Paul W. Thurner – författare

This volume investigates nuclear energy policies in Western Europe over the entire post-war period, but with special attention to the two most recent decades. The comparative analytical perspective draws on the interplay between voters' attitudes, challenging movements, party competition, and coalition formation. Spanning more than 60 years and 16 countries, the researchers examine the underlying causal processes leading to the observed varieties of Western European nuclear energy policies. Based on a mixed methods approach using both structured case studies as well as quantitative analyses, the study shows that the nature of party competition under given institutional contexts is a key-driver for, as a rule, tactically motivated governmental policy changes and stability, respectively. Part I introduces the practical and theoretical relevance of the topic. It outlines the reasoning of the major scientific contributions with regard to nuclear energy policies, and offers a theoretical alternative to the previous literatures that has been predominantly movements-oriented. Additionally, it provides core economic and political indicators of the changing role of nuclear energy in the countries. Part II consists of seven in-depth case studies where the outlined theoretical perspective is applied. Part III consists of a general summary, short narratives of the countries not covered in case studies, qualitative comparison and an assessment of the factors for policy change from multivariate analysis.

This book provides a detailed examination of the complex negotiation processes surrounding intergovernmental conferences in the European Union.Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and its ‘appendix’, the Treaty of Nice in 2002, any reform of the treaty framework of the European Union seems to be doomed to fail, evidenced by the decline of the Constitutional Treaty and by the current fate of the Lisbon treaty. By presenting an extensive quantitative study of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/7 prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the authors argue that these negotiations reveal the major challenges of European integration. Drawing on advanced statistical methods, they contend that multi-level negotiations require an appropriate coordination of informal administrative networks and the empowerment of administrative leadership, with these factors significantly shaping the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations. Through these findings, this book lays down the foundation for future evidence-based evaluations of negotiations and implementation studies, and delivers new insights on decision-making within the European Union.European Union Intergovernmental Conferences will be of interest to students and researchers of political science, sociology, administrative science, business and management studies, international law and European law.

This book provides a detailed examination of the complex negotiation processes surrounding intergovernmental conferences in the European Union.Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and its ‘appendix’, the Treaty of Nice in 2002, any reform of the constitutional framework of the European Union experiences formidable difficulties. By presenting an extensive study of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/7 prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the authors argue that these negotiations reveal major challenges of European integration. They contend that multi-level negotiations require an appropriate coordination of informal administrative networks and the empowerment of administrative leadership, with these factors significantly shaping the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations. Through these findings, this book lays down the foundation for future evidence-based support and evaluation of multilateral negotiations, and delivers new insights on decision-making within the European Union. It draws on advanced statistical methods and network analysis. European Union Intergovernmental Conferences will be of interest to students and researchers of political science, sociology, administrative science, business and management studies, international law and European law.

Paul W. Thurner untersucht, wie es zu konstitutionellen Entscheidungen, d.h. Entscheidungen über das zukünftige Design einer Organisation und zur Verteilung der jeweiligen Kompetenzen auf deren Teilnehmer kommt. Theoretischer Ausgangspunkt seiner Untersuchung ist die neue Institutionenökonomie und die Organisationssoziologie. Als Anwendungsbeispiel dient ein Bereich internationaler Verhandlungen und deren Vorbereitungen, konkret: die Regierungskonferenz 1996. Diese mündete bekanntlich in den Vertrag von Amsterdam. Der Autor analysiert die Auswirkungen der regierungsinternen formalen und informellen Organisationsstrukturen im Hinblick auf Qualität, Quantität und die Dynamik von signalisierten Verhandlungspositionen sowie die letztendliche Verhandlungsperformanz bzw. Durchsetzungskraft der Mitgliedstaaten der damaligen EU-15. Zur Rekonstruktion der informellen Regierungsorganisationen ermittelt er informelle Kommunikations- und Koordinationskanäle der Ministerialbürokratie. Hierbei werden auch sogenannte transgouvernementale, also die Organisationsgrenzen durchstoßende Netzwerke berücksichtigt. Unter Verwendung der Terminologie und der Techniken der quantitativen Netzwerkanalyse werden die in der Literatur häufig nur begrifflich diskutierten entscheidungsrelevanten Merkmale von Organisationen operationalisiert und deren relative Auswirkungen mittels diverser statistischer Verfahren quantitativ bestimmt. Erstmals gelingt es damit, Graham Allisons Modell III der Außenpolitikformulierung in einem empirisch-operationalem Modell anzuwenden,