Robert P. Gilles – författare

‘This is the second book of a two-volume set that continues Adam Smith''s work, using the tools mathematical, experimental, and behavioural economists have developed since 1776. As in the first volume, markets are not the central organising principle. Instead, attention centres on social institutions and the division of labour that they enable. The book studies this via the endogenous division of labour that existing institutions help form. The first book in the series examined this problem deeply, resorting minimally to formal mathematical modelling; the second volume is where the formal modelling blossoms. General equilibrium theory meets network theory and receives a breath of fresh air, including a new viewpoint on economic inequality, the newly resurgent bane of capitalism. What I said for the first volume applies to this second volume equally: if you care to understand the economy, this book belongs to your bookshelf.’—Dimitrios Diamantaras, Temple University,Philadelphia, USA

This textbook introduces and develops new tools to understand the recent economic crisis and how desirable economic policies can be adopted. Gilles provides new institutional concepts for wealth creation, such as network economies, which are based on the social division of labour.

This textbook introduces and develops new tools to understand the recent economic crisis and how desirable economic policies can be adopted. Gilles provides new institutional concepts for wealth creation, such as network economies, which are based on the social division of labour. This volume investigates the formation of networks and hierarchical authority organisations, with a focus on the role of trust. Gilles also looks at the theory of growth and development, using real world examples and problem sets to put into practice. This title is suitable reading for undergraduate, MSc and postgraduate students in microeconomic analysis, economic theory and political economy.

The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.