Philippa Foot – författare

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. Natural Goodness is the long-awaited exposition of a highly original approach to moral philosophy, representing a fundamental break away from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; hers is not, however, a work of dry theory, but full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human life. This beautifully written book offers a new beginning for moral philosophy.

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated aspecial form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, endingwith a critique of Nietzsche''s immoralism.Natural Goodness is the long-awaited exposition of a highly original approach to moral philosophy, representing a fundamental break away from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; hers is not, however, a work of dry theory, but full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human life. This beautifully written book offers a new beginning for moralphilosophy.

'Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences - the primary focus of most other contemporary theorists. This volume brings together a dozen essays published between 1957 and 1977, and includes two new ones as well. In the first, Foot argues explicitly for an ethic of virtue, and in the next five discusses abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of Hume and Nietzsche. The final eight essays chart her growing disenchantment with emotivism and prescriptivism and their account of moral arguments. All the essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue.... Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle, ingenious, and some of them important.' Choice'All in all, this collection of essays provides much to whet the moral philosopher's appetite.' International Philosophical Quarterly

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated aspecial form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, endingwith a critique of Nietzsche''s immoralism.Natural Goodness is the long-awaited exposition of a highly original approach to moral philosophy, representing a fundamental break away from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; hers is not, however, a work of dry theory, but full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human life. This beautifully written book offers a new beginning for moralphilosophy.

Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied also with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such: she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion ranges over topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. Natural Goodness is the long-awaited exposition of a highly original approach to moral philosophy, representing a fundamental break away from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; hers is not, however, a work of dry theory, but full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human life. This beautifully written book offers a new beginning for moral philosophy.

These important essays by leading thinkers center around two principal topics: the nature of moral judgement, and the part played by social utility in determining right and wrong. The contributors include R.M. Hare, John R. Searle, John Rawls, C.L. Stevenson, G.E. Moore, P.T. Geach, PhilippaFoot, J.O. Urmson, and J.J.C. Smart.

Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her famous 1978 collection Virtues and Vices (now reissued) and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas presents the best of Professor Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays she develops further her influential critique of the 'non-cognitivist' approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of morality in terms of special psychological states, expressed in special kinds of judgement and a special 'moral' kind of language. Instead she portrays thoughts about the goodness of human will and action as a particular case of the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and indeed of all living things. Among other topics, she discusses the nature of moral judgement, practical rationality, and the conflict of virtue with desire and self-interest. Moral Dilemmas, alongside Professor Foot's other two books, completes the summation of her distinctive and lasting contribution to twentieth-century moral philosophy.

'Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences - the primary focus of most other contemporary theorists. This volume brings together a dozen essays published between 1957 and 1977, and includes two new ones as well. In the first, Foot argues explicitly for an ethic of virtue, and in the next five discusses abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of Hume and Nietzsche. The final eight essays chart her growing disenchantment with emotivism and prescriptivism and their account of moral arguments. All the essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue.... Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle, ingenious, and some of them important.' Choice'All in all, this collection of essays provides much to whet the moral philosopher's appetite.' International Philosophical Quarterly