Tim Roughgarden – författare

In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

There are no silver bullets in algorithm design, and no single algorithmic idea is powerful and flexible enough to solve every computational problem. Nor are there silver bullets in algorithm analysis, as the most enlightening method for analyzing an algorithm often depends on the problem and the application. However, typical algorithms courses rely almost entirely on a single analysis framework, that of worst-case analysis, wherein an algorithm is assessed by its worst performance on any input of a given size. The purpose of this book is to popularize several alternatives to worst-case analysis and their most notable algorithmic applications, from clustering to linear programming to neural network training. Forty leading researchers have contributed introductions to different facets of this field, emphasizing the most important models and results, many of which can be taught in lectures to beginning graduate students in theoretical computer science and machine learning.

There are no silver bullets in algorithm design, and no single algorithmic idea is powerful and flexible enough to solve every computational problem. Nor are there silver bullets in algorithm analysis, as the most enlightening method for analyzing an algorithm often depends on the problem and the application. However, typical algorithms courses rely almost entirely on a single analysis framework, that of worst-case analysis, wherein an algorithm is assessed by its worst performance on any input of a given size. The purpose of this book is to popularize several alternatives to worst-case analysis and their most notable algorithmic applications, from clustering to linear programming to neural network training. Forty leading researchers have contributed introductions to different facets of this field, emphasizing the most important models and results, many of which can be taught in lectures to beginning graduate students in theoretical computer science and machine learning.

There are no silver bullets in algorithm design, and no single algorithmic idea is powerful and flexible enough to solve every computational problem. Nor are there silver bullets in algorithm analysis, as the most enlightening method for analyzing an algorithm often depends on the problem and the application. However, typical algorithms courses rely almost entirely on a single analysis framework, that of worst-case analysis, wherein an algorithm is assessed by its worst performance on any input of a given size. The purpose of this book is to popularize several alternatives to worst-case analysis and their most notable algorithmic applications, from clustering to linear programming to neural network training. Forty leading researchers have contributed introductions to different facets of this field, emphasizing the most important models and results, many of which can be taught in lectures to beginning graduate students in theoretical computer science and machine learning.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author''s Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author''s Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.