Robert A. Doughty – författare

As the driving force behind the Allied effort in World War I, France willingly shouldered the heaviest burden. In this masterful book, Robert Doughty explains how and why France assumed this role and offers new insights into French strategy and operational methods.French leaders, favoring a multi-front strategy, believed the Allies could maintain pressure on several fronts around the periphery of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires and eventually break the enemy's defenses. But France did not have sufficient resources to push the Germans back from the Western Front and attack elsewhere. The offensives they launched proved costly, and their tactical and operational methods ranged from remarkably effective to disastrously ineffective. Using extensive archival research, Doughty explains why France pursued a multi-front strategy and why it launched numerous operations as part of that strategy. He also casts new light on France's efforts to develop successful weapons and methods and the attempts to use them in operations.An unparalleled work in French or English literature on the war, Pyrrhic Victory is destined to become the standard account of the French army in the Great War.

The French city of Sedan, located near the Belgian border, played a key role in Germany’s plans for a blitzkrieg assault on Allied forces in France. This engaging narrative details the small-unit actions near Sedan during the 1940 campaign for France and recounts the fighting in and around the city by German panzer forces under the famous Heinz Guderian. In addition to an analytical reconstruction of the battle, this account provides a detailed explanation for why the battle and related events occurred. Offering an examination of both sides of the conflict, from privates up to generals, this book is recommended reading by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. According to the Journal of Military History, “Doughty’s lively study should appeal to soldiers and civilians.”

An examination of the military doctrine that animated the French defense against the German invasion in 1940. Argues that the French learned the wrong lessons from World War I and were ill prepared for World War II Lessons for modern armies about how to learn from past wars and prepare for future wars Winner of the Paul Birdsall Prize of the American Historical Association"