This book examines the relationship between Britain and Oman since the end of the Second World War up until the Iranian revolution. Particular focus is given to the political and economic development of the state, together with Britain’s various overt and covert interventions, principally in the three decades between 1945 and 1975. The author addresses themes which have previously been unexplored in the literature on Oman and British Imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the establishment of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, and the impact of the oil industry. The book shows that Sultan Said bin Taymur (r. 1932-1970) enjoyed considerable ‘agency’ in his relations with the British who found it very difficult to persuade him to implement economic development and establish relations with his neighbours. Britain’s relations with successive sultans were deliberately concealed, including the contribution of special forces in fighting Oman’s insurgencies.

It is widely argued that when Qaboos bin Said became Sultan in 1970, a ‘renaissance’ occurred, however many newly discovered documents have called this into question. They reveal how an inexperienced Sultan came to power with covert British support, and Whitehall’s direction of the war in Dhofar from afar. These documents highlight the extent of British intelligence cooperation and psychological warfare planning to counter the insurgents in Dhofar. However, as this book demonstrates, the Sultan also relied on non-British advisors, known as the ‘mafia’, to secure financial assistance and establish diplomatic ties across the Middle East. Finally, the book details how British defence assistance continued well beyond the retreat from empire in the Persian Gulf.

This book examines the relationship between Britain and Oman since the end of the Second World War up until the Iranian revolution. Particular focus is given to the political and economic development of the state, together with Britain’s various overt and covert interventions, principally in the three decades between 1945 and 1975. The author addresses themes which have previously been unexplored in the literature on Oman and British Imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the establishment of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, and the impact of the oil industry. The book shows that Sultan Said bin Taymur (r. 1932-1970) enjoyed considerable ‘agency’ in his relations with the British who found it very difficult to persuade him to implement economic development and establish relations with his neighbours. Britain’s relations with successive sultans were deliberately concealed, including the contribution of special forces in fighting Oman’s insurgencies.

It is widely argued that when Qaboos bin Said became Sultan in 1970, a ‘renaissance’ occurred, however many newly discovered documents have called this into question. They reveal how an inexperienced Sultan came to power with covert British support, and Whitehall’s direction of the war in Dhofar from afar. These documents highlight the extent of British intelligence cooperation and psychological warfare planning to counter the insurgents in Dhofar. However, as this book demonstrates, the Sultan also relied on non-British advisors, known as the ‘mafia’, to secure financial assistance and establish diplomatic ties across the Middle East. Finally, the book details how British defence assistance continued well beyond the retreat from empire in the Persian Gulf.