Roy Allison – författare

Russia has been embroiled in bitter disputes with major Western powers over high-profile military interventions - over Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Georgia (2008), and even Libya (2011) which had a UN Security Council mandate. Moscow and the West reached much more agreement over the Gulf War (1990) and intervention in Afghanistan (2001), but these cases are exceptional.This interdisciplinary study explores the persistent differences between Russian and Western leaders about most Western-led military campaigns and about Russia''s own use of force in the CIS region. What does this tell us about emerging norms on the use of force in humanitarian crises? How and why has there been such controversy over the legal justifications for these military operations? Has greater consensus been possible over force in global counterterrorism? What do all these controversiestell us about international rule-making? More specifically, how can we understand Russian political and diplomatic responses during international crises around major interventions? This book argues that Russia has been influential in these debates on norms and law as a permanent United NationsSecurity Council member and as a major military power. Moscow''s approach to these questions has reflected distinctive and quite entrenched attitudes to international order and sovereignty, as well as a preoccupation with its own status. The book draws deeply on Russian sources to show how these attitudes are expressed among the Russian leadership and the political elite. This raises challenging questions about the ability of Russia and Western states to cooperate in emerging crises, in Syria,Iran, or elsewhere and about Russia''s role in international society.

After the turmoil following the collapse of Soviet power, post-Communist Russia has emerged as an assertively independent force in international affairs. Meanwhile, an intense debate has been underway in Moscow about Russia's national interests and foreign policy priorities. Domestic political conflicts and the close ties with former Soviet partner states have made internal factors particularly particularly important in shaping Russian foreign policy.Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy is the first systematic analysis of the domestic political forces which condition the international behaviour of the new Russian state. Four leading specialists examine in turn the areas of foreign policy thinking and debate, how policy is made, the public politics of foreign policy and the role of the military. They explore the changing domestic alignments associated with recent shifts in Russian foreign policy, focusing on the roles played by institutions such as the Security Council and the legislature, by military groupings and by emerging economic interests. The authors throw new light on the domestic foundations of Moscow's more assertive and sef-reliant stance.

Russia has been embroiled in bitter disputes with major Western powers over high-profile military interventions - over Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Georgia (2008), and even Libya (2011) which had a UN Security Council mandate. Moscow and the West reached much more agreement over the Gulf War (1990) and intervention in Afghanistan (2001), but these cases are exceptional. This interdisciplinary study explores the persistent differences between Russian and Western leaders about most Western-led military campaigns and about Russia's own use of force in the CIS region. What does this tell us about emerging norms on the use of force in humanitarian crises? How and why has there been such controversy over the legal justifications for these military operations? Has greater consensus been possible over force in global counterterrorism? What do all these controversies tell us about international rule-making? More specifically, how can we understand Russian political and diplomatic responses during international crises around major interventions? This book argues that Russia has been influential in these debates on norms and law as a permanent United Nations Security Council member and as a major military power. Moscow's approach to these questions has reflected distinctive and quite entrenched attitudes to international order and sovereignty, as well as a preoccupation with its own status. The book draws deeply on Russian sources to show how these attitudes are expressed among the Russian leadership and the political elite. This raises challenging questions about the ability of Russia and Western states to cooperate in emerging crises, in Syria, Iran, or elsewhere and about Russia's role in international society.

This study investigates the overall Soviet conception of non-alignment in the Third World and assesses Soviet policy in relation to this issue. The author argues that official Soviet encouragement for the policy of non-alignment and Soviet support for the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and 1970s have been part of a broad Soviet strategy aimed at weakening and ultimately supplanting Western military and political ties with Third World states. Soviet officials have been reluctant, therefore, to view neutrality, nuetralism or non-alignment as concepts or policies which denote an intermediate status between the blocs. This study assesses the implications of such perceptions for Soviet policy and considers how far Soviet leaders have accepted the independent foreign policy aspirations of non-aligned states.

This 1990 publication puts forward the view that superpower competition in the Third World has always carried with it the likelihood of acute crises and that this likelihood may be reduced through a variety of tacit understandings or explicit agreements between Washington and Moscow. As the central study from the Ford Foundation/Southampton University project on North/South security relations, the text brings together specialists from a variety of backgrounds to identify the roots of the competitive relationship in the 1970s and 1980s and then consider a range of specific regional conflicts in which both superpowers have been involved. Although superpower collaboration had increased, the long-term character and intentions of Soviet and American involvement in the Third World remained uncertain. In these circumstances it was particularly timely to reappraise past experience and assess the future prospects for crisis prevention in politically turbulent and potentially dangerous areas.

This study investigates the overall Soviet conception of non-alignment in the Third World and assesses Soviet policy in relation to this issue. The author argues that official Soviet encouragement for the policy of non-alignment and Soviet support for the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and 1970s have been part of a broad Soviet strategy aimed at weakening and ultimately supplanting Western military and political ties with Third World states. Soviet officials have been reluctant, therefore, to view neutrality, nuetralism or non-alignment as concepts or policies which denote an intermediate status between the blocs. This study assesses the implications of such perceptions for Soviet policy and considers how far Soviet leaders have accepted the independent foreign policy aspirations of non-aligned states.

A Brookings Institution Press and Chatham House publicationThis volume is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the strategic reconfiguration of Central Asia as Russia has become more disengaged from the nations in the region and as these nations have developed new relations to the south, east, and west. The international implications are enormous because of the rich energy sources—oil and natural gas—located in the Caspian Sea area.The authors assess a variety of internal security policy challenges confronting these states—for example, the potential for conflict arising from such factors as a mixed ethnic population, resource scarcity, particularly in relation to water management, and an Islamic revival. They also examine the security policy content of relations between the Central Asian states and regional and international powers—specifically the stakes, interests, and policies of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States.These internal challenges and the evolution of relations with external powers may result in new cooperative relationships, but they may also lead to destabilizing rivalry and interstate enmity in Central Asia. It is important to identify new patterns of relevance for future security cooperation in the region, but the potential for a new security system or for new institutions to manage security in the region remains uncertain. These issues are explored by a team of prominent specialists from Western Europe, the United States, Russia and China.

This authoritative work examines recent changes in Russia's relations with the EU and NATO and explores the patterns of support for these various orientations among its own elites and public. Investigates Russian engagement with the enlarged European Union and NATO.Evaluates the serious choices to be made on both sides about the obstacles to good relations, and about the policies to enable a form of Russian 'inclusion without membership'.Draws on extensive interviews with Russian decision-makers as well as a body of new survey evidence, official sources and recently published debates.Anticipates the issues that will become increasingly prominent, including competition in the 'common neighbourhood' and controversy over the role of values in shaping Russia's future position in Europe.