Peter van Inwagen – författare

The Abstract and the Concrete presents nine essays in ontology by Peter van Inwagen. Three of the essays concern topics in meta-ontology: the idea of multiple modes of being; Carnap's idea that the questions of "ontology," insofar as they are meaningful at all, are questions about which linguistic frameworks it is expedient to employ; the concept of one object's being metaphysically more fundamental that another. Three of the essays concern various topics that pertain to the author's "lower-case" or "lightweight" platonism. (According to lightweight platonism, there are attributes-necessarily existent universals. These attributes are not constituents of substances, they cannot enter into causal relations, and it is false that an F object is F in virtue of instantiating the attribute of being F.) The remaining three essays examine proposed answers to particular ontological questions: the question of the validity of mathematical fictionalism; the question whether it is analytic that at any place at which some xs are arranged chairwise, there is there a chair; the question of what it means to say that colour is an illusion, and whether (in the sense determined) colour is an illusion.

For millennia, philosophers have debated about the existence of things - not only the existence of things like God, demons and the soul, but things like mathematical objects, qualities and attributes, or merely possible states of affairs and people. Ontology is the present-day name for the part of philosophy that addresses such questions. Being attempts to answer these old questions-and the question of how one should go about attempting to answer them.This book presents and defends a meta-ontology and an ontology. Quine has taught us to use the word 'ontology' as a label for the part of philosophy that addresses "the ontological question" - 'What is there?' Meta-ontology, then, is the part of philosophy that addresses two questions, 'What is it to be (or to exist)?' and 'How should one attempt to answer the ontological question?' Chapters 1 and 5 are devoted to meta-ontology - Chapter 1 to a defense of the "neo-Quinean" meta-ontology, Chapter 5 to an examination of various alternative meta-ontologies. The essence of neo-Quineanism is that 'x exists' and 'Something is x' and 'The number of things that are x is not 0' mean more or less the same thing'. Neo-Quineanism obviously entails that there are no non-existent things, for nothing is such that nothing is it and everything is such that the number of things identical with it is 1. Chapter 2 is an examination of various positions that imply that there are non-existent things. The topic of Chapter 3 is the ancient "problem of universals," or the problem of the existence and nature of abstract objects. Chapter 4 is devoted to questions concerning possible worlds and other objects belonging to the ontology of modality.

The author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for free will and argues that free will is necessary for moral responsibility.

It is generally supposed that the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering, much of it truly horrible suffering, confronts those who believe in an all-powerful and benevolent Creator with a serious problem: to explain why such a Creator would permit this. Many reflective people are convinced that the problem, the problem of evil, is insoluble. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as a powerful argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: If there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. Peter van Inwagen examines this argument, which he regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. His conclusion is that (like most philosophical arguments) it is a failure. He seeks to demonstrate, not that God exists, but the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering does not show that God does not exist.Along the way he discusses a wide range of topics of interest to philosophers and theologians, such as: the concept of God; what might be meant by describing a philosophical argument as a failure; the distinction between versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Lisbon earthquake or the death of a fawn in a forest fire; the free-will defense; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.

The nature of persons is a perennial topic of debate in philosophy, currently enjoying something of a revival. In this volume for the first time metaphysical debates about the nature of human persons are brought together with related debates in philosophy of religion and theology. Fifteen specially written essays explore idealist, dualist, and materialist views of persons, discuss specifically Christian conceptions of the value of embodiment, and address four central topics in philosophical theology: incarnation, resurrection, original sin, and the trinity.

The nature of persons is a perennial topic of debate in philosophy, currently enjoying something of a revival. In this volume for the first time metaphysical debates about the nature of human persons are brought together with related debates in philosophy of religion and theology. Fifteen specially written essays explore idealist, dualist, and materialist views of persons, discuss specifically Christian conceptions of the value of embodiment, and address four central topics in philosophical theology: incarnation, resurrection, original sin, and the trinity.

It is generally supposed that the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering, much of it truly horrible suffering, confronts those who believe in an all-powerful and benevolent Creator with a serious problem: to explain why such a Creator would permit this. Many reflective people are convinced that the problem, the problem of evil, is insoluble. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as a powerful argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: If there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. Peter van Inwagen examines this argument, which he regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. His conclusion is that (like most philosophical arguments) it is a failure. He seeks to demonstrate, not that God exists, but the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering does not show that God does not exist.Along the way he discusses a wide range of topics of interest to philosophers and theologians, such as: the concept of God; what might be meant by describing a philosophical argument as a failure; the distinction between versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Lisbon earthquake or the death of a fawn in a forest fire; the free-will defense; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.

In Do Numbers Exist? Peter van Inwagen and William Lane Craig take opposite sides on whether there are abstract objects, such as numbers and properties. Craig argues that there are no abstract objects, whereas Van Inwagen argues that there are. Their exchange explores various arguments about the existence and nature of abstract objects. They focus especially on whether our ordinary and scientific thought and talk commit us to abstract objects, surveying the options available to us and the objections each faces. The debate covers central problems and methods in metaphysics, and also delves into theological questions raised by abstract objects.Key Features:Showcases the presentation and defense of two points of view on the existence of abstract objects, from two of the world’s leading philosophersPresents definitions in an easily accessible formProvides frequent summaries of previously covered materialIncludes a glossary of all specialized vocabulary

In Do Numbers Exist? Peter van Inwagen and William Lane Craig take opposite sides on whether there are abstract objects, such as numbers and properties. Craig argues that there are no abstract objects, whereas Van Inwagen argues that there are. Their exchange explores various arguments about the existence and nature of abstract objects. They focus especially on whether our ordinary and scientific thought and talk commit us to abstract objects, surveying the options available to us and the objections each faces. The debate covers central problems and methods in metaphysics, and also delves into theological questions raised by abstract objects.Key Features:Showcases the presentation and defense of two points of view on the existence of abstract objects, from two of the world’s leading philosophersPresents definitions in an easily accessible formProvides frequent summaries of previously covered materialIncludes a glossary of all specialized vocabulary

This book gathers together thirteen of Peter van Inwagen's essays on metaphysics, several of which have acquired the status of modern classics in their field. They range widely across such topics as Quine's philosophy of quantification, the ontology of fiction, the part-whole relation, the theory of 'temporal parts', and human knowledge of modal truths. In addition, van Inwagen considers the question as to whether the psychological continuity theory of personal identity is compatible with materialism, and defends the thesis that possible states of affairs are abstract objects, in opposition to David Lewis's 'extreme modal realism'. A specially-written introduction completes the collection, which will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in metaphysics.

This book gathers together thirteen of Peter van Inwagen's essays on metaphysics, several of which have acquired the status of modern classics in their field. They range widely across such topics as Quine's philosophy of quantification, the ontology of fiction, the part-whole relation, the theory of 'temporal parts', and human knowledge of modal truths. In addition, van Inwagen considers the question as to whether the psychological continuity theory of personal identity is compatible with materialism, and defends the thesis that possible states of affairs are abstract objects, in opposition to David Lewis's 'extreme modal realism'. A specially-written introduction completes the collection, which will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in metaphysics.

"There is much to bee learned from this book.... Material Beings is a refreshing example of straight-on, full-speed metaphysics. Van Inwagen goes where his arguments lead him-and they lead him to some remarkable places indeed."-Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchAccording to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

In a book that will appeal to a general audience as well as philosophers of religion, a leading metaphysician tackles fundamental theological problems in a lucid and engaging manner. Peter van Inwagen begins with a provocative new introduction exploring the question of whether a philosopher such as himself is qualified to address theological matters. The chapters that follow take up the central problem of evil in a world created and sustained by God.

"There is much to bee learned from this book.... Material Beings is a refreshing example of straight-on, full-speed metaphysics. Van Inwagen goes where his arguments lead him-and they lead him to some remarkable places indeed."-Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchAccording to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

This book is an introduction to metaphysics. It presupposes no previous acquaintance with philosophy, and addresses the following questions: What is metaphysics? Is there a plurality of things, or is there only one thing? Is there an external world, a world of things that exist independently of human thought and sensation? What is time? Is there such a thing as objective truth? Why is there something rather than nothing? Does our existence have a meaning? Are we physical or non-physical beings? Do we have free will? Are there things that do not exist? Do universals exist?This Fifth Edition differs from the Fourth in that the long, previously difficult chapter on time has been extensively rewritten, making it much more accessible and engaging for the student reader. In addition, the author has enhanced clarity throughout the text with improvements to word choice, sentence structure, and paragraph lucidity. Finally, the Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of each chapter and the General Bibliography have all been brought up to date.Key Features: Presupposes no prior acquaintance with philosophy, making the book ideal for the undergraduate student or interested general readerOffers 13 chapters, organized into three parts and each with its own introduction:The Way the World IsWhy the World IsThe Inhabitants of the World Incorporates extensive revisions to Chapter 4 on temporalityIncludes updates to the Chapter Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading as well as to the General Bibliography

This book is an introduction to metaphysics. It presupposes no previous acquaintance with philosophy, and addresses the following questions: What is metaphysics? Is there a plurality of things, or is there only one thing? Is there an external world, a world of things that exist independently of human thought and sensation? What is time? Is there such a thing as objective truth? Why is there something rather than nothing? Does our existence have a meaning? Are we physical or non-physical beings? Do we have free will? Are there things that do not exist? Do universals exist?This Fifth Edition differs from the Fourth in that the long, previously difficult chapter on time has been extensively rewritten, making it much more accessible and engaging for the student reader. In addition, the author has enhanced clarity throughout the text with improvements to word choice, sentence structure, and paragraph lucidity. Finally, the Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of each chapter and the General Bibliography have all been brought up to date.Key Features: Presupposes no prior acquaintance with philosophy, making the book ideal for the undergraduate student or interested general readerOffers 13 chapters, organized into three parts and each with its own introduction:The Way the World IsWhy the World IsThe Inhabitants of the World Incorporates extensive revisions to Chapter 4 on temporalityIncludes updates to the Chapter Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading as well as to the General Bibliography

The problem of the nature of being was central to ancient and medieval philosophy, and continues to be relevant today. In this collection of thirteen recent essays, Peter van Inwagen applies the techniques of analytical philosophy to a wide variety of problems in ontology and meta-ontology. Topics discussed include the nature of being, the meaning of the existential quantifier, ontological commitment, recent attacks on metaphysics and ontology, the concept of ontological structure, fictional entities, mereological sums, and the ontology of mental states. Van Inwagen adopts a generally 'Quinean' position in meta-ontology, yet reaches ontological conclusions very different from Quine's. The volume includes two previously unpublished essays, one of which is an introductory essay where van Inwagen explains his conception of the relation between the language of 'the ordinary business of life' and that of 'the ontology room'. The volume will be an important collection for students and scholars of metaphysics.

Peter van Inwagen, author of the classic book An Essay on Free Will (1983), has established himself over the last forty years as a leading figure in the philosophical debate about the problem of free will. This volume presents eleven influential essays from throughout his career, as well as two new and previously unpublished essays, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll' and 'Ability'. The essays include discussions of determinism, moral responsibility, 'Frankfurt counterexamples', the meaning of 'the ability to do otherwise', and the very definition of free will, as well as critiques of writings on the topic by Daniel Dennett and David Lewis. An introduction by the author discusses the history of his thinking about free will. The volume will be a valuable resource for those looking to engage with van Inwagen's significant contributions to this perennially important topic.

The problem of the nature of being was central to ancient and medieval philosophy, and continues to be relevant today. In this collection of thirteen recent essays, Peter van Inwagen applies the techniques of analytical philosophy to a wide variety of problems in ontology and meta-ontology. Topics discussed include the nature of being, the meaning of the existential quantifier, ontological commitment, recent attacks on metaphysics and ontology, the concept of ontological structure, fictional entities, mereological sums, and the ontology of mental states. Van Inwagen adopts a generally 'Quinean' position in meta-ontology, yet reaches ontological conclusions very different from Quine's. The volume includes two previously unpublished essays, one of which is an introductory essay where van Inwagen explains his conception of the relation between the language of 'the ordinary business of life' and that of 'the ontology room'. The volume will be an important collection for students and scholars of metaphysics.

Peter van Inwagen, author of the classic book An Essay on Free Will (1983), has established himself over the last forty years as a leading figure in the philosophical debate about the problem of free will. This volume presents eleven influential essays from throughout his career, as well as two new and previously unpublished essays, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll' and 'Ability'. The essays include discussions of determinism, moral responsibility, 'Frankfurt counterexamples', the meaning of 'the ability to do otherwise', and the very definition of free will, as well as critiques of writings on the topic by Daniel Dennett and David Lewis. An introduction by the author discusses the history of his thinking about free will. The volume will be a valuable resource for those looking to engage with van Inwagen's significant contributions to this perennially important topic.