S. Craig Pirrong – författare

This study is an independent scholarly analysis of the economics of the grain futures contracts of the Chicago Board of Trade. The study was made possible by a research grant to the MidAmerica Institute from the Chicago Board of Trade, and we gratefully acknowledge this financial support, as well as the information and vast body of experience made available to us by the Division of Economic Analysis and members of the Exchange. Several other organizations also provided invaluable help from the inception of this study through the full process, either in the form of information, or through discussion: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Grain and Feed Association, the American Soybean Association, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, the House Committee on Agriculture, the General Accounting Office, and the Center for the Study of Futures and Options Markets at Virginia Polytechnic and State University. We express our thanks. The primary authors wish to extend a special word of apprecia­ tion to Michael Brennan, Merton Miller, Richard Roll, Hans Stoll and Lester Telser, who served as members of the Resource Panel for the study. While key strengths of the study reflect their input, ultimate responsibility for the analysis rests with the primary authors.

Deterrence of market manipulation is central to the entire regulatory and legal framework governing the operation of American commodity futures markets. However, despite all of the regulatory, scholarly, and legal scrutiny of market manipulation, the subject is widely misunderstood. Federal commodity and securities laws prohibit manipulation, but do not define it. Scholarly research has failed to analyze adequately the causes or effects of manipulation, and the relevant judicial decisions are confused, confusing, and contradictory. The aim of this book is to illuminate the process of market manipulation by presenting a rigorous economic analysis of this phenomenon, including the conditions that facilitate it and its effects on market users and others. The conclusions of this analysis are used to examine critically some legal and regulatory anti-manipulation policies. The Economics, Law and Public Policy of Market Power Manipulation concludes with a set of robust and realistic tests that regulators and jurists can apply to detect and deter manipulation.

This study is an independent scholarly analysis of the economics of the grain futures contracts of the Chicago Board of Trade. The study was made possible by a research grant to the MidAmerica Institute from the Chicago Board of Trade, and we gratefully acknowledge this financial support, as well as the information and vast body of experience made available to us by the Division of Economic Analysis and members of the Exchange. Several other organizations also provided invaluable help from the inception of this study through the full process, either in the form of information, or through discussion: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Grain and Feed Association, the American Soybean Association, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, the House Committee on Agriculture, the General Accounting Office, and the Center for the Study of Futures and Options Markets at Virginia Polytechnic and State University. We express our thanks. The primary authors wish to extend a special word of apprecia­ tion to Michael Brennan, Merton Miller, Richard Roll, Hans Stoll and Lester Telser, who served as members of the Resource Panel for the study. While key strengths of the study reflect their input, ultimate responsibility for the analysis rests with the primary authors.

Deterrence of market manipulation is central to the entire regulatory and legal framework governing the operation of American commodity futures markets. However, despite all of the regulatory, scholarly, and legal scrutiny of market manipulation, the subject is widely misunderstood. Federal commodity and securities laws prohibit manipulation, but do not define it. Scholarly research has failed to analyze adequately the causes or effects of manipulation, and the relevant judicial decisions are confused, confusing, and contradictory. The aim of this book is to illuminate the process of market manipulation by presenting a rigorous economic analysis of this phenomenon, including the conditions that facilitate it and its effects on market users and others. The conclusions of this analysis are used to examine critically some legal and regulatory anti-manipulation policies. The Economics, Law and Public Policy of Market Power Manipulation concludes with a set of robust and realistic tests that regulators and jurists can apply to detect and deter manipulation.

This study is an independent scholarly analysis of the economics of the grain futures contracts of the Chicago Board of Trade. The study was made possible by a research grant to the MidAmerica Institute from the Chicago Board of Trade, and we gratefully acknowledge this financial support, as well as the information and vast body of experience made available to us by the Division of Economic Analysis and members of the Exchange. Several other organizations also provided invaluable help from the inception of this study through the full process, either in the form of information, or through discussion: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Grain and Feed Association, the American Soybean Association, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, the House Committee on Agriculture, the General Accounting Office, and the Center for the Study of Futures and Options Markets at Virginia Polytechnic and State University. We express our thanks. The primary authors wish to extend a special word of apprecia­ tion to Michael Brennan, Merton Miller, Richard Roll, Hans Stoll and Lester Telser, who served as members of the Resource Panel for the study. While key strengths of the study reflect their input, ultimate responsibility for the analysis rests with the primary authors.

Deterrence of market manipulation is central to the entire regulatory and legal framework governing the operation of American commodity futures markets. However, despite all of the regulatory, scholarly, and legal scrutiny of market manipulation, the subject is widely misunderstood. Federal commodity and securities laws prohibit manipulation, but do not define it. Scholarly research has failed to analyze adequately the causes or effects of manipulation, and the relevant judicial decisions are confused, confusing, and contradictory. The aim of this book is to illuminate the process of market manipulation by presenting a rigorous economic analysis of this phenomenon, including the conditions that facilitate it and its effects on market users and others. The conclusions of this analysis are used to examine critically some legal and regulatory anti-manipulation policies. The Economics, Law and Public Policy of Market Power Manipulation concludes with a set of robust and realistic tests that regulators and jurists can apply to detect and deter manipulation.

On February 6, 1989, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board contacted Mid America Institute to inquire whether it would undertake an independent, academically oriented analysis of the insolvency resolution crisis in the thrift industry. The Senate Banking Committee, during the course of hearings on the thrift crisis, had suggested to the Bank Board tile desirability of an independent assessment of Bank: Board and FSLIC resolution methodology, specifically as it related to the controversy surrounding the December deals, the Southwest Plan, and the possibility that tax considerations were driving certain deals. The Bank Board had already initiated studies from industry-oriented perspectives. Therefore, it felt that an academic perspective would provide both a valuable addition to the process, and by the nature of academia, perhaps the best prospect of a credible and independent viewpoint. The Bank Board was prepared to give an appropriately structured Task Force virtually unlimited access to all personnel, documents and resources that the Task Force felt necessary to come to an uncompromising assessment. The only significant constraint imposed was that a report had to be available prior to the start of the next round of Senate Banking Committee hearings on March 1, 1989. The Task Force would be given complete discretion as to the scope and coverage of the report, but it was requested that the topic of the December deals, particularly the associated tax considerations, be a significant part of the report.