Thomas W. Church - Böcker

Monetary incentives are increasingly seen as attractive alternatives to strict regulatory approaches for achieving objectives. This book examines one of the most ambitious attempts to use monetary incentives in the criminal justice system: New York City's $8.25 million Speedy Disposition Program (SDP). New York City officials introduced SDP as an incentive scheme to encourage the city's six District Attorneys to accelerate the disposition of those criminal cases that most contributed to the city's chronic jail overcrowding problem. Substantial financial rewards would be given to those DAs' offices that managed to dispose of their oldest felony cases, those cases involving "long-term detainees."The implementation of SDP in New York City - and the responses of the city's district attorneys to it - provides fascinating tales that teach much about innovation in criminal justice, about new approaches to court reform and delay reduction, and more generally, about the uses of monetary incentives as policy tools. Further, the program provides a rich source for analysis of the considerations that should go into the design of incentive programs, and into the contextual factors that argue for their applicability in other areas.

The federal Superfund program for cleaning up America's inactive toxic waste sites is noteworthy not only for its enormous cost - $15.2 billion has been authorized thus far - but also for its unique design. The legislation that created Superfund provided the Environmental Protection Agency with a diverse set of policy tools. Preeminent among them is a civil liability scheme that imposes responsibility for multimillion dollar cleanups on businesses and government units linked - even tangentially - to hazardous waste sites. Armed with this potent policy implement, the agency can order the parties who are legally responsible for the toxic substances at a site to clean it up, with large fines and damages for failure to comply. EPA can also offer conciliatory measures to bring about voluntary, privately financed cleanup; or it can launch a cleanup initially paid for by Superfund and later force the responsible parties to reimburse the government.In this book, Thomas W. Church and Robert T. Nakamura provide the first in-depth study of Superfund operations at hazardous waste sites. They examine six Superfund cleanups, including three regions and both 'hard' and 'easy' sites, to ask 'what works?' Based on detailed case studies, the book describes various strategies that have been applied by government regulators and lawyers and the responses to those different strategies by businesses and local government officials.The authors characterize the implementation strategies used by the EPA as prosecution, accommodation, and public works. They point out that the choice of strategy involves setting priorities among Superfund's competing objectives. They conclude that the best implementation strategy is one that considers the context of each site and the particular priorities in each case. Looking toward the reauthorization of Superfund, they also offer recommendations for improvements in the organization of the program and discuss proposals for change in its

Despite three decades of vigorous efforts at deregulation across the government, regulation remains ubiquitous. It also continues to be unpopular because it forces individuals and businesses to do things—frequently costly and unpleasant things—that they don't want to do. If regulatory programs are to survive and remain effective, the challenge posed by their endemic unpopularity and political vulnerability must be met. Unlike much of the existing literature on regulation, Taming Regulation begins with the assumption that the government's capacity to utilize regulation as a policy tool is vital. The book examines the questions of how to make the inherently coercive aspects of regulation more politically acceptable in the present antiregulatory environment and how the legal and administrative challenges of reform in ongoing regulatory programs might best be approached. The authors explore these issues through a case study of administrative reform in the Superfund program. Chartered with an ambitious mission to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites, Superfund was from its inception a uniquely aggressive and unpopular program. Yet despite the election in 1994 of a Republican Congress committed to fundamental changes in environmental regulation, the Superfund program weathered the storm and remains intact today. The authors credit this political and programmatic success to a series of artfully designed and orchestrated internal reforms that softened Superfund's implementation, thus increasing its political support while retaining its potent coercive tools. Taming Regulation provides a cautionary discussion of both the necessity and the difficulty of regulatory reform. It is essential reading for students of regulation and environmental policy, for practitioners contemplating reform of ongoing regulatory programs, and for those interested in the checkered history of Superfund.