Sorin Bangu – författare

This book is meant as a part of the larger contemporary philosophical project of naturalizing logico-mathematical knowledge, and addresses the key question that motivates most of the work in this field: What is philosophically relevant about the nature of logico-mathematical knowledge in recent research in psychology and cognitive science? The question about this distinctive kind of knowledge is rooted in Plato’s dialogues, and virtually all major philosophers have expressed interest in it. The essays in this collection tackle this important philosophical query from the perspective of the modern sciences of cognition, namely cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge contributes to consolidating a new, emerging direction in the philosophy of mathematics, which, while keeping the traditional concerns of this sub-discipline in sight, aims to engage with them in a scientifically-informed manner. A subsequent aim is to signal the philosophers’ willingness to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the community of cognitive scientists and psychologists by examining their methods and interpretive strategies.

Wittgenstein once said that his aim was to make the philosophical problems 'completely disappear', a remark that has baffled philosophers ever since. In this book, Sorin Bangu reconstructs and defends Wittgenstein's unusual idea, and applies it to the traditional problems in philosophy of mathematics, setting out and explaining the subtleties of what is considered the most difficult area of Wittgenstein's views. He also considers how, according to the later Wittgenstein, we should think of the relation between philosophy and mathematics, articulating Wittgenstein's 'normativist' dissolution strategy and explaining his 'therapeutic' vision of the relation between the two disciplines. His book shows how these controversial views sit within the context of current debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and mounts a detailed and convincing defence of the radical eliminative claim - that philosophy of mathematics after Wittgenstein is devoid of its traditional problems.

Wittgenstein once said that his aim was to make the philosophical problems 'completely disappear', a remark that has baffled philosophers ever since. In this book, Sorin Bangu reconstructs and defends Wittgenstein's unusual idea, and applies it to the traditional problems in philosophy of mathematics, setting out and explaining the subtleties of what is considered the most difficult area of Wittgenstein's views. He also considers how, according to the later Wittgenstein, we should think of the relation between philosophy and mathematics, articulating Wittgenstein's 'normativist' dissolution strategy and explaining his 'therapeutic' vision of the relation between the two disciplines. His book shows how these controversial views sit within the context of current debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and mounts a detailed and convincing defence of the radical eliminative claim - that philosophy of mathematics after Wittgenstein is devoid of its traditional problems.