Shigeru Taguchi – författare

Der späte Husserl spricht von dem "Ur-Ich" als dem Ich, das der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität in einem gewissen Sinne vorangeht. Dies besagt aber nicht, dass es ein solipsistisches Ich wäre, das dem Anderen einseitig voranginge. Der Terminus "Ur-Ich" zeigt vielmehr die Ursprünglichkeit einer asymmetrischen und irreversiblen Relation zwischen Ich und Anderem zugespitzt an. Um dies zu zeigen, befragt die vorliegende Untersuchung das erfahrende Bewusstsein, in dem das Ich sich selbst in einzigartiger Weise gegeben ist. Diese Selbsterfahrung ist uns im gewöhnlichen Leben allzu selbstverständlich, wir sind uns gewissermaßen allzu nahe. Wenn uns diese selbstverständlich gelebte Vertrautheit mit uns selbst als Ur-Ich, als absolutes Medium aller Erfahrung, in einer philosophischen Reflexion eigens vor Augen gestellt wird, erscheint sie uns fremdartig. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht, die Fremdartigkeit des Phänomens des "Ur-Ich" verständlich zu machen, indem sie erstens Husserls Radikalisierung der Epoché nachvollziehbar macht, indem sie zweitens das Phänomen der intentionalen Modifikation (bzw. der ursprünglichen "Monadisierung" des Ich) eingehend analysiert und drittens die Bedeutung der apodiktischen Evidenz aus einer neuen Perspektive herausarbeitet.

The development of phenomenological philosophy in Japan is a well-established tradition that reaches back to the early 20th-century. The past decades have witnessed significant contributions and advances in different areas of phenomenological thought in Japan that remain unknown, or only partially known, to an international philosophical public. This volume offers a selection of original phenomenological research in Japan to an international audience in the form of an English language publication. The contributions in this volume range over classical figures in the phenomenological movement (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Monty), recent trends in French phenomenology, and contemporary inter-disciplinary approaches. In addition to this diverse engagement with European thinkers, many of the contributions in this volume establish critical and complimentary discussions with 20th-century Japanese philosophers.

This volume addresses the impact of the introduction of phenomenology in Japan and its interaction with Japanese philosophy. It is well known that phenomenology was introduced at a very early stage in Japan. Furthermore, phenomenology still constitutes one of the main currents of thought in Japan. However, the specific way in which phenomenology has interacted with the indigenous Japanese tradition of thought and Japanese culture has until now not been addressed in great detail. This volume fills that gap. It discusses in detail the encounter and the interaction between Japanese thought and phenomenological reflection, with special regards to the topics of awareness and the self, the experience of otherness, ethics, and metaphysical issues. The book shows how phenomenology has served, and still serves, Japan to re-comprehend its “own” tradition and its specific form(s) of culture. At the same time, it offers an example of how different cultures and traditions can be both preserved and developed in their reciprocal action. More in general, it advances the philosophical debate beyond cultural enclosures and beyond mere scholasticism. The phenomenological tradition has always been open to new and alien ideas. An encounter with Japanese philosophy can offer a new challenge to actual phenomenological thinking.

This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be “irrational” or “pre-rational.” The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl’s view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly “rational” and the “irrational” as well as that of the “practical” and the “theoretical.”