Robert Kirk – författare

Intellectual Capital investigates how companies throughout Ireland are measuring their intellectual capital assets and how their efforts compare to those of the leading exponents of intellectual capital. This report: * includes a survey of twenty-eight Irish companies * highlights the importance of intellectual capital within the new economy * defines the role of the management accountant in the area of intellectual capital The authors conclude there is a recognition of intellectual capital and its measurement in Irish companies, but acknowledge the masurement and practices appear to be taking place in isolation rather than forming part of an overall intellectual capital management strategy.* includes a survey of twenty-eight Irish companies * highlights the importance of intellectual capital within the new economy * defines the role of the management accountant in the area of intellectual capital

This book is all about how companies are applying the key principles in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and shows this by use of extensive examples of UK company accounts. The book provides coverage of the key points of each standard and links that with actual practice. It is not a detailed guidance book as such, or a transistion book from UK standards to IFRS, but a quick reference for the busy accountant which shows how to apply the key points of each standard by reference to how other companies have done it.Robert Kirk BSc (Econ) FCA CPA trained in Belfast with Price Waterhouse & Co., and subsequently spent two years in industry in a subsidiary of Shell (UK) and four further years in practice. He is currently Professor of Financial Reporting in the School of Accounting at the University of Ulster and has been lecturing on the CIMA Mastercourses Accounting Standards and Accounting Standards in Depth since 1985. He has authored four editions of Accounting Standards in Depth; UK Accounting Standards: A Quick Reference Guide; and International Reporting Standards in Depth Volume 1 Theory and Practice and Volume 2 Solutions.- Shows exactly what you need to know in order to fully understand and apply IFRS- Concepts, Standards and Regulations are explained in easy to understand terms so that you become familiar with them in the quickest amount of time- Shows by example - features the published accounts of well known British and European companies

How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth ''logico-conceptually'' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. ''Redescriptive physicalism'' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with ''a priori physicalism'': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired ''a posteriori physicalism'', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. ''Cartesian intuitions'' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the ''explanatory gap'', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.

Consciousness is a perennial source of mystification in the philosophy of mind: how could processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? Robert Kirk uses the notion of 'raw feeling' to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience; he argues that there is no need for recourse to dualism or private mental objects. The task is to understand how the truth about raw feeling could be strictly implied by narrowly physical truths. Kirk's explanation turns on an account of what it is to be a subject of conscious perceptual experience. He offers penetrating analyses of the philosophical problems of consciousness and suggests novel solutions which, unlike their rivals, can be accepted without gritting one's teeth.

Consciousness is a perennial source of mystification in the philosophy of mind: how can processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? Robert Kirk uses the notion of `raw feeling' to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience; he argues that there is no need for recourse to dualism or private mental objects. The task is to understand how the truth about raw feeling could be strictly implied by narrowly physical truths. Kirk's explanation turns on an account of what it is to be a subject of conscious perceptual experience. He offers penetrating analyses of the problems of consciousness and suggests novel solutions which, unlike their rivals, can be accepted without gritting one's teeth. His sustained defence of non-reductive physicalism shows that we need not abandon hope of finding a solution to the mind-body problem.

By definition zombies would be physically and behaviourally just like us, but not conscious. This currently very influential idea is a threat to all forms of physicalism, and has led some philosophers to give up physicalism and become dualists. It has also beguiled many physicalists, who feel forced to defend increasingly convoluted explanations of why the conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility. Robert Kirk argues that the zombie idea depends on an incoherent view of the nature of phenomenal consciousness.His book has two main aims. One is to demolish the zombie idea once and for all. There are plenty of objections to it in the literature, but they lack intuitive appeal. He offers a striking new argument which reveals fundamental confusions in the implied conception of consciousness. His other main contribution is to develop a fresh and original approach to the true nature of phenomenal consciousness. Kirk argues that a necessary condition is a 'basic package' of capacities. An important component of his argument is that the necessary cognitive capacities are not as sophisticated as is often assumed. By focusing on humbler creatures than ourselves he avoids some of the distracting complications of our sophisticated forms of cognition.The basic package does not seem to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is 'direct activity' - a special feature of the way the events which constitute incoming perceptual information affect the system. This is an integrated process, to be conceived of holistically, and contrasts sharply with what is often called the 'availability' or 'poisedness' of perceptual information.This original, penetrating, and highly readable book will be of interest to all who have a serious concern with the nature of consciousness: not only professional philosophers and students, but also many psychologists and neuroscientists.

How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth 'logico-conceptually' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. 'Redescriptive physicalism' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with 'a priori physicalism': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired 'a posteriori physicalism', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. 'Cartesian intuitions' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the 'explanatory gap', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.

Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinking. 'Relativists' disagree, arguing that what there is depends on our point of view. Which is right?Robert Kirk provides a crystal clear account of this debate from the Greek philosophers to Wittgenstein and Rorty. Along the way, he unpacks some of the more complicated issues surrounding ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, pragmatism and realism essential for those beginning any study of philosphy.

Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinking. 'Relativists' disagree, arguing that what there is depends on our point of view. Which is right?Robert Kirk provides a crystal clear account of this debate from the Greek philosophers to Wittgenstein and Rorty. Along the way, he unpacks some of the more complicated issues surrounding ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, pragmatism and realism essential for those beginning any study of philosphy.

This book reflects IFRS as of the preparation of the text during 2004, and as far as possible up to the date of first publication in July 2005. Accounting Standards in Depth contains a: * Brief summary of the relevant international accounting standards * Selection of questions illustrating how international standards are used in practice and provide useful revision practice for those attempting accountancy examsThe book starts with an introduction to the standard setting process, as well as looking at the development of IASB. It examines the framework for the preparation and presentation of financial statements which underpins the practice of financial accounting.The intention of the book is that the reader will be tested on basic numerical application, on an understanding of the underlying theory, and on presentation of financial statements under the international regulatory framework. The questions have been carefully chosen to test the readers ability to write good practical reports, perform calculations, and present both extracts and full sets of financial statements.* Tests the reader on numerical application, understanding of the underlying theory and presentation of financial statements* Includes questions selected from the major accounting bodies in the UK - CIMA and ACCA

The pace of development in financial reporting has accelerated sharply during the last few years and shows no sign of abating as the UK prepares to comply with International Accounting Standards. This text gives accounting professionals an understanding of UK accounting standards and demonstrate how they are used in practice. It is the perfect companion for those who need to keep abreast of changes to accounting standards or who need to see how the standards are applied in practice.Accounting Standards includes:* Summaries outlining the principles behind UK accounting standards* Examples and extracts from well-known recent company accounts* Keep up to date with changes to UK accounting standards* Includes practical examples to illustrate how accounting standards work in practice

Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that ''even reality is relative''. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? ''Realists'' argue that reality is independent of out thinking. ''Relativists'' disagree, arguing that what there is depends on our point of view. Which is right?Robert Kirk provides a crystal clear account of this debate from the Greek philosophers to Wittgenstein and Rorty. Along the way, he unpacks some of the more complicated issues surrounding ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, pragmatism and realism essential for those beginning any study of philosphy.

Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that ''even reality is relative''. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? ''Realists'' argue that reality is independent of out thinking. ''Relativists'' disagree, arguing that what there is depends on our point of view. Which is right?Robert Kirk provides a crystal clear account of this debate from the Greek philosophers to Wittgenstein and Rorty. Along the way, he unpacks some of the more complicated issues surrounding ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, pragmatism and realism essential for those beginning any study of philosphy.

A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle''s Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor''s doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author''s own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading.

A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle''s Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor''s doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author''s own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading.

Could robots be genuinely intelligent? Could they be conscious? Could there be zombies? Prompted by these questions Robert Kirk introduces the main problems of consciousness and sets out a new approach to solving them. He starts by discussing behaviourism, Turing’s test of intelligence and Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument, and goes on to examine dualism – the idea that consciousness requires something beyond the physical – together with its opposite, physicalism. Probing the idea of zombies, he concludes they are logically impossible. Having presented the central problems, he sketches his solution: a version of functionalism, according to which consciousness consists in the performance of functions.While there is wide agreement among philosophers about what the main problems of consciousness are, there is little agreement on how to go about solving them. With this powerful case for his version of functionalism, Kirk offers an engaging introduction to both the problems and a possible solution.

Could robots be genuinely intelligent? Could they be conscious? Could there be zombies? Prompted by these questions Robert Kirk introduces the main problems of consciousness and sets out a new approach to solving them. He starts by discussing behaviourism, Turing’s test of intelligence and Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument, and goes on to examine dualism – the idea that consciousness requires something beyond the physical – together with its opposite, physicalism. Probing the idea of zombies, he concludes they are logically impossible. Having presented the central problems, he sketches his solution: a version of functionalism, according to which consciousness consists in the performance of functions.While there is wide agreement among philosophers about what the main problems of consciousness are, there is little agreement on how to go about solving them. With this powerful case for his version of functionalism, Kirk offers an engaging introduction to both the problems and a possible solution.

Could robots be genuinely intelligent? Could they be conscious? Could there be zombies? Prompted by these questions Robert Kirk introduces the main problems of consciousness and sets out a new approach to solving them. He starts by discussing behaviourism, Turing''s test of intelligence and Searle''s famous Chinese Room argument, and goes on to examine dualism – the idea that consciousness requires something beyond the physical – together with its opposite, physicalism. Probing the idea of zombies, he concludes they are logically impossible. Having presented the central problems, he sketches his solution: a version of functionalism, according to which consciousness consists in the performance of functions.While there is wide agreement among philosophers about what the main problems of consciousness are, there is little agreement on how to go about solving them. With this powerful case for his version of functionalism, Kirk offers an engaging introduction to both the problems and a possible solution.

Could robots be genuinely intelligent? Could they be conscious? Could there be zombies? Prompted by these questions Robert Kirk introduces the main problems of consciousness and sets out a new approach to solving them. He starts by discussing behaviourism, Turing''s test of intelligence and Searle''s famous Chinese Room argument, and goes on to examine dualism – the idea that consciousness requires something beyond the physical – together with its opposite, physicalism. Probing the idea of zombies, he concludes they are logically impossible. Having presented the central problems, he sketches his solution: a version of functionalism, according to which consciousness consists in the performance of functions.While there is wide agreement among philosophers about what the main problems of consciousness are, there is little agreement on how to go about solving them. With this powerful case for his version of functionalism, Kirk offers an engaging introduction to both the problems and a possible solution.