Ronald Dworkin – författare

"Religion utan gud", som blev den framstående juristen och filosofen Ronald Dworkins sista bok, utgår från Albert Einsteins reflektioner kring religionens väsen. Enligt Einstein utgjordes -den sanna religiositeten- av upplevelsen av att det för oss ogenomträngliga uttrycker den högsta visdom och den mest lysande skönhet. I denna mening betraktade ateisten Einstein sig som tillhörande "de djupt religiösa människorna". Men vad är religiöst i en sådan hållning där Gud inte har någon plats? Detta är frågan som sysselsätter Dworkin i denna lilla bok, baserad på de Einstein-föreläsningar som han höll kort före sin död i februari förra året. Dworkins svar är att religion betecknar ett sätt att se på världen som bärs upp av en tro på objektiva värden, att universum och dess varelser är vördnadsbjudande, att människolivet har en mening och kan levas väl eller förfelat eller att upplevelsen av andlös skönhet är något mer än en sinnesretning. Teister menar att det är en gud som har fyllt världen med värde och mening. Enligt Dworkin förhåller det sig omvänt: det som kommer först är en tro på existensen av objektiva värden och tron på en gud är endast ett möjligt uttryck av en sådan världsåskådning. Det är fullt möjligt även för icketroende att ta ställning för en sådan tanke. Uttrycket "religiös ateism" är alltså inte någon oxymoron. Religion inskränker sig inte till teism. Från fysik, via politik till rätt förklarar Dworkin vad detta perspektivskifte betyder. Religionsfrihet ska, enligt Dworkin, inte förstås som respekt för en tro på gud utan som en rätt till etiskt oberoende. Han avslutar boken med reflektioner över död och odödlighet. Den är en religiös ateists testamente, skrivet med en blick för vad som är värdefullt och omistligt i mänskligt liv.

What is law? What is it for? How should judges decide novel cases when the statutes and earlier decisions provide no clear answer? Do judges make up new law in such cases, or is there some higher law in which they discover the correct answer? Must everyone always obey the law? If not, when is a citizen morally free to disobey?A renowned philosopher enters the debate surrounding these questions. Clearly and forcefully, Ronald Dworkin argues against the “ruling” theory in Anglo-American law—legal positivism and economic utilitarianism—and asserts that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and that they have political and moral rights against the state that are prior to the welfare of the majority.Mr. Dworkin criticizes in detail the legal positivists’ theory of legal rights, particularly H. L. A. Hart’s well-known version of it. He then develops a new theory of adjudication, and applies it to the central and politically important issue of cases in which the Supreme Court interprets and applies the Constitution. Through an analysis of John Rawls’s theory of justice, he argues that fundamental among political rights is the right of each individual to the equal respect and concern of those who govern him. He offers a theory of compliance with the law designed not simply to answer theoretical questions about civil disobedience, but to function as a guide for citizens and officials. Finally, Professor Dworkin considers the right to liberty, often thought to rival and even preempt the fundamental right to equality. He argues that distinct individual liberties do exist, but that they derive, not from some abstract right to liberty as such, but from the right to equal concern and respect itself. He thus denies that liberty and equality are conflicting ideals.Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law and the moral conception of individual rights that underlies it have already made him one of the most influential philosophers working in this area. This is the first publication of these ideas in book form.

In this reprint of Law's Empire,Ronald Dworkin reflects on the nature of the law, its given authority, its application in democracy, the prominent role of interpretation in judgement, and the relations of lawmakers and lawgivers to the community on whose behalf they pronounce. For that community, Law's Empire provides a judicious and coherent introduction to the place of law in our lives. Previously Published by Harper Collins. Reprinted (1998) by Hart Publishing.

"The Constitution is America's moral sail, and we must hold to the courage of the conviction that fills it, a conviction that we can all be equal citizens of a moral republic. That is a noble faith, and only optimism can redeem it." So writes Ronald Dworkin in the introduction to this characteristically robust and provocative new book in which Dworkin argues the fidelity to the constitution and to law demands that judges make contemporary judgements backed on political morality, and why it encourages, or ought to encourage, an open display of the true grounds of judgement. The book discusses almost all of the great constitutional issues of the last two decades including abortion, affirmative action, pornography, race, homosexuality, euthanasia and free-speech and in doing so consistently offers a liberal view of the American Constitution. Dworkin's "moral reading" proposes that we all, judges, lawyers, citizens - interpret and apply the abstract language of the Constitution on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice. The "moral reading" therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. The various chapters of this book were first published seperately; now drawn together they bear all the hallmarks of Dworkin's legal and philosophical sophistication, his acute understanding of political process and his understanding of history. principles

Written by the world's best-known political and legal theorist, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution is a collection of essays that discuss almost all of the great constitutional issues of the last two decades, including abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, homosexuality, pornography, and free speech. Professor Dworkin offers a consistently liberal view of the Constitution and argues that fidelity to it and to law demands that judges make moral judgments. He proposes that we all interpret the abstract language of the Constitution by reference to moral principles about political decency and justice. His `moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. The various chapters of this book were originally published separately and are now drawn together to provide the reader with a rich, full-length treatment of Dworkin's general theory of law.

One of the country''s most distinguished scholars presents a brilliantly original approach to the twin dilemmas of abortion and euthanasia, showing why they arouse such volcanic controversy and how we as a society can reconcile our values of life and individual liberty.From the Trade Paperback edition.

The articles in this volume cover a wide range of intellectually exciting issues, written by people who were considered at the summit of their fields of enquiry. Though the individual topics addressed are diverse, each article can be taken as representative of 'humanistic understanding' of its stated subject. The volume is the first of a series based upon lectures given under the auspices of the New York Institute for the Humanities.

Equality is the endangered species of political ideals. Even left-of-center politicians reject equality as an ideal: government must combat poverty, they say, but need not strive that its citizens be equal in any dimension. In his new book Ronald Dworkin insists, to the contrary, that equality is the indispensable virtue of democratic sovereignty. A legitimate government must treat all its citizens as equals, that is, with equal respect and concern, and, since the economic distribution that any society achieves is mainly the consequence of its system of law and policy, that requirement imposes serious egalitarian constraints on that distribution. What distribution of a nation's wealth is demanded by equal concern for all? Dworkin draws upon two fundamental humanist principles--first, it is of equal objective importance that all human lives flourish, and second, each person is responsible for defining and achieving the flourishing of his or her own life--to ground his well-known thesis that true equality means equality in the value of the resources that each person commands, not in the success he or she achieves. Equality, freedom, and individual responsibility are therefore not in conflict, but flow from and into one another as facets of the same humanist conception of life and politics. Since no abstract political theory can be understood except in the context of actual and complex political issues, Dworkin develops his thesis by applying it to heated contemporary controversies about the distribution of health care, unemployment benefits, campaign finance reform, affirmative action, assisted suicide, and genetic engineering.

How should a judge’s moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, politicians, and judges all have answers to that question: these range from “nothing” to “everything.”In Justice in Robes, Ronald Dworkin argues that the question is much more complex than it has often been taken to be and charts a variety of dimensions—semantic, jurisprudential, and doctrinal—in which law and morals are undoubtedly interwoven. He restates and summarizes his own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticizes the most influential rival theories to his own. He argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalism reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority. In the course of that critical study he discusses the work of many of the most influential lawyers and philosophers of the era, including Isaiah Berlin, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Antonin Scalia, and Joseph Raz.Dworkin’s new collection of essays and original chapters is a model of lucid, logical, and impassioned reasoning that will advance the crucially important debate about the roles of justice in law.

The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: that what truth is, life means, morality requires, and justice demands are different aspects of the same large question. He develops original theories on a great variety of issues very rarely considered in the same book: moral skepticism, literary, artistic, and historical interpretation, free will, ancient moral theory, being good and living well, liberty, equality, and law among many other topics. What we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest.Skepticism in all its forms—philosophical, cynical, or post-modern—threatens that unity. The Galilean revolution once made the theological world of value safe for science. But the new republic gradually became a new empire: the modern philosophers inflated the methods of physics into a totalitarian theory of everything. They invaded and occupied all the honorifics—reality, truth, fact, ground, meaning, knowledge, and being—and dictated the terms on which other bodies of thought might aspire to them, and skepticism has been the inevitable result. We need a new revolution. We must make the world of science safe for value.

This is a book about the interplay of urgent political issues and hotly debated questions of moral philosophy. The controversies it joins are old; but history has given them fresh shape. For example, whether judges should and do make law is now of more practical importance than ever before, as recent presidents have appointed enough justices to the Supreme Court to set its character for a generation.With forceful style, Ronald Dworkin addresses questions about the Anglo-American legal system as protector of individual rights and as machinery for furthering the common good. He discusses whether judges should make political decisions in hard cases; the balancing of individual rights versus the good of the community; whether a person has the right to do what society views as wrong; and the meaning of equality in any framework of social justice. Dworkin strongly opposes the idea that judges should aim at maximizing social wealth. It is his conviction that the area of discretion for judges is severely limited, that in a mature legal system one can always find in existing law a “right answer” for hard cases.Dworkin helps us thread our way through many timely issues such as the rights and privileges of the press under the First Amendment. He reviews the Bakke case, which tested affirmative action programs. These essays also examine civil disobedience, especially in nuclear protests, and bring new perspective to the debate over support of the arts.Above all, this is a book about the interplay between two levels of our political consciousness: practical problems and philosophical theory, matters of urgency and matters of principle. The concluding essay on press freedom expands the discussion of conflict between principle and policy into a warning. Though some defenders of the press blend the two in order to expand freedom of speech, the confusion they create does disservice to their aim and jeopardizes the genuine and fragile right of free speech. We stand in greater danger of compromising that right than of losing the most obvious policy benefits of powerful investigative reporting and should therefore beware the danger to liberty of confusing the two. The caution is general. If we care so little for principle that we dress policy in its colors when this suits our purpose, we cheapen principle and diminish its authority.

In his last book, Ronald Dworkin addresses questions that men and women have asked through the ages: What is religion and what is God’s place in it? What is death and what is immortality? Based on the 2011 Einstein Lectures, Religion without God is inspired by remarks Einstein made that if religion consists of awe toward mysteries which “manifest themselves in the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty, and which our dull faculties can comprehend only in the most primitive forms,” then, he, Einstein, was a religious person.Dworkin joins Einstein’s sense of cosmic mystery and beauty to the claim that value is objective, independent of mind, and immanent in the world. He rejects the metaphysics of naturalism—that nothing is real except what can be studied by the natural sciences. Belief in God is one manifestation of this deeper worldview, but not the only one. The conviction that God underwrites value presupposes a prior commitment to the independent reality of that value—a commitment that is available to nonbelievers as well. So theists share a commitment with some atheists that is more fundamental than what divides them. Freedom of religion should flow not from a respect for belief in God but from the right to ethical independence.Dworkin hoped that this short book would contribute to rational conversation and the softening of religious fear and hatred. Religion without God is the work of a humanist who recognized both the possibilities and limitations of humanity.

Politics in America are polarized and trivialized, perhaps as never before. In Congress, the media, and academic debate, opponents from right and left, the Red and the Blue, struggle against one another as if politics were contact sports played to the shouts of cheerleaders. The result, Ronald Dworkin writes, is a deeply depressing political culture, as ill equipped for the perennial challenge of achieving social justice as for the emerging threats of terrorism. Can the hope for change be realized? Dworkin, one the world's leading legal and political philosophers, identifies and defends core principles of personal and political morality that all citizens can share. He shows that recognizing such shared principles can make substantial political argument possible and help replace contempt with mutual respect. Only then can the full promise of democracy be realized in America and elsewhere. Dworkin lays out two core principles that citizens should share: first, that each human life is intrinsically and equally valuable and, second, that each person has an inalienable personal responsibility for identifying and realizing value in his or her own life.He then shows what fidelity to these principles would mean for human rights, the place of religion in public life, economic justice, and the character and value of democracy. Dworkin argues that liberal conclusions flow most naturally from these principles. Properly understood, they collide with the ambitions of religious conservatives, contemporary American tax and social policy, and much of the War on Terror. But his more basic aim is to convince Americans of all political stripes--as well as citizens of other nations with similar cultures--that they can and must defend their own convictions through their own interpretations of these shared values.

A landmark work of political and legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin''s Taking Rights Seriously was acclaimed as a major work on its first publication in 1977 and remains profoundly influential in the 21st century. A forceful statement of liberal principles - championing the legal, moral and political rights of the individual against the state - Dworkin demolishes prevailing utilitarian and legal-positivist approaches to jurisprudence. Developing his own theory of adjudication, he applies this to controversial public issues, from civil disobedience to positive discrimination. Elegantly written and cuttingly insightful, Taking Rights Seriously is one of the most important works of public thought of the last fifty years.

A landmark work of political and legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously was acclaimed as a major work on its first publication in 1977 and remains profoundly influential in the 21st century. A forceful statement of liberal principles - championing the legal, moral and political rights of the individual against the state - Dworkin demolishes prevailing utilitarian and legal-positivist approaches to jurisprudence. Developing his own theory of adjudication, he applies this to controversial public issues, from civil disobedience to positive discrimination. Elegantly written and cuttingly insightful, Taking Rights Seriously is one of the most important works of public thought of the last fifty years.

A landmark work of political and legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin''s Taking Rights Seriously was acclaimed as a major work on its first publication in 1977 and remains profoundly influential in the 21st century. A forceful statement of liberal principles - championing the legal, moral and political rights of the individual against the state - Dworkin demolishes prevailing utilitarian and legal-positivist approaches to jurisprudence. Developing his own theory of adjudication, he applies this to controversial public issues, from civil disobedience to positive discrimination. Elegantly written and cuttingly insightful, Taking Rights Seriously is one of the most important works of public thought of the last fifty years.

Las constituciones más contemporáneas declaran derechos individuales en un lenguaje bastante amplio y abstracto: "debido proceso", "igualdad ante la ley", "libertad de expresión". ¿Qué significa este lenguaje abstracto bajo las controversias políticas que dividen a la ciudadanía? ¿Cómo deberían decidir los jueces?Dworkin propone la lectura moral de la Constitución, bajo el entendimiento de que ésta invoca principios morales sobre libertad, igualdad y dignidad. Aun cuando muchos académicos pretenden que las cuestiones constitucionales nunca deben tratarse como cuestiones morales, en cada una de las discusiones abordadas en este libro —aborto, pornografía, eutanasia, homosexualidad, etc.—, Dworkin muestra que los jueces deciden casos difíciles respondiendo a cuestiones morales concretas. Esa es, según él, la única forma en la que pueden decidir tales casos.

El libro va desgranando los argumentos que permiten concluir que el pragmatismo ofrece una teoría vacía del derecho, que el pluralismo valorativo refleja de modo inadecuado la naturaleza de los conceptos morales, que el originalismo constitucional presenta una visión empobrecedora del rol de una constitución en una sociedad democrática y que el positivismo jurídico contemporáneo está basado en una teoría errónea del significado y en una visión desacertada de la naturaleza de la autoridad. Esta nueva colección de ensayos de Ronald Dworkin constituye un modelo de razonamiento jurídico lúcido, racional y apasionado que contribuirá, sin lugar a dudas, a que podamos progresar en el tema crucial de qué papel desempeña la justicia en el derecho.

El filósofo y jurista americano Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) presenta en este libro, una de las obras cumbre de la teoría del derecho actual, la articulación más acabada de su pensamiento jurídico. Esta nueva edición incluye también un estudio preliminar firmado por Juan Iosa y Pablo A. Rapetti, «El imperio del desacuerdo», que contribuye a dimensionar y a reivindicar las aportaciones de Dworkin en su crítica al positivismo jurídico y su propia concepción del derecho.Vivimos según el derecho. El derecho nos convierte en lo que somos: ciudadanos y empleados, doctores y cónyuges, personas que poseen cosas. El derecho es espada, escudo y amenaza: reclamamos nuestro salario, nos negamos a pagar el alquiler, debemos afrontar multas o nos encierran en la cárcel, todo en nombre de lo que este etéreo y abstracto soberano ha ordenado. «¿Cómo puede mandar el derecho cuando los textos legales son silenciosos, confusos o ambiguos?», se pregunta el autor. Este libro despliega en toda su extensión la respuesta que Dworkin desarrolló a lo largo de los años: que el razonamiento jurídico es un ejercicio de interpretación constructiva, que nuestro derecho consiste en la mejor justificación de nuestras prácticas jurídicas como un todo —la narración que convierte a estas prácticas en lo mejor que pueden ser—.

Dworkins böcker utgör en frontalattack på de båda föreställningar, utilitarismen och rättspositivismen, som dominerat rättsfilosofin under nittonhundratalet. ? Dworkins teorier har sänt ut chockvågor bland forskare i juridik och rättsfilosofi. Time Magazine