Simo Knuuttila – författare

Emotions are the focus of intense debate both in contemporary philosophy and psychology and increasingly also in the history of ideas. Simo Knuuttila presents a comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of emotion from Plato to Renaissance times, combining rigorous philosophical analysis with careful historical reconstruction. The first part of the book covers the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle and later ancient views from Stoicism to Neoplatonism and, in addition, their reception and transformation by early Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen to Augustine and Cassian. Knuuttila then proceeds to a discussion of ancient themes in medieval thought, and of new medieval conceptions, codified in the so-called faculty psychology from Avicenna to Aquinas, in thirteenth century taxonomies, and in the voluntarist approach of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and their followers. Philosophers, classicists, historians of philosophy, historians of psychology, and anyone interested in emotion will find much to stimulate them in this fascinating book.

Emotions are the focus of intense debate both in contemporary philosophy and psychology and increasingly also in the history of ideas. Simo Knuuttila presents a comprehensive survey of philosophical theories of emotion from Plato to Renaissance times, combining rigorous philosophical analysis with careful historical reconstruction. The first part of the book covers the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle and later ancient views from Stoicism to Neoplatonism and, in addition, their reception and transformation by early Christian thinkers from Clement and Origen to Augustine and Cassian. Knuuttila then proceeds to a discussion of ancient themes in medieval thought, and of new medieval conceptions, codified in the so-called faculty psychology from Avicenna to Aquinas, in thirteenth century taxonomies, and in the voluntarist approach of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and their followers. Philosophers, classicists, historians of philosophy, historians of psychology, and anyone interested in emotion will find much to stimulate them in this fascinating book.

Originally published in 1993, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy looks at the idea of modality as multiplicity of reference with respect to alternative domains. The book examines how this emerged in early medieval discussions and addresses how it was originally influenced by the theological conception of God acting by choice. After a discussion of ancient modal paradigms, the author traces the interplay of old and new modal views in medieval logic and semantics, philosophy and theology. A detailed account is given of late medieval discussions of the new modal logic, epistemic logic, and the logic norms. These theories show striking similarities to some basic tenets of contemporary approaches to modal matters. This work will be of considerable interest to historians of philosophy and ideas and philosophers of logic and metaphysics.

Originally published in 1993, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy looks at the idea of modality as multiplicity of reference with respect to alternative domains. The book examines how this emerged in early medieval discussions and addresses how it was originally influenced by the theological conception of God acting by choice. After a discussion of ancient modal paradigms, the author traces the interplay of old and new modal views in medieval logic and semantics, philosophy and theology. A detailed account is given of late medieval discussions of the new modal logic, epistemic logic, and the logic norms. These theories show striking similarities to some basic tenets of contemporary approaches to modal matters. This work will be of considerable interest to historians of philosophy and ideas and philosophers of logic and metaphysics.

Sense perception is one of the classical themes in philosophy. Although perhaps not among the most exciting topics, it is traditionally considered a necessary preamble to many of these, such as the mind-body relationship, consciousness, knowledge, and scepticism. This introductory role is not the only reason for the philosophical interest in perception. It is also a phenomenon which raises important questions about what is perceived, how a perceptual experience is caused, what the content of perception is, whether this content is conceptual, how perception is related to epistemic attitudes, and so on. While philosophical psychology is the main area in which perception is dealt with in contemporary philosophy, itis also discussed in the theory of knowledge, cognitive science, philosophical aesthetics and metaphysics. In recent years, the rich tradition of various philosophical theories of perception has been increasingly studied by scholars of the history of philosophy of mind. It may be added that there is of course a large number of scienti c studies of perception in psychology, physiology and contemporary neuroscience.

This book provides a comprehensive study of major issues of moral psychology throughout history, from ancient to early modern philosophy. The volume focuses primarily on the Western history of philosophy but also deals with Jewish and Islamic heritage. The Introduction chapter lays out the historical background in broad strokes, giving the reader the “lay of the land” when it comes to the terms of analysis and their overall development within the Western tradition of moral psychology. The book continues by studying and analyzing moral anthropology, moral agency and motivation, virtues and social and political commitments, taking a thematic approach in a specific time-period and focus on the most unique and/or fruitful discussions about a particular historically situated discussion when it comes to thinking about questions and/or ‘problems’ in the field of moral psychology. Aimed at both a layman and academic audience, this book is of great interest to a broad readership.

This book provides a comprehensive study of major issues of moral psychology throughout history, from ancient to early modern philosophy. The volume focuses primarily on the Western history of philosophy but also deals with Jewish and Islamic heritage. The Introduction chapter lays out the historical background in broad strokes, giving the reader the “lay of the land” when it comes to the terms of analysis and their overall development within the Western tradition of moral psychology. The book continues by studying and analyzing moral anthropology, moral agency and motivation, virtues and social and political commitments, taking a thematic approach in a specific time-period and focus on the most unique and/or fruitful discussions about a particular historically situated discussion when it comes to thinking about questions and/or ‘problems’ in the field of moral psychology. Aimed at both a layman and academic audience, this book is of great interest to a broad readership.

A sports reporter might say that in a competition all the participants realize their potentialities or possibilities. When an athlete performs far below his usual standard, it can be said that it was possible for him to do better. But the idea of fair play requires that this use of 'possible' refers to another com­ petition. It is presumed that the best athlete wins and that no real possibility of doing better is left unrealized in a competition. Here we have a use of language, a language game, in which modal notions are used so as to imply that if something is possible, it is realized. This idea does not belong to the general presuppositions of current ordinary usage. It is, nevertheless, not difficult to fmd other similar examples outside of the language of sports. It may be that such a use of modal notions is sometimes calculated to express that in the context in question there are no real alternative courses of events in contradistinction to other cases in which some possible alternatives remain unrealized. Even though modal notions are currently interpreted without the presup­ position that each genuine possibility should be realized at some moment of the actual history, there are contemporary philosophical models of modalities which incorporate this presupposition. In his book Untersuchungen tiber den Modalkalkiil (Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1952, pp. 16-36), Oscar Becker presents a statistical interpretation of modal calculi.

The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti'/'einai'/'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn. Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or'esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and fre­ quently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other.

The word "modem" in the title of this book refers primarily to post-medieval discussions, but it also hints at those medieval mo­ dal theories which were considered modem in contradistinction to ancient conceptions and which in different ways influenced philosophical discussions during the early modem period. The me­ dieval developments are investigated in the opening paper, 'The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors', by Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila. Boethius's works from the early sixth century belonged to the sources from which early medieval thinkers obtained their knowledge of ancient thought. They offered extensive discus­ sions of traditional modal conceptions the basic forms of which were: (1) the paradigm of possibility as a potency striving to realize itself; (2) the "statistical" interpretation of modal no­ tions where necessity means actuality in all relevant cases or omnitemporal actuality, possibility means actuality in some rel­ evant cases or sometimes, and impossibility means omnitemporal non-actuality; and (3) the "logical" definition of possibility as something which, being assumed, results in nothing contradic­ tory. Boethius accepted the Aristotelian view according to which total possibilities in the first sense must prove their met­ tle through actualization and possibilities in the third sense are assumed to be realized in our actual history. On these presump­ tions, all of the above-mentioned ancient paradigms imply the Principle of Plenitude according to which no genuine possibility remains unrealized.

Sense perception is one of the classical themes in philosophy. Although perhaps not among the most exciting topics, it is traditionally considered a necessary preamble to many of these, such as the mind-body relationship, consciousness, knowledge, and scepticism. This introductory role is not the only reason for the philosophical interest in perception. It is also a phenomenon which raises important questions about what is perceived, how a perceptual experience is caused, what the content of perception is, whether this content is conceptual, how perception is related to epistemic attitudes, and so on. While philosophical psychology is the main area in which perception is dealt with in contemporary philosophy, itis also discussed in the theory of knowledge, cognitive science, philosophical aesthetics and metaphysics. In recent years, the rich tradition of various philosophical theories of perception has been increasingly studied by scholars of the history of philosophy of mind. It may be added that there is of course a large number of scienti c studies of perception in psychology, physiology and contemporary neuroscience.

A sports reporter might say that in a competition all the participants realize their potentialities or possibilities. When an athlete performs far below his usual standard, it can be said that it was possible for him to do better. But the idea of fair play requires that this use of 'possible' refers to another com­ petition. It is presumed that the best athlete wins and that no real possibility of doing better is left unrealized in a competition. Here we have a use of language, a language game, in which modal notions are used so as to imply that if something is possible, it is realized. This idea does not belong to the general presuppositions of current ordinary usage. It is, nevertheless, not difficult to fmd other similar examples outside of the language of sports. It may be that such a use of modal notions is sometimes calculated to express that in the context in question there are no real alternative courses of events in contradistinction to other cases in which some possible alternatives remain unrealized. Even though modal notions are currently interpreted without the presup­ position that each genuine possibility should be realized at some moment of the actual history, there are contemporary philosophical models of modalities which incorporate this presupposition. In his book Untersuchungen tiber den Modalkalkiil (Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1952, pp. 16-36), Oscar Becker presents a statistical interpretation of modal calculi.

Fresh translations of key texts, exhaustive coverage from Plato to Kant, and detailed commentary by expert scholars of philosophy add up to make this sourcebook the first and most comprehensive account of the history of the philosophy of mind. Published at a time when the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology are high-profile domains in current research, the volume will inform our understanding of philosophical questions by shedding light on the origins of core conceptual assumptions often arrived at before the instauration of psychology as a recognized subject in its own right.   The chapters closely follow historical developments in our understanding of the mind, with sections dedicated to ancient, medieval Latin and Arabic, and early modern periods of development. The volume’s structural clarity enables readers to trace the entire progression of philosophical understanding on specific topics related to the mind, such as the nature of perception. Doing so revealsthe fascinating contrasts between current and historical approaches. In addition to its all-inclusive source material, the volume provides subtle expert commentary that includes critical introductions to each thematic section as well as detailed engagement with the central texts. A voluminous bibliography includes hundreds of primary and secondary sources. The sheer scale of this new publication sheds light on the progression, and discontinuities, in our study of the philosophy of mind, and represents a major new sourcebook in a field of extreme importance to our understanding of humanity as a whole.​

The word "modem" in the title of this book refers primarily to post-medieval discussions, but it also hints at those medieval mo­ dal theories which were considered modem in contradistinction to ancient conceptions and which in different ways influenced philosophical discussions during the early modem period. The me­ dieval developments are investigated in the opening paper, 'The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors', by Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila. Boethius's works from the early sixth century belonged to the sources from which early medieval thinkers obtained their knowledge of ancient thought. They offered extensive discus­ sions of traditional modal conceptions the basic forms of which were: (1) the paradigm of possibility as a potency striving to realize itself; (2) the "statistical" interpretation of modal no­ tions where necessity means actuality in all relevant cases or omnitemporal actuality, possibility means actuality in some rel­ evant cases or sometimes, and impossibility means omnitemporal non-actuality; and (3) the "logical" definition of possibility as something which, being assumed, results in nothing contradic­ tory. Boethius accepted the Aristotelian view according to which total possibilities in the first sense must prove their met­ tle through actualization and possibilities in the third sense are assumed to be realized in our actual history. On these presump­ tions, all of the above-mentioned ancient paradigms imply the Principle of Plenitude according to which no genuine possibility remains unrealized.