Robert P. Gilles – författare

This text discusses the development of an institutional approach to general economic equilibrium. It is argued that general equilibrium theory forms a well-rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic theory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this re-focusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. In the first part a summary of the well-established insights regarding the core of an economy is given. Next the book explores the extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism through core convergence results, the comparison of core allocations with Walrasian equilibrium allocations, and equivalence results. In the second part, an alternative model of Edgeworthian barter in the setting of a large institutionally structured economy is developed. Two new Edgeworthian equilibrium concepts are considered - the semi-core and the contract-core. The book concludes by showing that equivalence is extremely hard to achieve and that perfect competition thus has a pathological nature.

Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations.

This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general economic equi­ librium. Thus far, institutional economics has essentially been confined to purely verbal discourse. Here I argue the case that general equilibrium theory forms a well rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic the­ ory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this refocusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. There is an extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism, which is explored in this book. Next I develop an alternative model of explicitly nonsovereign trade in the setting of an institutionally structured economy. In this book the core and several of its extensions are considered to be descriptions of the equilibrium allocations resulting from institutionalized barter processes, thereby providing a basis of an institutionally based economic theory. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed as the most natural represen­ tations of real life economies, in particular of market economies. Many funda­ mental insights have been developed. In the first half of the book I summarize the most influential and important results in the literature on finite economies regarding the relationship of the Walrasian model of a perfectly competitive market system and the Edgeworthian theory of individually based, pure barter processes. I use the axiomatic method as the main methodological framework according to which I construct my models.

‘This is the second book of a two-volume set that continues Adam Smith's work, using the tools mathematical, experimental, and behavioural economists have developed since 1776. As in the first volume, markets are not the central organising principle. Instead, attention centres on social institutions and the division of labour that they enable. The book studies this via the endogenous division of labour that existing institutions help form. The first book in the series examined this problem deeply, resorting minimally to formal mathematical modelling; the second volume is where the formal modelling blossoms. General equilibrium theory meets network theory and receives a breath of fresh air, including a new viewpoint on economic inequality, the newly resurgent bane of capitalism. What I said for the first volume applies to this second volume equally: if you care to understand the economy, this book belongs to your bookshelf.’—Dimitrios Diamantaras, Temple University,Philadelphia, USAThis textbook introduces and develops new tools to understand the recent economic crisis and how desirable economic policies can be adopted. Gilles provides new institutional concepts for wealth creation, such as network economies, which are based on the social division of labour.This second volume introduces mathematical theories of the endogenous formation of social divisions of labour through which economic wealth is created. Gilles also investigates the causes of inequality in the social division of labour under imperfectly competitive conditions. These theories frame a comprehensive, innovative and consistent perspective on the functioning of the twenty-first century global economy, explaining many of its failings. Suitable reading for advanced undergraduate, MSc and postgraduate students in microeconomic analysis, economic theory and political economy.

This textbook introduces and develops new tools to understand the recent economic crisis and how desirable economic policies can be adopted. This title is suitable reading for undergraduate, MSc and postgraduate students in microeconomic analysis, economic theory and political economy.

The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.

The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.