This book explains what inalienable rights are and how they restrict the behavior of their possessors. McConnell develops compelling arguments to support the inalienability of the right to life, the right of conscience, and a competent person''s right not to have medical treatment administered without consent. Yet, surprisingly, he argues that the inalienability of the right to life does not entail that voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide are wrong. This distinctive defense of inalienable rights will appeal to medical ethicists and other applied ethicists, political theorists, and philosophers of law.

McConnell presents the unusual and distinctive argument that inalienable rights differ from other types of rights in that, rather than restraining the behaviour of others, inalienable rights seem to put limits on the possessors themselves, because even the possessor's consent does not justify others in encroaching on them. He offers a full account of what it means for a right to be inalienable, distinguishing them from other kinds of rights in the contexts of moral and political issues in medicine and law: for example, the right to life, the right of conscience, and, in particular, the right of informed consent. McConnell's book is intended as a distinctive conception and persuasive defence of inalienable rights, which ties into current discussions of informed consent. It should appeal to applied ethicists and philosophers of law among others.

This book explains what inalienable rights are and how they restrict the behavior of their possessors. McConnell develops compelling arguments to support the inalienability of the right to life, the right of conscience, and a competent person''s right not to have medical treatment administered without consent. Yet, surprisingly, he argues that the inalienability of the right to life does not entail that voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide are wrong. This distinctive defense of inalienable rights will appeal to medical ethicists and other applied ethicists, political theorists, and philosophers of law.

McConnell presents the unusual and distinctive argument that inalienable rights differ from other types of rights in that, rather than restraining the behaviour of others, inalienable rights seem to put limits on the possessors themselves, because even the possessor's consent does not justify others in encroaching on them. He offers a full account of what it means for a right to be inalienable, distinguishing them from other kinds of rights in the contexts of moral and political issues in medicine and law: for example, the right to life, the right of conscience, and, in particular, the right of informed consent. McConnell's book is intended as a distinctive conception and persuasive defence of inalienable rights, which ties into current discussions of informed consent. It should appeal to applied ethicists and philosophers of law among others.