Pavel Gregoric - Böcker

Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are active. Observing that lower animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the 'common sense' or sensus communis. Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. Pavel Gregoric offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. Aristotle on the Common Sense begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, Gregoric provides a detailed examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are active. Observing that lower animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the 'common sense' or sensus communis. Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. Pavel Gregoric offers and extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. Aristotle on the Common Sense begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, Gregoric provides a detailed examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

This collection of essays engages with several topics in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, some well-known and hotly debated, some new and yet to be explored. The contributors analyze Aristotle’s arguments and present their cases in ways that invite contemporary philosophers of mind to consider the potentials—and pitfalls—of an Aristotelian philosophy of mind.The volume brings together an international group of renowned Aristotelian scholars as well as rising stars to cover five main themes: method in the philosophy of mind, sense perception, mental representation, intellect, and the metaphysics of mind. The papers collected in this volume, with their choice of topics and quality of exposition, show why Aristotle is a philosopher of mind to be studied and reckoned with in contemporary discussions.Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of ancient philosophy and philosophy of mind.

This collection of essays engages with several topics in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, some well-known and hotly debated, some new and yet to be explored. The contributors analyze Aristotle’s arguments and present their cases in ways that invite contemporary philosophers of mind to consider the potentials—and pitfalls—of an Aristotelian philosophy of mind.The volume brings together an international group of renowned Aristotelian scholars as well as rising stars to cover five main themes: method in the philosophy of mind, sense perception, mental representation, intellect, and the metaphysics of mind. The papers collected in this volume, with their choice of topics and quality of exposition, show why Aristotle is a philosopher of mind to be studied and reckoned with in contemporary discussions.Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of ancient philosophy and philosophy of mind.

In this volume, leading scholars explore aspects of Renaissance Aristotelianism in the overlooked region of Southeast Europe. Uncovering forgotten texts, neglected topics, and little-known authors, ten chapters examine the philosophies and scholarly practices of figures including Antonio Zara, Nikola Vitov Gucetic (Nicolaus Viti Gozzius), Matija Frkic (Matthaeus Ferchius), Juraj Dubrovcanin (Georgius Raguseius), and Daniel Furlanus.The volume is organized into three sections. ‘Scholarship’ explores various aspects of accumulation, organization, and the display of knowledge typical for the Renaissance period. ‘Metaphysics’ looks at Aristotelian cosmological theories and doctrines, as well as exceptions to the general demise of metaphysics as a discipline in the Renaissance. ‘Interactions with Platonism’ provides different angles on how Renaissance philosophers handled the authority and the intellectual legacy of the two towering figures, Plato and Aristotle. In so doing, this volume provides insight into a number of topics central to Renaissance Aristotelianism in general. Beginning with an Editors’ Introduction offering vital context to the differing interpretations of Aristotelianism at the time, as well as a brief history of the areas in focus, this is an essential resource for anyone wanting to broaden their understanding of Renaissance Aristotelianism beyond the oft-examined cultural centres of Western Europe.

In this volume, leading scholars explore aspects of Renaissance Aristotelianism in the overlooked region of Southeast Europe. Uncovering forgotten texts, neglected topics, and little-known authors, ten chapters examine the philosophies and scholarly practices of figures including Antonio Zara, Nikola Vitov Gucetic (Nicolaus Viti Gozzius), Matija Frkic (Matthaeus Ferchius), Juraj Dubrovcanin (Georgius Raguseius), and Daniel Furlanus.The volume is organized into three sections. ‘Scholarship’ explores various aspects of accumulation, organization, and the display of knowledge typical for the Renaissance period. ‘Metaphysics’ looks at Aristotelian cosmological theories and doctrines, as well as exceptions to the general demise of metaphysics as a discipline in the Renaissance. ‘Interactions with Platonism’ provides different angles on how Renaissance philosophers handled the authority and the intellectual legacy of the two towering figures, Plato and Aristotle. In so doing, this volume provides insight into a number of topics central to Renaissance Aristotelianism in general. Beginning with an Editors’ Introduction offering vital context to the differing interpretations of Aristotelianism at the time, as well as a brief history of the areas in focus, this is an essential resource for anyone wanting to broaden their understanding of Renaissance Aristotelianism beyond the oft-examined cultural centres of Western Europe.