R.A. Mall – författare

In this work the author has tried to present a brief exposition of the phenomenology of HusserI. In doing this, he had in mind a two-fold purpose. He wanted on the one hand to give a critical exposition, interpretation and appreciation of the most leading concepts of HusserI­ ian phenomenology. On the other hand, he tried to show that a true comprehensive understanding of HusserI's phenomenology culminates in his teaching of experience and reason. It is the strong conviction of the author that the central-most teaching of HusserI's phenomenology is the discovery of the "noetic­ noematic" correlativity. In the reduced realm of "constituting­ intentionality," the distinction between reason and experience seems to vanish, and these two concepts become interchangeable terms. The present study suffers from one great limitation, and this must be made clear right here in order to avoid any misconception about the author's intentions. The author has not discussed the other important theories of experience and reason. He has undertaken the humble task of giving an account of HusserI's phenomenology of experience and reason. The bringing in of Hume serves, as would be clear in the course of the book, a two-fold purpose. It tries on the one hand to show the pro­ grammatic similarity between the philosophies of these two philoso­ phers. On the other hand, it implicitly maintains that the philosophical continuity from Hume to HusserI runs not so much via Kant, but rather via Meinong, Brentano, A venarius, James and so forth.

The present work is the product of several years study of the various aspects of Kanfs Critical Philosophy and Hume's naturalism. During that time many individuals have helped with this work and it is hardly possible to set down the names of aH of them. One name does des erve special mention - Prof. Dr. H. Heimsoeth with whom the author has discussed some of the very knotty problems of Kantian Philosophy. Although Hume has been - as Kant freely admits in the Preface to his "Prolegomena" - one of the most decisive influences and turning points in the philosophical development of Kant, the author does not thematize in this work the age-old problem of whether Kant reaHy read, understood and refuted Hume. That it has been, ever since Hume wrote, a favorite pursuit among philosophers to answer hirn, to refute hirn, and to refute Kanfs attempt at refutation of hirn, irrespective of its being convincing or not, must be mentioned with special respect.

The present work is the product of several years study of the various aspects of Kanfs Critical Philosophy and Hume''s naturalism. During that time many individuals have helped with this work and it is hardly possible to set down the names of aH of them. One name does des erve special mention - Prof. Dr. H. Heimsoeth with whom the author has discussed some of the very knotty problems of Kantian Philosophy. Although Hume has been - as Kant freely admits in the Preface to his "Prolegomena" - one of the most decisive influences and turning points in the philosophical development of Kant, the author does not thematize in this work the age-old problem of whether Kant reaHy read, understood and refuted Hume. That it has been, ever since Hume wrote, a favorite pursuit among philosophers to answer hirn, to refute hirn, and to refute Kanfs attempt at refutation of hirn, irrespective of its being convincing or not, must be mentioned with special respect.

In this work the author has tried to present a brief exposition of the phenomenology of HusserI. In doing this, he had in mind a two-fold purpose. He wanted on the one hand to give a critical exposition, interpretation and appreciation of the most leading concepts of HusserI­ ian phenomenology. On the other hand, he tried to show that a true comprehensive understanding of HusserI''s phenomenology culminates in his teaching of experience and reason. It is the strong conviction of the author that the central-most teaching of HusserI''s phenomenology is the discovery of the "noetic­ noematic" correlativity. In the reduced realm of "constituting­ intentionality," the distinction between reason and experience seems to vanish, and these two concepts become interchangeable terms. The present study suffers from one great limitation, and this must be made clear right here in order to avoid any misconception about the author''s intentions. The author has not discussed the other important theories of experience and reason. He has undertaken the humble task of giving an account of HusserI''s phenomenology of experience and reason. The bringing in of Hume serves, as would be clear in the course of the book, a two-fold purpose. It tries on the one hand to show the pro­ grammatic similarity between the philosophies of these two philoso­ phers. On the other hand, it implicitly maintains that the philosophical continuity from Hume to HusserI runs not so much via Kant, but rather via Meinong, Brentano, A venarius, James and so forth.