The Putin regime and its propagandists have long claimed to be fighting the heirs of Nazi Germany. From its crackdown on domestic dissent to its aggression on the international stage, the Kremlin has regularly smeared its adversaries as fascists and fascist collaborators. Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, which Putin claimed would achieve its ''denazification'', brought this propaganda to a new level of intensity.

This book shines a spotlight on the disturbing reality behind Putin''s anti-fascist posturing. It shows how his regime mobilised neo-nazis as proxies during Russia''s descent into authoritarianism. Using court records and extensive media and internet sources, it analyses the relationship between the Kremlin and Russkii Obraz, a neo-nazi organization that became a major force on Russia''s radical nationalist scene in 2008-10. It shows how Russkii Obraz’s rise was boosted by the regime’s policy of ‘managed nationalism,’ which mobilised radical nationalist proxies against opponents of authoritarianism. In return for undermining moderate nationalists and pro-democracy activists, Russkii Obraz received official support and access to public space. This collaboration became politically hazardous for the Kremlin because of Russkii Obraz''s neo-Nazi ideology and its connections to BORN, a terrorist group responsible for a series of high-profile killings. When security forces captured the ringleader of BORN, they precipitated the destruction of Russkii Obraz, but veterans of the organisation went on to play a prominent role in Russia''s attack on Ukraine in 2014.

The Putin regime and its propagandists have long claimed to be fighting the heirs of Nazi Germany. From its crackdown on domestic dissent to its aggression on the international stage, the Kremlin has regularly smeared its adversaries as fascists and fascist collaborators. Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, which Putin claimed would achieve its ''denazification'', brought this propaganda to a new level of intensity.

This book shines a spotlight on the disturbing reality behind Putin''s anti-fascist posturing. It shows how his regime mobilised neo-nazis as proxies during Russia''s descent into authoritarianism. Using court records and extensive media and internet sources, it analyses the relationship between the Kremlin and Russkii Obraz, a neo-nazi organization that became a major force on Russia''s radical nationalist scene in 2008-10. It shows how Russkii Obraz’s rise was boosted by the regime’s policy of ‘managed nationalism,’ which mobilised radical nationalist proxies against opponents of authoritarianism. In return for undermining moderate nationalists and pro-democracy activists, Russkii Obraz received official support and access to public space. This collaboration became politically hazardous for the Kremlin because of Russkii Obraz''s neo-Nazi ideology and its connections to BORN, a terrorist group responsible for a series of high-profile killings. When security forces captured the ringleader of BORN, they precipitated the destruction of Russkii Obraz, but veterans of the organisation went on to play a prominent role in Russia''s attack on Ukraine in 2014.

During the 1970s, dissidents like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn dominated Western perceptions of the USSR, but were then quickly forgotten, as Gorbachev''s reformers monopolised the spotlight. This book restores the dissidents to their rightful place in Russian history. Using a vast array of samizdat and published sources, it shows how ideas formulated in the dissident milieu clashed with the original programme of perestroika, and shaped the course of democratisation in post-Soviet Russia. Some of these ideas - such the dissidents'' preoccupation with glasnost and legality, and their critique of revolutionary violence - became part of the agenda of Russia''s democratic movement. But this book also demonstrates that dissidents played a crucial role in the rise of the new Russian radical nationalism. Both the friends and foes of Russian democracy have a dissident lineage.

During the 1970s, dissidents like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn dominated Western perceptions of the USSR, but were then quickly forgotten, as Gorbachev''s reformers monopolised the spotlight. This book restores the dissidents to their rightful place in Russian history. Using a vast array of samizdat and published sources, it shows how ideas formulated in the dissident milieu clashed with the original programme of perestroika, and shaped the course of democratisation in post-Soviet Russia. Some of these ideas - such the dissidents'' preoccupation with glasnost and legality, and their critique of revolutionary violence - became part of the agenda of Russia''s democratic movement. But this book also demonstrates that dissidents played a crucial role in the rise of the new Russian radical nationalism. Both the friends and foes of Russian democracy have a dissident lineage.

This book examines the ''preventive counter-revolution,'' a programme of reforms and repression that transformed the face of Russian politics during Vladimir Putin''s second term as president. Kremlin propagandists hailed this programme as a defence of national sovereignty against Western attempts to foment a ''velvet revolution'' in Russia. But this book shows that the Putin regime was reacting to a real domestic threat: opposition leaders and youth activists who had begun to employ ''velvet'' revolutionary methods in a campaign to harness popular grievances and to challenge Putin in the streets and at the ballot box. It traces the formulation and implementation of the regime''s two-track response, which was based on a careful analysis of the lessons of the recent ''velvet’ (or ‘coloured’) revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The first track was repressive: the imposition of controls on NGOs, restrictions on electoral competition, and a crackdown on opposition demonstrations. The second was the mobilisation of supporters in ''patriotic'' youth organisations that employed both gang violence and ''velvet'' revolutionary techniques. Drawing on a wide range of Russian-language sources, including opposition activists'' blogs, this book charts the end of Russia''s experiment with liberal democracy and the emergence of a new type of authoritarian order.

This book examines the ''preventive counter-revolution,'' a programme of reforms and repression that transformed the face of Russian politics during Vladimir Putin''s second term as president. Kremlin propagandists hailed this programme as a defence of national sovereignty against Western attempts to foment a ''velvet revolution'' in Russia. But this book shows that the Putin regime was reacting to a real domestic threat: opposition leaders and youth activists who had begun to employ ''velvet'' revolutionary methods in a campaign to harness popular grievances and to challenge Putin in the streets and at the ballot box. It traces the formulation and implementation of the regime''s two-track response, which was based on a careful analysis of the lessons of the recent ''velvet’ (or ‘coloured’) revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The first track was repressive: the imposition of controls on NGOs, restrictions on electoral competition, and a crackdown on opposition demonstrations. The second was the mobilisation of supporters in ''patriotic'' youth organisations that employed both gang violence and ''velvet'' revolutionary techniques. Drawing on a wide range of Russian-language sources, including opposition activists'' blogs, this book charts the end of Russia''s experiment with liberal democracy and the emergence of a new type of authoritarian order.

The Putin regime and its propagandists have long claimed to be fighting the heirs of Nazi Germany. From its crackdown on domestic dissent to its aggression on the international stage, the Kremlin has regularly smeared its adversaries as fascists and fascist collaborators. Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, which Putin claimed would achieve its ''denazification'', brought this propaganda to a new level of intensity.

This book shines a spotlight on the disturbing reality behind Putin''s anti-fascist posturing. It shows how his regime mobilised neo-nazis as proxies during Russia''s descent into authoritarianism. Using court records and extensive media and internet sources, it analyses the relationship between the Kremlin and Russkii Obraz, a neo-nazi organization that became a major force on Russia''s radical nationalist scene in 2008-10. It shows how Russkii Obraz’s rise was boosted by the regime’s policy of ‘managed nationalism,’ which mobilised radical nationalist proxies against opponents of authoritarianism. In return for undermining moderate nationalists and pro-democracy activists, Russkii Obraz received official support and access to public space. This collaboration became politically hazardous for the Kremlin because of Russkii Obraz''s neo-Nazi ideology and its connections to BORN, a terrorist group responsible for a series of high-profile killings. When security forces captured the ringleader of BORN, they precipitated the destruction of Russkii Obraz, but veterans of the organisation went on to play a prominent role in Russia''s attack on Ukraine in 2014.

The Putin regime and its propagandists have long claimed to be fighting the heirs of Nazi Germany. From its crackdown on domestic dissent to its aggression on the international stage, the Kremlin has regularly smeared its adversaries as fascists and fascist collaborators. Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, which Putin claimed would achieve its ''denazification'', brought this propaganda to a new level of intensity.

This book shines a spotlight on the disturbing reality behind Putin''s anti-fascist posturing. It shows how his regime mobilised neo-nazis as proxies during Russia''s descent into authoritarianism. Using court records and extensive media and internet sources, it analyses the relationship between the Kremlin and Russkii Obraz, a neo-nazi organization that became a major force on Russia''s radical nationalist scene in 2008-10. It shows how Russkii Obraz’s rise was boosted by the regime’s policy of ‘managed nationalism,’ which mobilised radical nationalist proxies against opponents of authoritarianism. In return for undermining moderate nationalists and pro-democracy activists, Russkii Obraz received official support and access to public space. This collaboration became politically hazardous for the Kremlin because of Russkii Obraz''s neo-Nazi ideology and its connections to BORN, a terrorist group responsible for a series of high-profile killings. When security forces captured the ringleader of BORN, they precipitated the destruction of Russkii Obraz, but veterans of the organisation went on to play a prominent role in Russia''s attack on Ukraine in 2014.

During the 1970s, dissidents like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn dominated Western perceptions of the USSR, but were then quickly forgotten, as Gorbachev''s reformers monopolised the spotlight. This book restores the dissidents to their rightful place in Russian history. Using a vast array of samizdat and published sources, it shows how ideas formulated in the dissident milieu clashed with the original programme of perestroika, and shaped the course of democratisation in post-Soviet Russia. Some of these ideas - such the dissidents'' preoccupation with glasnost and legality, and their critique of revolutionary violence - became part of the agenda of Russia''s democratic movement. But this book also demonstrates that dissidents played a crucial role in the rise of the new Russian radical nationalism. Both the friends and foes of Russian democracy have a dissident lineage.

During the 1970s, dissidents like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn dominated Western perceptions of the USSR, but were then quickly forgotten, as Gorbachev''s reformers monopolised the spotlight. This book restores the dissidents to their rightful place in Russian history. Using a vast array of samizdat and published sources, it shows how ideas formulated in the dissident milieu clashed with the original programme of perestroika, and shaped the course of democratisation in post-Soviet Russia. Some of these ideas - such the dissidents'' preoccupation with glasnost and legality, and their critique of revolutionary violence - became part of the agenda of Russia''s democratic movement. But this book also demonstrates that dissidents played a crucial role in the rise of the new Russian radical nationalism. Both the friends and foes of Russian democracy have a dissident lineage.

This book examines the ''preventive counter-revolution,'' a programme of reforms and repression that transformed the face of Russian politics during Vladimir Putin''s second term as president. Kremlin propagandists hailed this programme as a defence of national sovereignty against Western attempts to foment a ''velvet revolution'' in Russia. But this book shows that the Putin regime was reacting to a real domestic threat: opposition leaders and youth activists who had begun to employ ''velvet'' revolutionary methods in a campaign to harness popular grievances and to challenge Putin in the streets and at the ballot box. It traces the formulation and implementation of the regime''s two-track response, which was based on a careful analysis of the lessons of the recent ''velvet’ (or ‘coloured’) revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The first track was repressive: the imposition of controls on NGOs, restrictions on electoral competition, and a crackdown on opposition demonstrations. The second was the mobilisation of supporters in ''patriotic'' youth organisations that employed both gang violence and ''velvet'' revolutionary techniques. Drawing on a wide range of Russian-language sources, including opposition activists'' blogs, this book charts the end of Russia''s experiment with liberal democracy and the emergence of a new type of authoritarian order.

This book examines the ''preventive counter-revolution,'' a programme of reforms and repression that transformed the face of Russian politics during Vladimir Putin''s second term as president. Kremlin propagandists hailed this programme as a defence of national sovereignty against Western attempts to foment a ''velvet revolution'' in Russia. But this book shows that the Putin regime was reacting to a real domestic threat: opposition leaders and youth activists who had begun to employ ''velvet'' revolutionary methods in a campaign to harness popular grievances and to challenge Putin in the streets and at the ballot box. It traces the formulation and implementation of the regime''s two-track response, which was based on a careful analysis of the lessons of the recent ''velvet’ (or ‘coloured’) revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The first track was repressive: the imposition of controls on NGOs, restrictions on electoral competition, and a crackdown on opposition demonstrations. The second was the mobilisation of supporters in ''patriotic'' youth organisations that employed both gang violence and ''velvet'' revolutionary techniques. Drawing on a wide range of Russian-language sources, including opposition activists'' blogs, this book charts the end of Russia''s experiment with liberal democracy and the emergence of a new type of authoritarian order.