Stephen Badsey – författare

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command.In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command.In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

A collection of the papers from the 1995 Sandhurst conference presented by leading members of the armed forces, the media and academia. The conference marked a major advance in British thinking on this very topical and fast-moving subject, bringing together authorities from various fields in a multidisciplinary investigation which has been, and will be of great interest to a wide variety of specialist readers.

A collection of the papers from the 1995 Sandhurst conference presented by leading members of the armed forces, the media and academia. The conference marked a major advance in British thinking on this very topical and fast-moving subject, bringing together authorities from various fields in a multidisciplinary investigation which has been, and will be of great interest to a wide variety of specialist readers.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

At 0630 hours on 6 June 1944, the US Army's 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions led the assault on Omaha Beach, the most strongly defended of the all invasion beaches. Supporting Allied bombers had mostly missed their targets, the offshore naval bombardment was hampered by poor visibility, and many elements of the first assault waves were swamped or sank, including amphibious tanks. The first waves of infantry waded ashore into a storm of German fire. In these first harrowing hours of 'Overlord', Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commanding First US Army, seriously considered aborting the Omaha landing altogether. Yet despite appalling difficulties and heavy casualties, the US troops prevailed and a vulnerable bridgehead inland was established by the evening of 6 June. It was the hardest fight of D-Day.

A prevalent view among historians is that both horsed cavalry and the cavalry charge became obviously obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower, and that officers of the cavalry clung to both for reasons of prestige and stupidity. It is this view, commonly held but rarely supported by sustained research, that this book challenges. It shows that the achievements of British and Empire cavalry in the First World War, although controversial, are sufficient to contradict the argument that belief in the cavalry was evidence of military incompetence. It offers a case study of how in reality a practical military doctrine for the cavalry was developed and modified over several decades, influenced by wider defence plans and spending, by the experience of combat, by Army politics, and by the rivalries of senior officers. Debate as to how the cavalry was to adjust its tactics in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower began in the mid nineteenth century, when the increasing size of armies meant a greater need for mobile troops. The cavalry problem was how to deal with a gap in the evolution of warfare between the mass armies of the later nineteenth century and the motorised firepower of the mid twentieth century, an issue that is closely connected with the origins of the deadlock on the Western Front. Tracing this debate, this book shows how, despite serious attempts to ’learn from history’, both European-style wars and colonial wars produced ambiguous or disputed evidence as to the future of cavalry, and doctrine was largely a matter of what appeared practical at the time.

In this collection of essays of incomparable scholarship, Stephen Badsey explores in individual detail how the British Army fought in the First World War, how politics and strategy affected its battles and the decisions of senior commanders such as Douglas Haig, and how these issues were intimately intertwined with the mass media portrayal of the Army to itself and to the British people. Informative, provocative, and often entertaining, based on more than a quarter-century of research, these essays on the British Army in the First World War range through topics from a trench raid to modern television comedy. As a contribution to progressive military history, "The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918" proves that the way the British Army fought and its portrayal through the media cannot be separated. It is one of a growing number of studies which show that, far from being in opposition to each other, cultural history and the history of battle must be combined for the First World War to be properly understood. For more information visit Stephen Badsey's website www.stephenbadsey.com

A concise, illustrated account of one of the most famous offensives in European history.D-Day, 6 June 1944, saw the largest amphibious landing operation in history. From ports and harbours on the southern coast of England, an armada of troopships and landing craft launched the Allied return to mainland Europe. Stephen Badsey provides a concise account of the Normandy campaign, from the fiercely contested landings, to the struggle to capture Caen, the 'Cobra' offensive and the dramatic pursuit of the Germans to the River Seine.This was the crucial campaign of the Western theatre: after the Battle of Normandy the only question was how soon the war would end, not who would win it.

A prevalent view among historians is that both horsed cavalry and the cavalry charge became obviously obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower, and that officers of the cavalry clung to both for reasons of prestige and stupidity. It is this view, commonly held but rarely supported by sustained research, that this book challenges. It shows that the achievements of British and Empire cavalry in the First World War, although controversial, are sufficient to contradict the argument that belief in the cavalry was evidence of military incompetence. It offers a case study of how in reality a practical military doctrine for the cavalry was developed and modified over several decades, influenced by wider defence plans and spending, by the experience of combat, by Army politics, and by the rivalries of senior officers. Debate as to how the cavalry was to adjust its tactics in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower began in the mid nineteenth century, when the increasing size of armies meant a greater need for mobile troops. The cavalry problem was how to deal with a gap in the evolution of warfare between the mass armies of the later nineteenth century and the motorised firepower of the mid twentieth century, an issue that is closely connected with the origins of the deadlock on the Western Front. Tracing this debate, this book shows how, despite serious attempts to ’learn from history’, both European-style wars and colonial wars produced ambiguous or disputed evidence as to the future of cavalry, and doctrine was largely a matter of what appeared practical at the time.

In this collection of essays of incomparable scholarship, Stephen Badsey explores in individual detail how the British Army fought in the First World War, how politics and strategy affected its battles and the decisions of senior commanders such as Douglas Haig, and how these issues were intimately intertwined with the mass media portrayal of the Army to itself and to the British people. Informative, provocative, and often entertaining, based on more than a quarter-century of research, these essays on the British Army in the First World War range through topics from a trench raid to modern television comedy. As a contribution to progressive military history, The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918 proves that the way the British Army fought and its portrayal through the media cannot be separated. It is one of a growing number of studies which show that, far from being in opposition to each other, cultural history and the history of battle must be combined for the First World War to be properly understood. For more information visit Stephen Badsey's website www.stephenbadsey.com.

Illustrated with colour maps and images, this is an introduction to the Franco-Prussian War, a war that marked the beginning of the creation of modern Europe.The Franco-Prussian War started in 1870 when Otto von Bismarck engineered a war with the French Second Empire under Napoleon III, as part of his plan to unite Prussia with the southern German states as a new Germany. Stephen Badsey examines the build-up, battles, and impact of the war, which was an overwhelming Prussian victory with massive consequences. The French Second Empire collapsed, Napoleon III became an exile in Britain, and King Wilhelm I was proclaimed Emperor of the new united Germany. In the peace settlement that followed, Germany gained the eastern French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, areas that were to provide a bone of contention for years to come.Updated for the new edition with revisions from the author and new images throughout, this is an accessible introduction to the largest and most important war fought in Europe between the age of Napoleon and the First World War.

A compact, illustrated exploration of one of the most audacious, and ultimately controversial, operations of the Second World War.'Market Garden' was a joint penetration, by an armoured column and a large-scale airborne drop, to punch a decisive hole in the German defences. If it had succeeded, the war could have ended in 1944. Yet the two-pronged attack failed in its objectives.This book details how, instead of being relieved after 48 hours as expected, British paratroopers were cut off for nine days. Facing two unexpected SS Panzer divisions the Allies were eventually evacuated across the Rhine after putting up an incredible fight: of the 10,000 men involved less than 2,000 survived.