peron's death, the military prepared to take power again, inspired by a new National Security Doctrine. The origins of this ideology in U.S. Cold War doctrine and in French revolutionary war doctrine are fully explored because the Argentine military's Dirty War strategy and tactics grew directly out of these ideas. The arrests, the treatment of prisoners, and the mindset of the interrogators are treated in detail. Special attention is given to the anti-guerrilla war in Tucuman's jungles, the strange history of David Graiver (the guerrillas' banker) and the Timerman case. In the concluding section of the book, Lewis describes the intrigues that undermined the military regime, its retreat from power, and the human rights trials that were held under the new democratic government. Those trials eventually were stopped by military revolts. Presidential pardons followed and have left Argentina divided once more. This is an important survey for scholars and students of Latin American politics, contemporary history, and civil-military relations.

In this comprehensive, balanced examination of Argentina's Dirty War, Lewis analyzes the causes, describes the ideologies that motivated both sides, and explores the consequences of all-or-nothing politics. The military and guerrillas may seem marginal today, but Lewis questions whether the Dirty War is really over.Lewis traces the Dirty War's origins back to military interventions in the 1930s and 1940s, and the rise of General Juan Peron's populist regime, which resulted in the polarization of Argentine society. Peron's overthrow by the military in 1955 only heightened social conflict by producing a resistance movement out of which several guerrilla organizations would soon emerge. The ideologies, terrorist tactics, and internal dynamics of those underground groups are examined in detail, as well as their links to other movements in Argentina and abroad. The guerrillas reached the height of their influence when the military withdrew from power in 1973 and turned over the government to Peron's puppet president, Hector Campora. They quickly found themselves in opposition again after Peron returned from exile, and as Peronism dissolved into factions after Peron's death, the military prepared to take power again, inspired by a new National Security Doctrine. The origins of this ideology in U.S. Cold War doctrine and in French revolutionary war doctrine are fully explored because the Argentine military's Dirty War strategy and tactics grew directly out of these ideas. The arrests, the treatment of prisoners, and the mindset of the interrogators are treated in detail. Special attention is given to the anti-guerrilla war in Tucuman's jungles, the strange history of David Graiver (the guerrillas' banker) and the Timerman case. In the concluding section of the book, Lewis describes the intrigues that undermined the military regime, its retreat from power, and the human rights trials that were held under the new democratic government. Those trials eventually were stopped by military revolts. Presidential pardons followed and have left Argentina divided once more. This is an important survey for scholars and students of Latin American politics, contemporary history, and civil-military relations.

Many dictatorships are short-lived, but a few manage to stay in power for decades. Lewis takes three Latin fascist tyrants—Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar—and shows how they perpetuated their rule through the careful recruitment and circulation of top-echelon subordinates to carry out their orders.Long-established dictatorships have to respond to political and social pressures surrounding them, just as democracies do, but it is harder to study them because they are closed systems. One possible way of viewing their internal processes is by observing who they recruit into top leadership positions. Every dictator, however powerful, must delegate some authortiy to an elite stratum just below him. By watching which kinds of men are recruited, how long they are kept in power, and whether different skills are sought at different times, it may be possible to chart the evolution of a 20- or 30-year regime.The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar regimes all fit the criteria of being long-established. Mussolini ruled for almost 21 years, Franco for over 37, and Salazar for 36. Moreover, all three shared a family resemblance as being fascist. Comparing them affords the additional advantage of adding to our understanding of the Latin variant of fascism, as contrasted to the Central and Eastern European. A provocative work for scholars, students, and other researchers involved with European Politics, Modern European History, and fascist regimes.

Many dictatorships are short-lived, but a few manage to stay in power for decades. Lewis takes three Latin fascist tyrants—Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar—and shows how they perpetuated their rule through the careful recruitment and circulation of top-echelon subordinates to carry out their orders.Long-established dictatorships have to respond to political and social pressures surrounding them, just as democracies do, but it is harder to study them because they are closed systems. One possible way of viewing their internal processes is by observing who they recruit into top leadership positions. Every dictator, however powerful, must delegate some authortiy to an elite stratum just below him. By watching which kinds of men are recruited, how long they are kept in power, and whether different skills are sought at different times, it may be possible to chart the evolution of a 20- or 30-year regime.The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar regimes all fit the criteria of being long-established. Mussolini ruled for almost 21 years, Franco for over 37, and Salazar for 36. Moreover, all three shared a family resemblance as being fascist. Comparing them affords the additional advantage of adding to our understanding of the Latin variant of fascism, as contrasted to the Central and Eastern European. A provocative work for scholars, students, and other researchers involved with European Politics, Modern European History, and fascist regimes.

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world's ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….'"

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world's ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….'"

Strong, colorful personalities who impose their will upon laws, constitutions, courts, and congresses are an enduring feature of Latin American politics, beginning with the violent regional bosses (caudillos) of the early nineteenth century and continuing with the "hyper-presidential" systems of today. Paul Lewis explores the origins of the region's authoritarian culture and the different types of regimes that have exhibited it. Taking a student-friendly chronological approach, this thoughtful and accessible text begins with a brief overview of Latin America's Iberian heritage, then describes the general breakdown of order and the rise of the caudillos following independence. Lewis shows how the internal dynamics of caudillo politics have produced, in one country after another, either strong personalistic dictatorships or oligarchies that ruthlessly imposed order on their societies. Order made economic growth and urbanization possible, yet created great social injustices that spurred the development of mass politics. The author describes the twentieth-century upheavals that brought the people into the political arena, resulting in a variety of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary regimes that borrow their inspiration from fascism and communism. Balanced yet cautious about the future of democracy in the region, this accessible book will be invaluable for courses on contemporary Latin America.

Strong, colorful personalities who impose their will upon laws, constitutions, courts, and congresses are an enduring feature of Latin American politics, beginning with the violent regional bosses (caudillos) of the early nineteenth century and continuing with the "hyper-presidential" systems of today. Paul Lewis explores the origins of the region''s authoritarian culture and the different types of regimes that have exhibited it. Taking a student-friendly chronological approach, this thoughtful and accessible text begins with a brief overview of Latin America''s Iberian heritage, then describes the general breakdown of order and the rise of the caudillos following independence. Lewis shows how the internal dynamics of caudillo politics have produced, in one country after another, either strong personalistic dictatorships or oligarchies that ruthlessly imposed order on their societies. Order made economic growth and urbanization possible, yet created great social injustices that spurred the development of mass politics. The author describes the twentieth-century upheavals that brought the people into the political arena, resulting in a variety of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary regimes that borrow their inspiration from fascism and communism. Balanced yet cautious about the future of democracy in the region, this accessible book will be invaluable for courses on contemporary Latin America.

At the end of World War II, Argentina was the most industrialized nation in Latin America, with a highly urbanized, literate, and pluralistic society. But over the past four decades, the country has suffered political and economic crises of increasing intensity that have stalled industrial growth, sharpened class conflict, and led to long periods of military rule. In this book, Paul Lewis attempts to explain how that happened. Lewis begins by describing the early development of Argentine industry, from just before the turn of the century to the eve of Juan Peron's rise to power after World War II. He discusses the emergence of the new industrialists and urban workers and delineates the relationships between those classes and the traditional agrarian elites who controlled the state. Under Peron, the country shifted from an essentially liberal strategy of development to a more corporatist approach. Whereas most writers view Peron as a pragmatist, if not opportunist, Lewis treats him as an ideologue whose views remained consistent throughout his career, and he holds Peron, along with his military colleagues, chiefly responsible for ending the evolution of Argentina's economy toward dynamic capitalism. Lewis describes the political stalemate between Peronists and anti-Peronists from 1955 to 1987 and shows how the failure of post-Peron governments to incorporate the trade union movement into the political and economic mainstream resulted in political polarization, economic stagnation, and a growing level of violence. He then recounts Peron's triumphal return to power and the subsequent inability of his government to restore order and economic vigor through a return to corporatist measures. Finally, Lewis examines the equally disappointing failures of the succeeding military regime under General Videla and the restoration of democracy under President Raul Alfonsin to revive the free market. By focusing on the organization, development, and political activities of pressure groups rather than on parties or governmental institutions, Lewis gets to the root causes of Argentina's instability and decline--what he calls ""the politics of political stagnation."" At the same time, he provides important information about Argentina's entrepreneurial classes and their relation to labor, government, the military, and foreign capital. The book is unique in the wealth of its detail and the depth of its analysis.

From a North American perspective, the turbulence that dominated Paraguayan politics during the Liberal Era appears so pervasive as to approach anarchy. But in this seemingly haphazard succession of administrations, political machines, and governmental systems, Paul Lewis sees a pattern of evolution. His astute examination of political institutionalization employs the concept of political generations to explain Paraguayan conflict and change while analyzing a significant but understudied period of Paraguayan history. Lewis chronicles the growth of the two major Paraguayan parties, the Liberals and the Colorados, from their early days as political clubs through periods of personalist caudillo politics, national machine politics, and finally institutionalized party politics. Arguing that coalitions formed along generational lines and then held power until a new--and often younger--group pushed them aside, he ties the rise and fall of party fortunes to generational change. Lewis constructs a multistage theory of political party development that makes sense not only of Paraguay's Liberal Era but also of political turmoil in many Latin American states.

At the end of World War II, Argentina was the most industrialized nation in Latin America, with a highly urbanized, literate, and pluralistic society. But over the past four decades, the country has suffered political and economic crises of increasing intensity that have stalled industrial growth, sharpened class conflict, and led to long periods of military rule. In this book, Paul Lewis attempts to explain how that happened.Lewis begins by describing the early development of Argentine industry, from just before the turn of the century to the eve of Juan Peron''s rise to power after World War II. He discusses the emergence of the new industrialists and urban workers and delineates the relationships between those classes and the traditional agrarian elites who controlled the state.Under Peron, the country shifted from an essentially liberal strategy of development to a more corporatist approach. Whereas most writers view Peron as a pragmatist, if not opportunist, Lewis treats him as an ideologue whose views remained consistent throughout his career, and he holds Peron, along with his military colleagues, chiefly responsible for ending the evolution of Argentina''s economy toward dynamic capitalism.Lewis describes the political stalemate between Peronists and anti-Peronists from 1955 to 1987 and shows how the failure of post-Peron governments to incorporate the trade union movement into the political and economic mainstream resulted in political polarization, economic stagnation, and a growing level of violence. He then recounts Peron''s triumphal return to power and the subsequent inability of his government to restore order and economic vigor through a return to corporatist measures. Finally, Lewis examines the equally disappointing failures of the succeeding military regime under General Videla and the restoration of democracy under President Raul Alfonsin to revive the free market.By focusing on the organization, development, and political activities of pressure groups rather than on parties or governmental institutions, Lewis gets to the root causes of Argentina''s instability and decline--what he calls "the politics of political stagnation." At the same time, he provides important information about Argentina''s entrepreneurial classes and their relation to labor, government, the military, and foreign capital. The book is unique in the wealth of its detail and the depth of its analysis.

The Febrerista party of Paraguay, which is examined here, is particularly interesting because it has operated in exile for twenty-seven of the thirty years of its existence. This is an informative study concerning a long-neglected type of political party and should invite comparative analyses from other countries.Originally published in 1968.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world''s ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….''"

In this comprehensive, balanced examination of Argentina's Dirty War, Lewis analyzes the causes, describes the ideologies that motivated both sides, and explores the consequences of all-or-nothing politics. The military and guerrillas may seem marginal today, but Lewis questions whether the Dirty War is really over.Lewis traces the Dirty War's origins back to military interventions in the 1930s and 1940s, and the rise of General Juan Peron's populist regime, which resulted in the polarization of Argentine society. Peron's overthrow by the military in 1955 only heightened social conflict by producing a resistance movement out of which several guerrilla organizations would soon emerge. The ideologies, terrorist tactics, and internal dynamics of those underground groups are examined in detail, as well as their links to other movements in Argentina and abroad. The guerrillas reached the height of their influence when the military withdrew from power in 1973 and turned over the government to Peron's puppet president, Hector Campora. They quickly found themselves in opposition again after Peron returned from exile, and as Peronism dissolved into factions after Peron's death, the military prepared to take power again, inspired by a new National Security Doctrine. The origins of this ideology in U.S. Cold War doctrine and in French revolutionary war doctrine are fully explored because the Argentine military's Dirty War strategy and tactics grew directly out of these ideas. The arrests, the treatment of prisoners, and the mindset of the interrogators are treated in detail. Special attention is given to the anti-guerrilla war in Tucuman's jungles, the strange history of David Graiver (the guerrillas' banker) and the Timerman case. In the concluding section of the book, Lewis describes the intrigues that undermined the military regime, its retreat from power, and the human rights trials that were held under the new democratic government. Those trials eventually were stopped by military revolts. Presidential pardons followed and have left Argentina divided once more. This is an important survey for scholars and students of Latin American politics, contemporary history, and civil-military relations.

In this comprehensive, balanced examination of Argentina's Dirty War, Lewis analyzes the causes, describes the ideologies that motivated both sides, and explores the consequences of all-or-nothing politics. The military and guerrillas may seem marginal today, but Lewis questions whether the Dirty War is really over.Lewis traces the Dirty War's origins back to military interventions in the 1930s and 1940s, and the rise of General Juan Peron's populist regime, which resulted in the polarization of Argentine society. Peron's overthrow by the military in 1955 only heightened social conflict by producing a resistance movement out of which several guerrilla organizations would soon emerge. The ideologies, terrorist tactics, and internal dynamics of those underground groups are examined in detail, as well as their links to other movements in Argentina and abroad. The guerrillas reached the height of their influence when the military withdrew from power in 1973 and turned over the government to Peron's puppet president, Hector Campora. They quickly found themselves in opposition again after Peron returned from exile, and as Peronism dissolved into factions after Peron's death, the military prepared to take power again, inspired by a new National Security Doctrine. The origins of this ideology in U.S. Cold War doctrine and in French revolutionary war doctrine are fully explored because the Argentine military's Dirty War strategy and tactics grew directly out of these ideas. The arrests, the treatment of prisoners, and the mindset of the interrogators are treated in detail. Special attention is given to the anti-guerrilla war in Tucuman's jungles, the strange history of David Graiver (the guerrillas' banker) and the Timerman case. In the concluding section of the book, Lewis describes the intrigues that undermined the military regime, its retreat from power, and the human rights trials that were held under the new democratic government. Those trials eventually were stopped by military revolts. Presidential pardons followed and have left Argentina divided once more. This is an important survey for scholars and students of Latin American politics, contemporary history, and civil-military relations.

Many dictatorships are short-lived, but a few manage to stay in power for decades. Lewis takes three Latin fascist tyrants—Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar—and shows how they perpetuated their rule through the careful recruitment and circulation of top-echelon subordinates to carry out their orders.Long-established dictatorships have to respond to political and social pressures surrounding them, just as democracies do, but it is harder to study them because they are closed systems. One possible way of viewing their internal processes is by observing who they recruit into top leadership positions. Every dictator, however powerful, must delegate some authortiy to an elite stratum just below him. By watching which kinds of men are recruited, how long they are kept in power, and whether different skills are sought at different times, it may be possible to chart the evolution of a 20- or 30-year regime.The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar regimes all fit the criteria of being long-established. Mussolini ruled for almost 21 years, Franco for over 37, and Salazar for 36. Moreover, all three shared a family resemblance as being fascist. Comparing them affords the additional advantage of adding to our understanding of the Latin variant of fascism, as contrasted to the Central and Eastern European. A provocative work for scholars, students, and other researchers involved with European Politics, Modern European History, and fascist regimes.

Many dictatorships are short-lived, but a few manage to stay in power for decades. Lewis takes three Latin fascist tyrants—Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar—and shows how they perpetuated their rule through the careful recruitment and circulation of top-echelon subordinates to carry out their orders.Long-established dictatorships have to respond to political and social pressures surrounding them, just as democracies do, but it is harder to study them because they are closed systems. One possible way of viewing their internal processes is by observing who they recruit into top leadership positions. Every dictator, however powerful, must delegate some authortiy to an elite stratum just below him. By watching which kinds of men are recruited, how long they are kept in power, and whether different skills are sought at different times, it may be possible to chart the evolution of a 20- or 30-year regime.The Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar regimes all fit the criteria of being long-established. Mussolini ruled for almost 21 years, Franco for over 37, and Salazar for 36. Moreover, all three shared a family resemblance as being fascist. Comparing them affords the additional advantage of adding to our understanding of the Latin variant of fascism, as contrasted to the Central and Eastern European. A provocative work for scholars, students, and other researchers involved with European Politics, Modern European History, and fascist regimes.

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world's ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….'"

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world's ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….'"

Strong, colorful personalities who impose their will upon laws, constitutions, courts, and congresses are an enduring feature of Latin American politics, beginning with the violent regional bosses (caudillos) of the early nineteenth century and continuing with the "hyper-presidential" systems of today. Paul Lewis explores the origins of the region's authoritarian culture and the different types of regimes that have exhibited it. Taking a student-friendly chronological approach, this thoughtful and accessible text begins with a brief overview of Latin America's Iberian heritage, then describes the general breakdown of order and the rise of the caudillos following independence. Lewis shows how the internal dynamics of caudillo politics have produced, in one country after another, either strong personalistic dictatorships or oligarchies that ruthlessly imposed order on their societies. Order made economic growth and urbanization possible, yet created great social injustices that spurred the development of mass politics. The author describes the twentieth-century upheavals that brought the people into the political arena, resulting in a variety of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary regimes that borrow their inspiration from fascism and communism. Balanced yet cautious about the future of democracy in the region, this accessible book will be invaluable for courses on contemporary Latin America.

Strong, colorful personalities who impose their will upon laws, constitutions, courts, and congresses are an enduring feature of Latin American politics, beginning with the violent regional bosses (caudillos) of the early nineteenth century and continuing with the "hyper-presidential" systems of today. Paul Lewis explores the origins of the region''s authoritarian culture and the different types of regimes that have exhibited it. Taking a student-friendly chronological approach, this thoughtful and accessible text begins with a brief overview of Latin America''s Iberian heritage, then describes the general breakdown of order and the rise of the caudillos following independence. Lewis shows how the internal dynamics of caudillo politics have produced, in one country after another, either strong personalistic dictatorships or oligarchies that ruthlessly imposed order on their societies. Order made economic growth and urbanization possible, yet created great social injustices that spurred the development of mass politics. The author describes the twentieth-century upheavals that brought the people into the political arena, resulting in a variety of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary regimes that borrow their inspiration from fascism and communism. Balanced yet cautious about the future of democracy in the region, this accessible book will be invaluable for courses on contemporary Latin America.

At the end of World War II, Argentina was the most industrialized nation in Latin America, with a highly urbanized, literate, and pluralistic society. But over the past four decades, the country has suffered political and economic crises of increasing intensity that have stalled industrial growth, sharpened class conflict, and led to long periods of military rule. In this book, Paul Lewis attempts to explain how that happened. Lewis begins by describing the early development of Argentine industry, from just before the turn of the century to the eve of Juan Peron's rise to power after World War II. He discusses the emergence of the new industrialists and urban workers and delineates the relationships between those classes and the traditional agrarian elites who controlled the state. Under Peron, the country shifted from an essentially liberal strategy of development to a more corporatist approach. Whereas most writers view Peron as a pragmatist, if not opportunist, Lewis treats him as an ideologue whose views remained consistent throughout his career, and he holds Peron, along with his military colleagues, chiefly responsible for ending the evolution of Argentina's economy toward dynamic capitalism. Lewis describes the political stalemate between Peronists and anti-Peronists from 1955 to 1987 and shows how the failure of post-Peron governments to incorporate the trade union movement into the political and economic mainstream resulted in political polarization, economic stagnation, and a growing level of violence. He then recounts Peron's triumphal return to power and the subsequent inability of his government to restore order and economic vigor through a return to corporatist measures. Finally, Lewis examines the equally disappointing failures of the succeeding military regime under General Videla and the restoration of democracy under President Raul Alfonsin to revive the free market. By focusing on the organization, development, and political activities of pressure groups rather than on parties or governmental institutions, Lewis gets to the root causes of Argentina's instability and decline--what he calls ""the politics of political stagnation."" At the same time, he provides important information about Argentina's entrepreneurial classes and their relation to labor, government, the military, and foreign capital. The book is unique in the wealth of its detail and the depth of its analysis.

From a North American perspective, the turbulence that dominated Paraguayan politics during the Liberal Era appears so pervasive as to approach anarchy. But in this seemingly haphazard succession of administrations, political machines, and governmental systems, Paul Lewis sees a pattern of evolution. His astute examination of political institutionalization employs the concept of political generations to explain Paraguayan conflict and change while analyzing a significant but understudied period of Paraguayan history. Lewis chronicles the growth of the two major Paraguayan parties, the Liberals and the Colorados, from their early days as political clubs through periods of personalist caudillo politics, national machine politics, and finally institutionalized party politics. Arguing that coalitions formed along generational lines and then held power until a new--and often younger--group pushed them aside, he ties the rise and fall of party fortunes to generational change. Lewis constructs a multistage theory of political party development that makes sense not only of Paraguay's Liberal Era but also of political turmoil in many Latin American states.

At the end of World War II, Argentina was the most industrialized nation in Latin America, with a highly urbanized, literate, and pluralistic society. But over the past four decades, the country has suffered political and economic crises of increasing intensity that have stalled industrial growth, sharpened class conflict, and led to long periods of military rule. In this book, Paul Lewis attempts to explain how that happened.Lewis begins by describing the early development of Argentine industry, from just before the turn of the century to the eve of Juan Peron''s rise to power after World War II. He discusses the emergence of the new industrialists and urban workers and delineates the relationships between those classes and the traditional agrarian elites who controlled the state.Under Peron, the country shifted from an essentially liberal strategy of development to a more corporatist approach. Whereas most writers view Peron as a pragmatist, if not opportunist, Lewis treats him as an ideologue whose views remained consistent throughout his career, and he holds Peron, along with his military colleagues, chiefly responsible for ending the evolution of Argentina''s economy toward dynamic capitalism.Lewis describes the political stalemate between Peronists and anti-Peronists from 1955 to 1987 and shows how the failure of post-Peron governments to incorporate the trade union movement into the political and economic mainstream resulted in political polarization, economic stagnation, and a growing level of violence. He then recounts Peron''s triumphal return to power and the subsequent inability of his government to restore order and economic vigor through a return to corporatist measures. Finally, Lewis examines the equally disappointing failures of the succeeding military regime under General Videla and the restoration of democracy under President Raul Alfonsin to revive the free market.By focusing on the organization, development, and political activities of pressure groups rather than on parties or governmental institutions, Lewis gets to the root causes of Argentina''s instability and decline--what he calls "the politics of political stagnation." At the same time, he provides important information about Argentina''s entrepreneurial classes and their relation to labor, government, the military, and foreign capital. The book is unique in the wealth of its detail and the depth of its analysis.

The Febrerista party of Paraguay, which is examined here, is particularly interesting because it has operated in exile for twenty-seven of the thirty years of its existence. This is an informative study concerning a long-neglected type of political party and should invite comparative analyses from other countries.Originally published in 1968.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

This diagnostic history of Argentina's economic prostration is full of timely lessons for readers in the United States about how an irresponsible capitalist elite and cynical politicians can lead a wealthy nation to throw it all away.They say those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Thus the importance of this book. The Agony of Argentine Capitalism: From Menem to the Kirchners is the capstone of a magisterial trilogy exploring the reasons for Argentina's shocking "reversal of development." In the early 20th century, Argentina was a rising star. It was one of the world''s ten richest countries, on course to a place among the most advanced and prosperous liberal democracies in the world. Then, in 1929, Argentina fell into an economic coma from which no political or military shock treatment has been able to rouse it.The collapse of Argentina's capitalist class has been so devastating that little support remains for free enterprise or free trade. Her fate poses an intellectual challenge for First World capitalist countries. As famed economist Paul Samuelson warned: "Argentina is the pattern no modern capitalist may face without crossing himself and saying, 'There but for the grace of God….''"