Stewart Halsey Ross - Böcker

The United States relied heavily on bombing to defeat the Germans and the Japanese in World War II, and air raids were touted as "precision" bombing in American propaganda. But was precision possible over cloud-covered Europe or a darkened Japanese countryside? Could the vaunted Norden optical bombsight in fact "drop bombs into pickle barrels" as advertised? Were the American aircrews well trained and well protected? How good were their airplanes? What were the results of the costly raids?This work sets suppositions against facts surrounding the United States' use of strategic bombing in World War II. Chapters cover the events leading up to World War II; the start of the war; the seers and the planners; the airplanes, bombs, bombsights, and aircrews; the planes Germany used to defend itself against American planes; the five cities (Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki) that experienced the most destruction; and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of the damage done by aerial bombing.The book also probes the government's myth-building statements that supported America's view of itself as a uniquely humanitarian nation, and analyzes the role played by interservice rivalry--"battleship admirals" against "bomber generals."

Reeling from the devastation of World War I, many Americans vowed never again to become involved in European conflicts. This stance was formalized in 1935 when Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, which was not only designed to keep America out of foreign wars but also called for the president to declare an immediate embargo of arms and munitions to all belligerent countries. As war loomed and eventually erupted in 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted several policies that aided the Allies, and American neutrality was questionable many months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.This work examines how Roosevelt navigated prewar neutrality to push the United States toward intervention on the side of the Allies in World War II, and considers critically his wartime policy of unconditional surrender and his unprecedented acceptance of a fourth term. It covers his prewar policies that sidestepped neutrality, including covert submarine warfare, air patrol of the North Atlantic, the Lend Lease Act and coordination between the American and British navies, and critiques his plans for rebuilding postwar Europe. Thirteen appendices parallel prewar planning by Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and reproduce such key documents as the Atlantic Charter and the Potsdam Declaration.