Robert M. Cassidy – författare

Military organizations are cultures, and such cultures have ingrained preferences and predilections for how and when to employ force. This is the first study to use a comparative framework to understand what happened with the U.S. military endeavor in Somalia and the British effort in Bosnia up to 1995. Both regions were potential quagmires, and no doctrine for armed humanitarian operations during ongoing conflicts existed at the outset of these efforts. After detailing the impact of military culture on operations, Cassidy draws conclusions about which military cultural traits and force structures are more suitable and adaptable for peace operations and asymmetric conflicts. He also offers some military cultural implications for the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation.The first part of the study offers an in-depth assessment of the military cultural preferences and characteristics of the British and American militaries. It shows that Britain's geography, its regimental system, and a long history of imperial policing have helped embed a small-war predilection in British military culture. This distinguishes it from American military culture, which has exhibited a preference for the big-war paradigm since the second half of the 19th century. The second part of the book examines how cultural preferences influenced the conduct of operations and the development of the first post-Cold War doctrine for peace operations.

Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in U.S. security documents such as the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. The description Long War—unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades—is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT.Colonel Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change-all reviewed in this important work.Cassidy combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western philosopher of war and the most renowned Eastern philosopher of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British, and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.

Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in U.S. security documents such as the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. The description Long War—unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades—is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT.Colonel Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change-all reviewed in this important work.Cassidy combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western philosopher of war and the most renowned Eastern philosopher of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British, and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.

Military organizations are cultures, and such cultures have ingrained preferences and predilections for how and when to employ force. This is the first study to use a comparative framework to understand what happened with the U.S. military endeavor in Somalia and the British effort in Bosnia up to 1995. Both regions were potential quagmires, and no doctrine for armed humanitarian operations during ongoing conflicts existed at the outset of these efforts. After detailing the impact of military culture on operations, Cassidy draws conclusions about which military cultural traits and force structures are more suitable and adaptable for peace operations and asymmetric conflicts. He also offers some military cultural implications for the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation.The first part of the study offers an in-depth assessment of the military cultural preferences and characteristics of the British and American militaries. It shows that Britain's geography, its regimental system, and a long history of imperial policing have helped embed a small-war predilection in British military culture. This distinguishes it from American military culture, which has exhibited a preference for the big-war paradigm since the second half of the 19th century. The second part of the book examines how cultural preferences influenced the conduct of operations and the development of the first post-Cold War doctrine for peace operations.

Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the "global war on terrorism (GWOT)." Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in U.S. security documents such as the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. The description Long War—unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades—is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT.Colonel Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change—all reviewed in this important work.He first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British, and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.