Thomas E. Hall – författare

Hall's excellent survey of business cycles is concise, lucid, and up-to-date discussing not only early theories of the business cycle and Keynesian and monetarist models, but also the rational expectationist and new Keynesian models along with actual business cycles. . . . Strengths of the book include an excellent bibliography and Hall's insightful history of business cycles from the panic of 1907 to the long cyclical expansion beginning in late 1982. ChoiceIntended as a primary text for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in business cycles and economic fluctuations, this book treats the nature and causes of business cycles. In contrast to previous works on the subject, which have tended to focus on basic macroeconomic models and intermediate level theory, Business Cycles offers both a broader scope and more in-depth coverage, concentrating on modern theories of the business cycle, data analysis, and recent and historical episodes of economic fluctuation. The author amplifies and combines the various theories that comprise the modern view of business cycles and develops a systematic rationale for economic fluctuations that integrates the key concept of economic shocks. Hall demonstrates that an economy grows over time but receives periodic shocks--such as oil price increases or monetary instability--which generate fluctuations. In addition to examining the nature of shocks that cause recessions and expansions, Hall suggests ways to forcast these cycles.Hall begins with a general overview of economic cycles and economic indicators and goes on to review the historical explanations for economic fluctuations that form the foundation for more modern theories. The contemporary theories of fluctuations--Keynesian, and real business cycles--receive extended treatment. Each theory is discussed in detail in a separate chapter that includes relevant empirical data. Hall then describes the nature and causes of several business cycles during the twentieth century, enabling the reader to see how the various alternative models of cycles explain actual phenomena over time. Finally, he examines some macroeconomic puzzles in the study of cycles and concludes with some observations about the performance of macroeconomic forecasting methods.

The Great Depression was the worst economic catastrophe in modern history. Not only did it cause massive worldwide unemployment, but it also led to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, World War II in Europe, and the tragic deaths of tens of millions of people. This book describes the sequence of policy errors committed by powerful, well-meaning people in several countries, which, in combination with the gold standard in place at the time, caused the disaster. In addition, it details attempts to reduce unemployment in the United States by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, and in Germany by Hitler's National Socialist economic policies. A comprehensive economic and historical explanation of the events pertaining to the Depression, this book begins by describing the economic setting in the major industrialized countries during the 1920s and the gold standard that linked theory economies together. It then discusses the triggering event that started the economic decline--the Federal Reserve's credit tightening in reaction to perceived overspeculation in the U.S. stock market. The policy bungling that transformed the recession into the Great Depression is detailed: Smoot Hawley, the Federal Reserve's disastrous adherence to the real bills doctrine, and Hoover's 1932 tax hike. This is followed by a detailed description of the New Deal's shortcomings in trying to end the Depression, along with a discussion of the National Socialist economic programs in Germany. Finally, the factors that ended the Depression are examined.This book will appeal to economists, historians, and those interested in business conditions who would like to know more about the causes and consequences of the Great Depression. It will be particularly useful as a supplementary text in economic history courses. Thomas E. Hall and J. David Ferguson are both Professors of Economics, Miami University.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. economy followed a boom-bust cycle that included four recessions, high inflation, two bouts of soaring energy prices and petroleum shortages, a stock market that lost half of its inflation-adjusted value, and rising interest rates that eventually peaked at levels not seen since the Civil War. This book explains how this economic mess came about. The story begins with Bill Phillips, the economist who discovered an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. This finding led U.S. policymakers to believe that they could permanently stimulate economic growth by raising inflation. Next, it describes the various price fixing schemes put in place which eventually caused serious market imbalances: the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings, the price ceilings on petroleum and natural gas, and Richard Nixon's economy-wide price controls system. Also addressed is the role played by the heads of the Federal Reserve during these years. The book's final chapters examine how the economic program instituted in 1981 by Ronald Reagan helped cause the severe 1981-1982 recession, but also laid the foundation for the major economic boom that followed.

When government imposes new taxes, rules, or regulations, it creates outcomes that often differ from the original intent. In some cases, these outcomes are so severe that they render the policy a failure. The law of unintended consequences has taken on an increasing importance during the era of ever-expanding government, and this book explores four important examples: cigarette taxes, alcohol prohibition, the minimum wage, and federal income tax. Thomas E. Hall examines how the policies came into being, what underlying political considerations influenced the process, the unintended outcomes of the policies, and why many of these policies are still in place. Because many of these unintended consequences are seriously adverse, the author argues that the moral of these four key examples is that whenever a new government policy is being considered, much more detailed review must be given to the range of potential unintended consequences-a practice that is rarely or accurately undertaken.