R. Key Dismukes – författare

This practical guide is designed to enable individual pilots, training departments and airline managers to better understand and use the techniques of facilitation. Based on extensive field studies by the editors and invited contributors, it presents an easily accessible guide to the philosophy of facilitation combined with practical applications designed to improve training and flight operations. Illustrated with realistic examples from aviation settings, and specifically designed for aviation professionals, the applications include: * debriefing of training sessions * crew self-debriefing of line operations * analysis of problematic flight incidents * assisting crew members after traumatic events It will be essential reading for managers and instructors in airline training departments, flight training organizations, flight schools and researchers in flight training.

Most aviation accidents are attributed to human error, pilot error especially. Human error also greatly effects productivity and profitability. In his overview of this collection of papers, the editor points out that these facts are often misinterpreted as evidence of deficiency on the part of operators involved in accidents. Human factors research reveals a more accurate and useful perspective: The errors made by skilled human operators - such as pilots, controllers, and mechanics - are not root causes but symptoms of the way industry operates. The papers selected for this volume have strongly influenced modern thinking about why skilled experts make errors and how to make aviation error resilient.

Why would highly skilled, well-trained pilots make errors that lead to accidents when they had safely completed many thousands of previous flights? The majority of all aviation accidents are attributed primarily to human error, but this is often misinterpreted as evidence of lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness of the pilots. The Limits of Expertise is a fresh look at the causes of pilot error and aviation accidents, arguing that accidents can be understood only in the context of how the overall aviation system operates. The authors analyzed in great depth the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reviewed in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step. The approach is guided by extensive evidence from cognitive psychology that human skill and error are opposite sides of the same coin. The book examines the ways in which competing task demands, ambiguity and organizational pressures interact with cognitive processes to make all experts vulnerable to characteristic forms of error. The final chapter identifies themes cutting across the accidents, discusses the role of chance, criticizes simplistic concepts of causality of accidents, and suggests ways to reduce vulnerability to these catastrophes. The authors' complementary experience allowed a unique approach to the study: accident investigation with the NTSB, cognitive psychology research both in the lab and in the field, enormous first-hand experience of piloting, and application of aviation psychology in both civil and military operations. This combination allowed the authors to examine and explain the domain-specific aspects of aviation operations and to extend advances in basic research in cognition to complex issues of human performance in the real world. Although The Limits of Expertise is directed to aviation operations, the implications are clear for understanding the decision processes, skilled performance and errors of professionals in many domains, including medicine.

Despite growing concern with the effects of concurrent task demands on human performance, and research demonstrating that these demands are associated with vulnerability to error, so far there has been only limited research into the nature and range of concurrent task demands in real-world settings. This book presents a set of NASA studies that characterize the nature of concurrent task demands confronting airline flight crews in routine operations, as opposed to emergency situations. The authors analyze these demands in light of what is known about cognitive processes, particularly those of attention and memory, with the focus upon inadvertent omissions of intended actions by skilled pilots. The studies reported within the book employed several distinct but complementary methods: ethnographic observations, analysis of incident reports submitted by pilots, and cognitive task analysis. They showed that concurrent task management comprises a set of issues distinct from (though related to) mental workload, an area that has been studied extensively by human factors researchers for more than 30 years. This book will be of direct relevance to aviation psychologists and to those involved in aviation training and operations. It will also interest individuals in any domain that involves concurrent task demands, for example the work of emergency room medical teams. Furthermore, the countermeasures presented in the final chapter to reduce vulnerability to errors associated with concurrent task demands can readily be adapted to work in diverse domains.