Shawn Donnelly – författare

The regulation of financial markets and companies in Europe has undergone significant changes over the last decade. The Commission, Member States, and Parliament constructed regimes that facilitate new legislation, sanction delegation to the Commission for financial market law, and structure the cross-border regulation of companies within the single market. The substance of this book is about that regime development.In creating the regimes discussed in this book, EU leaders contributed to the ongoing constitutionalisation of Europe by contesting and constructing norms. Patterns of normative collision, collusion and coexistence determined whether and what kind of regime emerged.Each of the regimes required an explicit definition of the vertical relationship between the EU and the member states, and of the horizontal relationship amongst the member states. It defined the kind of regulatory state that would be required, the mix of European and national bodies involved, and the procedures they were to follow in carrying out their functions. It also defined what kinds of national variation in related economic and social policy would be regarded as legitimate. As they made these agreements, European leaders simultaneously articulated what it meant to be a member state in the single market, and what it meant to delegate responsibilities to the EU. This constitutionalised these ideals by sorting out the issues of EU and national responsibilities in a powerfully authoritative way. The theory of this book is about demonstrating the normative foundations of these constitutional agreements and showing how they had to be built on the shoulders of national ones.

This book examines the politics of Banking Union and EMU reform in the EU, and draws lessons for what it means for international politics, both in Europe, and for international relations more broadly. It demonstrates that most of the reforms in Europe to break free of the Eurozone and banking crises in which Europe continues to find itself focus on building up the capacities of national authorities rather than European ones. The result is that national authorities remain largely in control of the decisions and funds that are to be deployed to prevent economic disaster if a single EU bank fails. The likely outcome is an accelerated balkanization of the European market for the foreseeable future. The book also contends that power politics, and realism in particular, is a defining feature of European politics with coercion and enforced national responsibility at the demand of Germany; the dominant form of institution-building that established the responsible sovereignty model, and shut down the possibility of alternatives. In making this case, the book demonstrates that the dominant view in international relations, that power politics best explains the behaviour of states, also apply to the EU.This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of the Eurozone crisis, EU politics, economic policy, and more broadly to political economy, public policy and international relations.

This book compares the different expressions of, and outcomes from, banking nationalism in two European countries to draw wider conclusions about the consequences for Banking Union in Europe and to show how national governments deal (or fail to deal) with international commitments. It reveals how and why one case – Spain – managed to tackle failing banks within EU Banking Union regulations even before they became written in EU law, while the other – Italy – had more persistent problems. The book argues that Spain demonstrates a successful case of liberal economic nationalism, typified by aggressive, early state intervention to restructure Spanish banks, and help from the European Stability Mechanism even in the face of local political opposition. Italy, meanwhile, suffered from the weaker, delayed intervention which forced it to confront European institutions with demands for special treatment as a means of externalizing its own internal weakness. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and professionals in economic policy, Economic and Monetary Union and Banking Union in Europe, European and global governance, European/EU studies, European public policy, European public administration and EU law, as well as professionals working in the banking sector.

This book compares the different expressions of, and outcomes from, banking nationalism in two European countries to draw wider conclusions about the consequences for Banking Union in Europe and to show how national governments deal (or fail to deal) with international commitments. It reveals how and why one case – Spain – managed to tackle failing banks within EU Banking Union regulations even before they became written in EU law, while the other – Italy – had more persistent problems. The book argues that Spain demonstrates a successful case of liberal economic nationalism, typified by aggressive, early state intervention to restructure Spanish banks, and help from the European Stability Mechanism even in the face of local political opposition. Italy, meanwhile, suffered from the weaker, delayed intervention which forced it to confront European institutions with demands for special treatment as a means of externalizing its own internal weakness. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and professionals in economic policy, Economic and Monetary Union and Banking Union in Europe, European and global governance, European/EU studies, European public policy, European public administration and EU law, as well as professionals working in the banking sector.